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TRANSCENDING BARRIERS: RACE, MOBILITY, AND TRANSPORTATION
PLANNING IN POSTWAR ATLANTA, 1944-1975

by

JOHN ELPHONSO WILLIAMS, JR.

Under the Direction of Clifford M. Kuhn, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT
In response to the economic upsurges of World War II, leaders in Atlanta
embarked on a planning mission to accommodate the increased demands of city living.
From the onset of postwar planning with the Lochner Report in 1944, to the
groundbreaking for the construction of the MARTA rapid rail lines in 1975, this project
explores the contours of race and mobility through the lenses of transportation planning.
It examines the city’s planning entities and dissects the plans produced by these
authorities, underscoring the lack of African American participation in the planning
process. As planning authorities operated in segregation, this research connects the
lack of African American participation in transportation planning with limited participation
in planning for other areas including housing and urban renewal. This project’s

framework is constructed with a two-fold function of mobility: first, in the physical sense
of movement about the expanding metropolitan landscape; secondly, and more
essential, in the social sense, showcasing a process of uplift for the African American
community in Atlanta.
This research illustrates an upward trajectory for African Americans over the
three-decade timeline. From being denied equal access and full political rights in a
segregated society, to the election of Georgia’s first black state senator of the 20th
century and Atlanta’s first black mayor, this research vocalizes the struggles of Atlanta’s
African American citizens in the fight for civil rights and full participation from the aspect
of transportation planning. Using the city’s historic black newspapers filled with primary
accounts of the period, this project tracks the discourse of the diverse African American
community from the leadership and business elite to the working-class citizens
participating in public hearings. From little to no participation in highway planning and
construction through historic African American sections in the early phases, to positions
of demand in the creation of the rapid transit system in the latter phases, this research
shows the evolution of African American participation and influence in shaping planning
processes in postwar Atlanta.

INDEX WORDS: Lochner Report, Up Ahead Plan, NOW – For Tomorrow, Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Urban Renewal, African American Participation,
Negro Housing, Segregation, Interstate Highways, Auburn Avenue, Rapid
Transit, Metropolitan Planning Commission, Black Politics
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INTRODUCTION
“Atlanta was born as a rail center and it has prospered as a hub of air and
highway traffic. Atlanta needs an efficient transportation system to grow and to prosper.
A successful and comprehensive transportation system is of paramount importance to
Atlanta’s future.”1
“To remain a viable and complete city, Atlanta must have a transportation system
that is responsive to the needs of all its citizens.”2
-Maynard Jackson

During the mid-twentieth century, Atlanta’s motto declared it “the city too busy to
hate.” A small, elite group of city leaders, planners, business leaders, and boosters
sought to present an image of Atlanta unlike other cities in the South because they
realized that the appearance of racial harmony served as a catalyst for economic
growth. Already engaged in planning and growth management as a result of the
economic upsurge and federal advances sparked by the Second World War, the city’s
power players mapped out Atlanta’s emerging infrastructure with great emphasis on
mobility and transportation planning, while holding fast to the traditions of segregation.3
Postwar transportation planning in Atlanta provides a lens to view shifts in the
balance of power in the city. As city leadership begin to more accurately reflect the
population, that is, as more African Americans were able to be elected and appointed to

1

Atlanta Daily World, August 16, 1973

2

Atlanta Daily World, September 26, 1971

3

Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005), p. 19. Charleston News and Courier, January 12, 1959. Stephen G.N. Tuck,
Beyond Atlanta: The Struggle for Racial Equality in Georgia, 1940-1980. (Athens, University of Georgia
Press, 2003), p. 102.
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positions of modest authority, the decisions reflecting transportation planning and
planning in general began to reflect movement towards biracial leadership and
cooperation.
This research will argue that at the advent of planning the emerging
transportation systems, and in the three decades to follow, the progress of
transportation planning reflected a city operating in the traditions of white supremacy
and segregation despite seeking to portray harmonious race relations. As the city of
Atlanta moved towards more aggressive measures in transportation planning during the
1950s, that forward progress in most cases failed to comprehensively address the
voices and concerns of its growing African American populace or seek fair
representation. In response, a significant portion of the early planning and many of the
decisions made mostly disregarded African American sentiments and had adverse
effects on their lives and the communities in which they resided.
This project is rooted in my profound interest in United States cities and
geography, interstate highways, and my desire to explore historic African American
communities and enclaves across the country. As an avid traveler and historical tourist,
I encountered in virtually every major American city I visited, the same phenomenon –
the historic African American core traversed by major freeways and interstate highways.
In New Orleans, Miami, Dallas, Detroit, Charlotte, Chicago, Cincinnati, Los Angeles,
and Atlanta, I witnessed highways and freeways disrupting these historic spaces. With
such stark similarities, immediately various broad questions that would eventually
become the basis of this project came to mind. How did these changes in the historic
spaces happen and from what authority? What role did African American leaders play in

3

the development? How was the destruction of African American spaces justified?
Further research of this topic revealed the greater connections to federal, state, and
local postwar policies; however, ample scholarship has not been dedicated to exploring
and excavating the position of African Americans.
This research links two major contemporary developments in the history of
Atlanta and explores their intersection. Moderation on behalf of the white power
structure during the post-WWII period created a political and business climate
conducive for the growth of black political and social mobility. This period also marked
the progress of Atlanta’s emerging transportation systems through planning as the city
continued growing far beyond its traditional borders into a larger metropolitan region.
The intersection of race and mobility with transportation planning falls within the
category of what political scientist Clarence Stone referred to as specific conditions of
social change, which present questions of on whose terms and concerns would policy
development occur. He added that in postwar Atlanta, effective policy development
hinged on balancing race and power. During this period, the white power structure and
business elite, along with elements of the black leadership made substantial efforts to
cope and shape arrangements to attend to their respective concerns. Arrangements
and changes made in the area of transportation planning and African American
participation over the three decades following World War II provide a central discussion
for this research.4
Exploring the intersection of race and mobility with transportation planning adds
to examining what Frederick Allen called the Atlanta “story.” Atlanta’s white power
4

Clarence Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas
Press, 1989) pp. 20-21
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structure, in the wake of the Brown decision, being watched closely and judged on its
handling of racial matters by critics across the nation. Allen adds, “Time and again, the
white leaders had risen to the occasion, giving paternalism a good name while giving
the city a gleaming national image.” Yet, this research explains, in the midst of Atlanta’s
economic boom of the postwar period, blacks still lacked a place at the planning tables,
transportation included. In insisting on immediate representation, blacks exercised
power through the ballot and forced changes in city governance to be more responsive
to the needs of the black electorate. By 1970, the white power structure gave way to a
biracial coalition of leaders seeking to mutually shape and fashion the rapidly expanding
metropolitan regional city. Transportation planning, with its critical importance
throughout postwar planning, represented only one area of policy in which the coalition
sought to improve.5
In Atlanta Unbound, Carlton Basmajian uses Atlanta’s racial geography during
the postwar period as a major factor in explaining the layout of the political and physical
landscape. From the placement of freeways and transit lines to the location of shopping
malls, sports arenas, and office parks, Atlanta’s physical, economic, and social
geography formed an expression of an implicitly racist growth machine, one bound to
the spatial demands of modern capitalism. This meant that projects like the placement
of the Downtown Connector through the Auburn Avenue district and construction of the
Civic Center and Atlanta Stadium superseded the displacement of the neighborhoods
(mostly black), which they altered. These projects not only provided capital and served
as revenue sources for the city and business interests, but also served as buffers
5

Frederick Allen, Atlanta Rising: The Invention of an International City, 1946-1996. (Atlanta: Longstreet
Press, 1996) pp. 160-161
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between the central business district and black neighborhoods. Basmajian further
explains that the politics of race, complicated by power and political economy, offers a
good explanation of the process of development in the city of Atlanta, and echoes
issues and conflicts documented in other cities. Yet, in my search and review of the
scholarship, the agency of African Americans in the process is limited and sparse.6

Planning Atlanta and Abroad
Atlanta faced challenges in postwar planning, as did other cities across the South
and throughout the country. In Sorting Out the New South City, Thomas Hanchett
examines Charlotte during the same timeframe, illustrating issues of city planning on a
regional and national scale. He explains how federal subsidies in housing, urban
renewal, and transportation planning helped propel the city into a modern center for
economic growth. Specifically, Hanchett details the impact of transportation planning
through highway and road development. With federal aid available to America’s cities in
the late 1940s and 1950s, he notes how local officials in Charlotte realized they could
secure the political benefits of additional jobs, enhanced economic opportunities, and an
expanding constituency. Among those most in favor of better highways were those
individuals wealthy enough to invest in land for development and growth. The ones
opposed were the unfortunates who stood to lose their homes in the wake of highway
construction. Like Atlanta, Charlotte’s business and civic elite moved quickly to take
advantage of the new federal advances. In 1944, around the same time of the drafting

6

Carlton Basmajian, Atlanta Unbound: Enabling Sprawl Through Policy and Planning. (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2013). p. 3. Ronald H. Bayor, Race & the Shaping of Twentieth Century Atlanta.
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 61.
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of the Lochner Report for Atlanta, the city of Charlotte became one of the first urban
areas in the nation to receive federal planning assistance. Federal experts, in
collaboration with state planners and local officials drafted a proposal for new
transportation plans.7
The construction of the first “superhighway” or the Crosstown Highway in
Charlotte marked the start of decades of federal road projects and transportation
initiatives that widened city thoroughfares and created new connections to the
surrounding regions. Simultaneously, these initiatives frequently created tension and
protest as African American neighborhoods - Brooklyn in particular - received the brunt
of destruction caused by road building. Given the weakness and powerlessness of
African American voters, road building frequently crossed “politically safe pathways”
with neighborhoods where elected officials and business elite stood to lose little or
nothing. Once inside these spaces, highways helped expose the squalor of areas
classified as the worst areas of the city. As a result, transportation planning in
Charlotte, as in Atlanta and other major American cities, alerted leaders of the problems
of urban decay, who then contended that federal advances could be used for
demolition, slum clearance, and urban renewal. Urban renewal efforts in Charlotte first
targeted Brooklyn, the historic African American neighborhood just east of downtown,
and already scarred by highway construction. Hanchett showcases the eerily similar
racial undertones and lack of African American participation in planning in the case of
Brooklyn in Charlotte, as in Sweet Auburn in Atlanta, Overtown in Miami, the Treme in

7

Thomas Hanchett, Sorting Out the New South City: Race, Class, and Urban Development in Charlotte,
1875-1975. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 239
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New Orleans, Bronzeville in Chicago, and many other African American neighborhoods
across the county.8
Sociologist Floyd Hunter published Community Power Structure in 1953, coining
the term power structure, and bringing it into the social science discourse. His work
specifically treated Atlanta, known as “Regional City.” In this study, Hunter explained
that power was a necessary function in society and also a necessary force in the
community. He further explained that power involved decision-making and the functions
of executing determined policies -- seeing to it that things get done which have been
deemed necessary to be done. The social rights and privileges implied in power
functions must be delegated to specific men to achieve social goals in any society. I
assert that in the case of Atlanta, those specific men operated under the auspices of
white supremacy with the social goal of maintaining the traditional boundaries of
segregation; and throughout the postwar period, that goal came into fruition through
highway and transportation planning, among other areas of planning for the city.
Hunter’s thesis became a primary lens by which scholars have examined growth and
policy development in Atlanta and the metropolitan region in the past half-century. It
sparked others to similar studies in cities across the country. Hunter revisited the topic
of community power structure with an update on Atlanta in 1980. His power structure
framework influenced others, such as Clarence Stone, whose Regime Politics carries
the story of Atlanta up through the 1980s. His study examines to what extent the rise of

8

Hanchett, p. 239-250
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black political leaders and the increase in mobility for blacks influenced the power
structure.9
In Race & the Shaping of Twentieth Century Atlanta, historian Ronald Bayor
examines urban renewal and highway development in the postwar period through the
lens of race. His research provided a starting point, which created broader questions
for my research. He asserts that although highways and roads were to be built for the
purposes of easing traffic flow around the city and subsequently furthering commercial
activity and neighborhood development, they were conceived with ulterior motives. He
adds that wherever the highway/road system could possibly serve a racial function, it
was developed with that in mind. These racial functions served to limit mobility and
confine blacks to certain areas. Many present highways and roads serve as physical
proof of the actions and decision of power players’ intent on achieving the goal of
maintaining segregation during this period. Though prolific, Bayor’s work fails to dig
deep enough into the African American story, which is critical to understanding postwar
development in Atlanta. My research builds on his foundation and fills the gaps with the
names, legacies, and successes of the African Americans leaders who planned and
organized on behalf of their communities in spite of segregation, unequal policies, and
limited political power.10
With the rapid growth of Atlanta and its metropolitan area in the postwar period,
transportation and highway matters constituted only a fraction of challenges faced in
planning and development. The widespread effects of frequent changes and expansion
9

Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers. (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1953), p. 2.
10

Bayor, p. 61.
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of planning authorities can be seen through the Metropolitan Planning Commission
(MPC), later renamed the Atlanta Regional Commission. Its planning procedures
presented me a greater opportunity to further showcase the lack of African American
participation in metropolitan development. Likewise, the rapid transit discussion,
introduced at the onset of postwar transportation planning, offered richness and depth
to the research on African American participation. Effectively, my research now
spanned three decades, from the onset of postwar transportation planning with the
Lochner Report, the highway and transportation plan authorized in 1944 by the state of
Georgia, through the creation and implementation of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority (MARTA). Research questions expanded to include those such as:
Were there African American members of the MPC? If not, why? How did the rapid
transit discussion development into the creation of MARTA? What role did African
Americans play in the development of MARTA? The expansion of this project made a
way for me to treat the agency for the African American community in the planning
process, of addressing the non-monolithic state of the black community. For so long,
African Americans were relegated to advisory roles with minuscule input in the planning
process, creating a void in the planning of not only the transportation systems, but in all
facets of life in the city.11

Mobility: The Framework and the Foundation
Mobility serves as a central theme of this project with a two-fold purpose. The
first purpose relates to its most common definition, the physical sense. In Edge City,

11

Bayor, p. 27
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Joel Garreau defines mobility as the ease with which you can get around a city. It is
explained as primarily a measure of commutability, and scholars have demonstrated
that no matter the transportation technology, most people desire to commute swiftly.12
Just as important with moving people around is the movement of goods and service
about the city. Since the beginning of the city, transportation and mobility have been key
factors in growth and development. From the successive developments of the carriage
industry, the railroad, public transportation, the automobile industry, and all forms of
transport, increased mobility has been key to the success and sustainability of large
cities. In Atlanta, as in other major American cities in the postwar period and
subsequent decades, leaders mounted aggressive highway building and mass transit
campaigns seeking to increase mobility. These ventures captured federal and local
support.13
Robert Bruegmann explains in Sprawl that central city leaders and business
interests heavily supported highways because individuals believed that highways, like
their predecessors the railroads, would reinforce the centrality of the downtown core
and make it easier for people from throughout the region to traverse it. They also
believed that mass transit created efficiency and made movement about the downtown
core easier and safer. In fact, highways and mass transit did make getting to and
movement about downtown easier, but like the railroads, they also made leaving town
simpler; ultimately creating greater issues of transportation, sprawl, and metropolitan
politics. Mobility in the physical sense provides an organized framework for the

12

Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier. (New York: Doubleday, 1991) p. 89

13

Garreau, p. 89
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overarching discussions of transportation systems and their importance in urban life,
growth, and development.14
The second purpose relates to mobility in the social sense. This category
encompasses economic, political, and other forms of mobility that alters one’s status or
social position. Kenneth T. Jackson in Crabgrass Frontier affirms that over the course of
American history, in most aspects of national life, the African American experience has
been separated from that of white ethnics through various patterns of segregation and
discrimination. He alludes that one of the most striking features of black life in the days
of segregation was the ability to transcend barriers of systematic oppression while still
pressing forward. In essence, mobility in the social sense relates to the ability of African
Americans to express their citizenship and unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Being in control of individual destiny through one’s own ability and
volition is the crux of the American dream. The repressiveness of segregation
contradicted the core values by which this nation stands. Mobility provides a useful lens
to examine the status of second-class citizenship forced upon African Americans in
Atlanta and throughout the country. This research showcases the resilience of the
African American community in withstanding and ultimately transcending the barriers of
segregation to achieve greater political rights, positions of power and influence, and
more equal access and participation in planning for Atlanta.15
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Overview
This dissertation is organized chronologically into four chapters. Chapter one and
two outlines the first decade and a half following World War II. As the population surged
and borders expanded, the need for organized planning on a greater scale surfaced. As
such, the late 1940s and 1950s witnessed the establishment of the Metropolitan
Planning Commission (MPC) and the enhancement of plans set forth by the Lochner
Report. The most striking features of the report prepared the city for increased mobility
through advanced highway and road networks. Of course, federal advances and the
emphasis on highway transportation and interstate commerce played a major role in
many of the advances. For the city of Atlanta, the Lochner Report initiated postwar
planning and outlined the foundations for modern highway and transportation plans.
With the recommendations from that outline, the newly established MPC created more
definitive proposals. Up Ahead and Now – For Tomorrow, both works of the MPC,
shared similarities and exhibited the active engagement of the city’s power structure to
foster economic growth and development while operating within the confines of a
segregated society. Yearning for input in planning, African Americans appeased city
leaders into placing them in advisory roles, giving them modest voice on issues such as
housing, education, municipal services, urban renewal, and transportation. At the same
time, African Americans soothed their own desires with the establishment of self-reliant
and mutual development organizations. These organizations carried out campaigns
urging biracial cooperation and participation in all entities of planning and development.
Nevertheless, highways were built and planning ensued, both at the greatest detriment
to the places and spaces of those with the most limited input.
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By the 1960s, the population of metropolitan Atlanta surpassed the one million
mark, confirming the population boom predicted for the postwar period. Chapter three
tracks this ongoing surge that prompted a new wave of planning and economic growth
for the city and the region. With numerous federal advances and input into the
operations and implementation of various planning initiatives, tension grew as
moderation along with the liberal measures of federal aid challenged the antiquated
systems woven into the fabric of Georgia politics. With the Democratic white primary
and the county-unit system overthrown, full participation for African Americans in the
political process gained momentum. African American residents of the city and the
state continued to fight for representation, rights, and privileges due them, and an early
victory came with the 1962 election of Leroy Johnson, Georgia’s first black state senator
of the 20th century. With the Civil Rights Movement in progress, the spotlight shone on
Atlanta, drawing attention to its handling of civil rights issues. As the tides gradually
turned towards progress and biracial cooperation, a new generation of leaders emerged
to carry Atlanta forward. With moderate leaders in place, restructured and enhanced
measures came about in the processes of metropolitan planning, gradually integrating
African Americans.
Throughout the 1960s, ongoing highway development and rapid transit
dominated the discussion of transportation planning and growth management. In
particular, rapid transit took center stage with the creation of the Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA). Originally planned as a five county transit system,
MARTA introduced even greater challenges for metropolitan planning. After failing to
gain necessary support in its first conceptualization, planners continued working on the
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transit system. They enhanced the original plans with the incorporation of suggestions
from public hearings and citizen participation. With expanded boundaries and rapid
suburban development, linking and incorporating the new developments into the
transportation system became a high priority as industry and economic development
followed the trends of suburban migration. Downtown Atlanta, like the central core of
many other cities, faced massive reconstruction as a result of the transportation
developments, urban renewal, rapid migration, and other federal advances. By the end
of the decade, the city’s physical and social structure along with the built environment
experienced dramatic alterations, setting the stage for even more change in the decade
to follow.
As the 1970s approached, Atlanta emerged as an invigorated metropolis equipped and adept, capable of maintaining and managing the facets of being a major
national urban center. With advances in biracial cooperation and leadership, rapid
transit, and economic development, the metropolis was geared for international
prominence. Chapter four opens on the eve of this decade, when the city elected its first
Jewish mayor along with an African American vice mayor. With the new leadership
came the increased appointments of African Americans and other minorities to positions
of civic authority. Also, by this time, the city reached a black majority in population, truly
changing the face of city politics. African Americans took advantage of this newfound
power, using it to gain mobility in all areas of city life.
In particular, African American support and consequently the vote in the final
MARTA referendum played a critical role in the adoption of the rapid transit program.
Blacks used their majority status to gain the upper hand, creating a list of demands
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presented to MARTA officials. The support of the referendum and entire rapid transit
program underscored MARTA’s pledge to diversity and commitment to meeting the
needs of all citizens with equality and fair practices. Moreover, Ira Jackson became the
first African American appointed to the planning commission. This appointment came
25 years after the initial creation of the Metropolitan Planning Commission. Finally, in
perhaps the greatest showcase of African American mobility in this story, Maynard
Jackson was elected as the city’s first black mayor, the first election of a black mayor in
a major southern city. As a strong supporter of transportation planning, he proclaimed
Atlanta’s need for an efficient transportation system, responsive to the needs of all
citizens. In essence, Jackson realized that Atlanta was born a center of transportation
and prospered over the years as a center of transportation; therefore, a successful and
comprehensive transportation system consistently remained a necessity of paramount
importance to Atlanta’s future.16
Major primary sources consulted in the compilation of this project included the
Lochner Report, Up Ahead plan, NOW – For Tomorrow plan, Atlanta Daily World,
Atlanta Constitution, City of Atlanta Records, Atlanta Bureau of Planning Records,
Atlanta Transit Authority Collection, Mule to MARTA Collection, Maynard Jackson
Mayoral Administrative Records and the countless MARTA publications. Various oral
histories in the Georgia Government Documentation Project in Georgia State
University’s Special Collections, the Living Atlanta Collection at the Atlanta History
Center, and the personal collections of Mr. Thomas Hills also served as invaluable tools
of research. The many additional sources including books, unpublished dissertations,
16
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maps, magazines, articles, and pamphlets, provided a great foundation and helped
weave the story together to present this comprehensive study of race, mobility, and
transportation planning in postwar Atlanta.

CHAPTER 1 – PHASE 1, 1944-1952
As World War II started to wind down in 1944, Atlanta’s political and business
leaders began to turn their attention to postwar development. The war changed
Georgia’s economy and accelerated the end of the cotton plantation system. These
factors aided in the rapid migration of workers, many of them black, to Atlanta seeking
employment. The transformation of the economy had profound consequences on race
relations and the immediate racial impact of the wartime economy not only boosted
black employment, but also political and social activism. Atlanta faced similar struggles
and challenges with rapid expansion, immigration, and race relations as other large
cities throughout the country after the war. Its development depended greatly on how
various governmental entities, organizations, people, and agendas interacted to
advance the “Gate City of the South” and maintain its place as a leading southern
metropolis. Concurrently, blacks mounted attacks on Jim Crow and sought to transform
racial customs.17
By 1944, city and state entities engaged in planning created preliminary plans for
postwar improvements and advances in the areas of civic life, education, watershed
management, mobility, and transportation planning for Atlanta. The plans included
outlines for parks, reorganization of schools, city hall additions, airport improvements, a
17
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new dam on the Chattahoochee River, a new $5,000,000 Grady Hospital, and other
lesser developments. For transportation improvements, the plans included an outline for
the “plaza plan,” a system of elevated highways over railways to carry traffic in and out
of the city. The preliminary outlines garnered attention with an estimated price tag of
approximately $100,000,000 -- with no definitive means of financing the ambitious
programs. The Atlanta Constitution noted the preliminary plans as being in “picture
stage,” and by October 1944, no detailed or working drawings had been authorized. At
that time, only projections had been drafted by groups of engineers and planners.
Though expertly planned, the plans still presented great challenges for the near future.
For the plans to be successfully implemented and attract financial support, the Atlanta
Constitution noted that they needed basic amendments in order to transfer them from
projections to reality.18
At the onset of postwar planning and in the midst of creating a comprehensive
development agenda, planners and engineers faced various challenges and constraints.
First of all, the haphazard expansion of Atlanta, as well as other cities, and the
development of other contiguous cities and suburbs posed a great problem. Solving this
problem proved to be necessary for American cities to function properly and
economically.19 Outward migration presented the next challenge and ranked among
common problems of larger American cities. Solutions to the migration problem
included annexations, consolidations, and the sheer reclamation of blighted areas and
slums to provide more open spaces within city boundaries. In most cases, Atlanta in the
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postwar period provided the perfect example of how planners sought to address both
problems of sprawl and the continued development of the central city. And no matter
what the city, modern transportation provided sufficient means and easy access to the
city centers and commercial districts, as well as the comforts of the city outside
confining city lines in open and more attractive surroundings. Because outward
migration continuously increased, transportation rose to the top of the list of planning
problems.20
With a shift towards metropolitan planning, the need for meaningful and effective
cross-jurisdictional conciliation topped the list of future challenges for the metropolitan
area. The Constitution expressed the need for metropolitan and regional cooperation,
stating: “Regional planning for land uses, for transportation, for sanitary services,
education and other governmental service is almost mandatory if the whole community
is considered as an entity instead of piecemeal.” Outward migration in particular
contributed to the movement of population beyond city lines, creating “runaway”
suburbs and small, incorporated areas, which aggravated the problems of the city.21
These problems were connected to Georgia’s county-unit system, installed in the
early 20th century to assure rural domination of the state. And as more people left the
countryside over the 20th century, the inequalities of the system became ever more
acute. The city competed with suburbs and smaller incorporated places for state
funding. Success came in only a few instances where the cities dealt directly with the
federal government on large projects such as public housing and national highway
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measures. In the end, people dispersed about the region, still maintaining close
connections with the central city. Transportation planning and more efficient methods of
communication strengthened ties between city and rural areas while simultaneously
perpetuating the growth of the surrounding region. Such connectivity gave birth to
metropolitan planning.22
Basic to the circulatory system of a healthy city is the centripetal transportation
system. A city’s transportation system helps guide economic prosperity and fosters
development throughout a region.”23 At the close of World War II, the arteries of
transport focused on downtown and funneled millions of Americans to the urban core.
Downtown served as the heart of the city, pumping vitality to all extremities of the
metropolitan region and beyond. Downtown interests heavily supported transportation
improvements because they considered it a way to rejuvenate the city. While breathing
life back into the city centers, transportation planning simultaneously contributed to
sprawl on the suburban fringes. Thus, transportation planning created discourse
beyond the central city. It now required the input of not only central city officials, but
also involvement from municipalities throughout the metropolitan region.24
Transportation planning played a central role in the postwar planning of the city
of Atlanta and the metropolitan region. It proved to be a critical link in the extended
development, economic prosperity, and future growth of the metropolis. With the
explosive growth of previous decades, along with the surge in economic activity and
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pent-up demand after WWII, Atlanta’s current transportation systems became
antiquated. Less efficient systems presented challenges in the face of continued growth,
making planning even more critical. In response to the need for expedient transportation
planning, in August 1944, Atlanta Mayor William Hartsfield elaborated, “With the war
rapidly nearing an end, this makes it highly necessary that we get something definite
immediately, or we will be caught in the postwar era with nothing definite in hand.” At
the urging of the mayor, and with the support of local governmental entities and the
business community, transportation planning in the postwar era commenced, making
Atlanta and its surrounding region the centerpiece and gateway of the American
South.25

The Plaza Plan
In a sweeping series of proposals, city-planning officials in conjunction with the
State Highway Department and the Federal Bureau of Roads introduced a plan
illustrating the remapping of main arteries and vehicular transportation facilities for
downtown Atlanta. The plan included the construction of a plaza over the railroad
tracks, which lay underneath downtown. Referred to as the “Plaza Plan,” it provided
solutions to Atlanta’s transportation issues stemming from traffic congestion. The
proposed plan won the strong support of Governor Ellis Arnall. He believed the plan to
“add beauty and at the same time, relieve the traffic problems of the city, eliminate
smoke, noise, and dirt.” Forceful in his support, Arnall added, “This project is one which
ought not to have any opposition from the railroads, or any other groups. Any efforts to
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block it would be reprehensible as also, incidentally, would be attempts to make of it a
purely commercial enterprise which would further congest the city.”26
Arnall’s advocacy for the project may have also stemmed from the fact that he
stood at the forefront of a lawsuit against the nation’s railroads. He charged them with a
conspiracy to fix transportation rates that hindered economic growth of Georgia, Atlanta,
and the rest of the South. He argued to the Supreme Court that discriminating rates
stifled, impeded, and crippled old industries, and prevented the establishment of new
ones. The rates as they stood placed the South at a disadvantage in competitive
markets. Ultimately, the Supreme Court deemed the discriminatory rates unjust and
unfair, and that rates on southern manufactured products must in the future be no
higher in the South than in the North. Arnall’s efforts led to the equalization of the freight
rates for the South by the Interstate Commerce Commission.27
For Atlanta in particular, Arnall’s freight-rate victory came well timed. Thousands
of people had flocked to the city as a result of wartime mobilization. The freight-rate
victory opened the gates for the expansion of manufacturing and industry. This rapid
surge in population and activity created traffic problems in the industrial and commercial
core of the city. The proposed Plaza Plan aimed at solving the aggravation of traffic
problems in the core and providing easy access and movement. It called for
approximately ten miles of elevated roads constructed over railways converging in the
heart of the city, along with a mile-long plaza with an estimated cost around $2,000,000.
This plaza would help to coordinate and expedite the flow of traffic in the congested
26
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downtown core within a one miles radius of Five Points, the heart of downtown. With
interest in the future of Atlanta and its transportation systems, Arnall urged that the
plans be put into blueprints within the year 1944.28

Figure 1: Plaza Plan, Atlanta Constitution, 1944
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Figure 2: Plaza Plan, Atlanta Constitution, 1944

City, county, and state officials jointly developed the Plaza Plan with proposed
solutions for Atlanta’s traffic congestion problems. Those solutions included: (1)
Construction of three elevated four-lane highways over railroad lines, to converge in the
heart of Atlanta -- each stretch of elevated highway traversing more than 10 miles with
estimated costs ranging from $50,000 to $500,000 per mile. Portions of the highways
featured double-decker construction. (2) Erection of a mile-long plaza over the gulch
from Washington to Walker Streets. (3) Construction of a combined railway terminal
located northeast of the present Union Station. (4) Conversion of the present Terminal
station site into a helicopter field to expedite air traffic. (5) Extension of the Hunter Street
viaduct from its present terminus at Spring Street across the railway yards into Hunter
Street beyond the present Terminal Station. The Plaza Plan served as a forerunner for
a master street plan for the Atlanta Metropolitan area. Planning officials believed this
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project would promote local, state and national government cooperation in funding this
venture. Because elevated highways could be toll highways and parking charges could
be levied on the plaza, Raymond W. Torras, engineering-secretary for the city planning
commission, Alderman Ed A. Gilliam, chairman of both the city council’s finance and
public works committees, and Commissioner Ellis B. Barrett, chairman of the Fulton
County Commission’s public works committee, all promoted this development as “selfliquidating” over a period of years.29
The new elevated highways were essential components of the Plaza Plan.
These highways would be comparable to the viaducts in the city, which had been
developed at the dawn of the automobile age. Motivated by the rise in automobile
ownership and the worsening of downtown traffic, city planners devised a system to
move the city above the railroad tracks through a series of viaducts. The viaducts
bridged the railroad tracks, freed the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and
increased parking for downtown.30 Unlike the viaducts, the proposed elevated highways
would be built over the rail tracks for their entire length rather than merely crossing the
tracks at an angle. A major feature of the elevated highways was that they were “limited
access roads” and would provide high-speed travel from suburban areas to or through
29
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the central section of the city. The two elevated highways considered extremely
important were the northbound and southbound. The southbound stretch would be the
longest, extending about six miles from the municipal airport to the heart of the city. It
would provide a rapid transit route from the suburbs of East Point, College Park,
Hapeville, and Fairburn, in addition to handling motor traffic from the airport.31
The city had recently purchased 400 additional acres of land to double the size of
the municipal airport. This route would improve highway travel to the growing airport
with more direct access. The northbound stretch would extend from the combined
railway terminal about two and a half miles towards the suburban city of Marietta.
Another two-mile extension was proposed into Peachtree Road if considered desirable
at a later date. The initial stretch would serve Marietta and points beyond. The final
stretch, in the eastbound direction, would radiate from the end of the plaza at
Washington Street about two miles east towards the direction of rapidly developing
DeKalb County. It would provide a genuine memorial drive to Stone Mountain. It would
also facilitate movement of traffic in areas beyond Decatur. Raymond W. Torras,
engineering-secretary of the city planning commission and one of the engineers drafting
the plan, elaborated, “All three of these arteries would secure Atlanta as the trading
center of the Southeast.”32
Although the Plaza Plan gained momentum at the local and state levels, it never
came into fruition. After being dissected and debated over the course of 1944, financing
remained the most contested item. The city planning commission decided to await the
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completion of a transportation survey of the metropolitan area by the State Highway
Department before acting upon any measures. In the interim, Ryburn Clay, director of
the state highway department, announced that he had approved nearly $5,000,000
worth of underpass and bridge planning for the metropolitan area from the Plaza Plan.
From that point, transportation surveying commenced while efforts to move forward with
other projects of the Plaza Plan were deferred. State, city and county officials realized
that by waiting, funding for the grand projects could possibly be supplemented by the
federal government. Clay noted that at the time, bills were pending in Congress, with
the support of Georgia congressional representatives. Those bills could grant federal
aid to postwar projects for municipalities and funding for many of the projects
envisioned by the city and county planning commissions. With that notion in mind, city
officials awaited the results of the survey to continue with the ambitious planning of the
postwar transportation systems.33

Creating a “Master Plan”
“This is a crisis in the history of Atlanta,” proclaimed Robert L. MacDougall on
behalf of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce in a letter sent to Atlanta Mayor William B.
Hartsfield and Chairman Charlie Brown of the Fulton County Commission in June
1945.34 “The question is,” MacDougall asked, “whether Atlanta is to grow into a city of a
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million persons and continue to be the leader in the South or decline.” He noted that
other cities were prepared to take advantage of the postwar improvements funds
already approved by the federal government. MacDougall continued, “The soldiers are
coming home and must find jobs; industry is ready and is scouting for locations for new
factories.” Atlanta had had no improvements in twenty years and when new cars
appeared on the streets, the traffic problems would be intolerable unless something was
done immediately. He concluded that all plans, both public and private, depended on
the master plan for metropolitan Atlanta then being drawn up by the State Highway
Department.35
“Is the city of Atlanta to go ahead, or remain static?” MacDougall asked. “The life
blood of a community is in its transportation and communication systems. We must see
that it is easy for the children to get to school, and that we have easy and quick
transportation for marketing and shopping. At present, our streets and highways are
few, congested and poorly arranged for the ever-increasing traffic they must bear. New
workers are questioning the advisability of buying or renting a home because of
transportation problems. Our transportation should be such that a new factory could be
started and employees could get to work easily, quickly and without fatigue. Terminal
facilities for passengers and freight must be improved and coordinated with street and
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highway systems.” This letter represented the sentiments of leaders in business and
labor in support of the creation of a committee to coordinate postwar plans, especially
those in transportation planning.36
By the summer of 1945, postwar transportation planning commenced, though not
in coordinated efforts by an official planning committee. The State Highway Committee
under the direction of Ryburn G. Clay had allotted $275,000 to three expert firms to
draw up “master plans” for metropolitan Atlanta. Those firms were H.W. Lochner &
Company, general engineers of New York; the Deleuw, Cather & Company of Chicago,
transport and public utility engineers; and Earle Andrews of New York, expert on high
speed highways. These companies had already drawn up the postwar plans for the city
of Chicago and were noted among the best in their respective areas. Clay announced
that the plans would be available in August 1945. He also noted that Congress had
already allocated $12,000,000 to the state of Georgia for postwar improvements.
Postwar transportation planning rose in priority for Atlanta, and local, state, and federal
officials placed more resources towards planning efforts and growth management. This
surge in planning activity characterized cities across the country. In his letter to Mayor
Hartsfield and Chairman Brown, MacDougall noted the advances and successes in
cities such as St. Louis, Chicago and Detroit, and Ryburn Clay echoed his sentiments.37
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The Lochner Report
In preparation for rapid growth, the State Highway Department launched the
development of a comprehensive highway and transportation plan for the Atlanta
Metropolitan area on December 14, 1944. Prepared by H.W. Lochner and Company
and Deleuw, Cather & Company, this plan became known as the Lochner Report. In an
introductory statement to the highway and transportation plan, the planning companies
exclaimed: “There is every indication that Atlanta is approaching a period of great
growth and prosperity. Improved highway and transit facilities are essential if the
community is to capitalize on its natural assets. Failure to take prompt action would not
only retard growth but add to the overall cost of the capital improvements required. We
respectfully urge vigorous action on a sound program of financing and construction to
translate the plans embodied herewith into reality.”38
The Lochner Report referenced the city of Atlanta as the capital of the
southeastern United States by virtue of its position as a transportation center.
Historically, the very existence of the city hinged on its early role as the terminus for the
various railroads that converged. The report’s overview labeled the entire city as a
terminal area, and its future prosperity depended on the successful integration of its
various transportation facilities. The proposed expressways, which would be the urban
portions of the interstate highways, formed a logical starting point for such
comprehensive planning of all future traffic and transportation improvements. The report
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included traffic analyses, expressway location and design, and estimates of the cost for
the highway plan.39
State highway engineers along with Atlanta, Fulton County and DeKalb County
administrators pooled their studies with the planning companies to write the Lochner
Report. This transportation survey dealt not only with the movement of private vehicles,
but also with public transportation services, including transit and truck movements.
Lochner and associates mapped a proposal in which they recommended the erection of
a giant union freight terminal to expedite the handling of truck freight and relieve local
congestion. The survey also included studies to provide better efficiency in rail service.
The Constitution noted that Atlanta’s face would be lifted under the programs of the
Lochner Report. The construction of modern facilities prompting the expeditious
handling of a large volume of vehicles would be applied to relieve congestion and speed
up movement. While expressways were the backbone of the new plan, existing streets
and thoroughfares would also be enhanced to provide maximum efficiency for the
completed program. Harry W. Lochner, head of the firm, explained that according to the
1945 traffic surveys, 69,000 vehicles traversed Atlanta’s roads daily, and by 1970, that
number would increase almost 100 percent. He noted that unless the city enhanced its
expressways to alleviate the current and anticipated congestion, the city could expect
no relief from the traffic ills. Furthermore, he continuously emphasized the importance
of express thoroughfares and their efficiency in solving local congestion.40
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Advances in Federal Highway Planning
While the city of Atlanta and the state of Georgia prepared for the expansion of
the highway system in the region, the Federal government also engaged in planning.
By the late 1930s, pressure for construction of transcontinental superhighways surged.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, repeatedly expressed interest in construction of a
network of toll superhighways as a way of providing more jobs for people out of work,
continuing the agenda of his New Deal programs. Congress also decided to explore the
concept. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938 directed the chief of the Bureau of Public
Roads (BPR) to study the feasibility of a six-route toll network. The results of this study
were presented in a two-part report on Toll Roads and Free Roads and were based on
the statewide highway planning surveys and analysis. On April 27, 1939, President
Roosevelt transmitted the report to Congress. He recommended that Congress consider
action on:
“A special system of direct interregional highways, with all necessary
connections through and around cities, designed to meet the requirements
of the national defense and the needs of a growing peacetime traffic of
longer range.”
Political opponents criticized the president’s actions as being yet another folly of
Roosevelt’s New Deal economics; however, highway advocates reacted favorably. With
the Second World War on the horizon, the timing of such as massive highway program
lacked feasibility. Nevertheless, the notion of such a project remained on Roosevelt’s
mind in part as a solution to postwar employment for returning soldiers in case of job
shortages.41
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In the third term of the Roosevelt Administration, discussion of a Federal
Interstate Highway System resurfaced. In 1941, Roosevelt requested to have the Public
Works Administration make a survey of highway facilities from the viewpoint of national
defense. He suggested that particular attention be given to the strength of bridges, the
width of strategic roads, adequacy of ingress and egress from urban centers, and the
servicing of existing and proposed Army, Navy, and Air bases. On April 14, 1941, the
president appointed a National Interregional Highway Committee to investigate the need
for a limited system of national highways.42
Interregional Highways, the publication released on Jan. 14, 1943, refined the
concepts introduced in Part II of Toll Roads and Free Roads report. It recommended an
interregional highway system of approximately 40,000 miles, designed to accommodate
traffic twenty years from the date of construction. This became the basis for the Federal
Highways Act of 1944. From its inception, this act created division among its
supporters. Contending apportionment formulas along with battling interests between
urban and rural delegations divided them. Also, the states sought increased authority
from the federal government. The result of these disagreements was an inability to
agree on the major changes needed in the post-war era to address accumulated
highway needs. Due to the multitude of issues, the Federal-Aid Highway Act failed in
gaining momentum needed to swiftly forge the National Interstate Highway System, but
debate, discussion and planning ensued.43
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The greatest advance of the Federal-Aid Highway Act came from Section
7 of the act, which designated authorization for a 65,000-km "National System of
Interstate Highways" to be selected by joint action of state highway departments.
Its purpose was:
“ . . . To connect by routes, as direct as practicable, the principal
metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers, to serve the national
defense, and to connect at suitable border points with routes of continental
importance in the Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico.”44
Although Section 7 authorized the interstate system, it did not include provisions to give
the interstate highways priority ranking based on national importance. Also, Section 7
did not authorize special funding or make a federal commitment to construct the
system.45
The Public Roads Administration (PRA), as the Bureau of Public Roads was now
called, moved swiftly to implement Section 7. Section 7 called on the states to submit
recommendations on which routes should be included in the interstate system. PRA
also began working with state and local officials to develop interstate plans for the larger
cities. In addition, PRA worked with the American Association of State Highway Officials
(AASHO) to develop design standards for the interstate system. Construction of the
interstate system moved slowly and many states did not wish to divert federal-aid funds
from local needs. Others complained that the standards of the interstate system were
too high. Some of the heavily populated states, finding federal-aid funding too small in
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comparison with need, decided to authorize construction of toll roads in the proposed
interstate corridors.46
This legislation brought state and federal highway engineers officially onto the
postwar urban planning stage, a stage already occupied by city planners, architects,
municipal engineers, and local officials. With approximately 5,200 miles of the interstate
highway system proposed for urban areas, the postwar urban planning stage drew
considerable attention. Much of the attention focused on the shortcomings of the
legislation. One issue in particular lay in the fact that it did not require state engineers to
clear their plans with city and local officials. This measure appeared in the legislation
despite the precedent of city and local approval in previous federal regulations. Next,
route designations were to be by “joint agreement” of state highway departments and
the Bureau of Public Roads, diminishing the role of city and local officials. Moreover, the
legislation did not require a comprehensive transportation planning process for
metropolitan area, causing city and county planners to fear that they would be at the
mercy of having to accept highway plans that did not meet the needs of local conditions.
Nonetheless, despite shortcomings, the Federal Highway Act of 1944 placed the federal
government and the state highway departments in leading positions to shape highway
and transportation planning in postwar America.47
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Atlanta Responds to the Lochner Report
The highway and traffic study used in preparing the Lochner Report consisted
principally of research conducted by the State Highway Department in cooperation with
the city of Atlanta, Fulton County, and the Public Roads Administration. The creation of
the report also gained momentum from the PRA’s proposal to construct a network of
interstate highways. Atlanta's importance in the interstate highway system seemed
apparent, as five of the proposed highways would enter the city. Even at the time of the
research, the Georgia State Highway Department proposed a sixth route to Augusta.
Described as a prototype for regional transportation planning, the Lochner Report
presented a rough blueprint to guide the routes and planning of the impending Interstate
Highway System.48
Not only did the Lochner Report present a comprehensive highway plan, but it
also covered external traffic crossing the metropolitan area and predicted the
movements of rural and inter-city traffic in the postwar period. The report suggested
“Downtown connectors” to tie main routes together outside the central business district,
along with the widening of downtown streets. Furthermore, it provided
recommendations for downtown parking and the creation of a smoothly flowing artery
system by eliminating jogs and separating grades. The traffic patterns of future
generations of Atlantans took shape with the provisions of the Lochner Report.49
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Figure 3: Proposed Highway Routes, Lochner Report, 1946
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Figure 4: Highways Sketch, Lochner Report, 1946
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Figure 5: Proposed Downtown Connector and Parking Lots,
Lochner Report, 1946
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Figure 6: Traffic Analysis of Vehicles Per Day, Lochner Report, 1946
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In a speech in support of the Lochner Plan to the Rotary Club in October 1945,
Atlanta Mayor William Hartsfield stated, “If we expect Atlanta to grow, we must open up
the traffic congestion. There is no cheap solution – it will cost big money and we must
be willing to pay the taxes to put through the Lochner Expressway Plan, or one like it.”
He noted that although he had not gone over the plan in detail or heard an engineer’s
verdict, it “generally looked good.” He further laid out the financial parameters of the
plan, placing the expenditures at $47,000,000. In this speech, he pointed out that the
improvements in the Lochner Plan were necessary for progress and dependent on the
citizens’ willingness to spend money and pay taxes. He called for a modernized and
streamlined city government through which these improvements would be administered.
Furthermore, he likened the city of Atlanta to a “big, gangling adolescent boy who
doesn’t know exactly what to do with himself.” In continuing the analogy, he concluded,
“it (Atlanta) is reaching adulthood, going into the big city phase and the next four years
will be decisive.”50
After hearing the details of the Lochner Plan, many leading Atlantans praised the
report and the plans to relieve the city’s traffic woes. Robert McDougall of the Chamber
of Commerce stated, “It appears to be a splendid study of Atlanta’s needs.” He further
stated, “Congress is going to appropriate large sums to match those available to local
governments and we must get ready to take full advantage of any and all opportunities
which present themselves.” William E. Mitchell, president of the Georgia Power
Company, praised Lochner for the work completed in the comprehensive study and
asserted that the plan was the best thing that had been brought to the city of Atlanta in
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many years. Frank H. Neely, executive vice president and secretary of Rich’s, Inc., and
former chairman of the Fulton County Planning Commission, concluded the plans
outlined in the Lochner Report were conclusive and near to those which his organization
had envisioned, and that the completed job was “outstanding and constructive.” Neely
further elaborated that it was apparent that the Federal Roads Administration had
selected the city of Atlanta as the focal point of a vast interregional highway system of
40,000 miles. This emerging highway system would link every important center of the
country. “It is up to the community to take full advantage of our position,” he said, “and
to prepare for the city of one million which we are destined to become if we do accept
our opportunities.” C.H. Jagels, president of the Davison-Paxon Company, referred to
the plans as being splendid. He concluded that the entire program should be adopted
and constructed by all means necessary to be realized.51
In August 1946, voters in Atlanta and Fulton County jointly approved a bond
issue totaling $40.4 million with significant portions to implement recommendations from
the Lochner Report. The report preceded the actual funding of the Federal Interstate
System by ten years, thus financing alternatives through bond referenda provided the
most logical source. This foresight in planning and the efforts put forth by city leaders
and supporters alike placed Atlanta in a very favorable position to receive federal
highway funds when they became available as a result of federal legislation. The
recommendations of the Lochner Report joined the list of capital improvements in the
metropolitan infrastructure. The city of Atlanta received $20.4 million, of which $7.1
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million would be allocated for transportation improvements. Fulton County’s figure
totaled $20 million, with $13 million allocated for transportation improvements.52
The bond issue, carrying the recommendations of the Lochner Report, featured
many additional capital improvements that garnered support and contributed greatly to
the favorable vote. Though transportation improvements ranked high on the agenda,
school improvements impressed black voters the most. Black voters rallied around
school improvements as the most specific benefit for their community. At a community
meeting held in support of the bond issue, John Wesley Dobbs, president of the Atlanta
Civic and Business League53, explained:
This is the first time in 20 years that Negroes can support with all of
their moral strength a bond election in which they will get a fair and just
share. Now, we will have no more double sessions. Now, we will reduce
the teaching load of Negro teachers to 35 pupils a classroom. And now,
for the first time, Negro schools will have auditoriums and cafeterias.
These improvements merit the support of all Atlanta voters and I hope not
a single Negro voter will stay away from the polls.54
Clark McDonald, president of the Central Atlanta Improvement Association55,
joined Dobbs in urging all qualified voters to support the bond issue. In rallies across the
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city, officials declared the bond a stepping-stone in Atlanta’s progress. Even Harry W.
Lochner, head of the firm of consultants responsible for designing the Lochner Report,
lobbied citizens for support of the bond issue, which passed by a 5 to 1 margin. Mayor
Hartsfield, Robert MacDougall, chairman of the Citizens Bond Commission; and Harry
Sommers, president of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, all hailed the successful
passage of the bond issue as a mandate from the voters to keep metropolitan Atlanta
the business, commercial, and educational center of the Southeast.56

Establishment of the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC)
The Lochner Report represented a seminal moment in the planning history of
Atlanta. Though not the first attempt at postwar planning, it set a precedent for all
master planning thereafter. The report provided a concise vision for the postwar period;
building on iterations of plans that took shape before and on the eve the war’s ending.
The Lochner Report, along with the Reed Report, encouraged regional planning and
played a role in the establishment of Atlanta’s permanent metropolitan planning
agency.57
Metropolitan planning had entered the planning discourse in Atlanta shortly
before World War II. In 1937, Fulton County, the city of Atlanta, and the Chamber of
Commerce contracted noted municipal consultant Dr. Thomas H. Reed to conduct a
complete survey of both county and city governments. By early 1938, he produced an
official report, known as the Reed Report, which dealt with every department and
56
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function of both jurisdictions. The report provided detailed recommendations for the
simplification and centralization of both governments. Dr. Reed’s recommendations
included collaboration between Atlanta and Fulton County regarding the delivery of city
services to unincorporated areas, the need for annexation, and the consolidation of city
and county police forces, health services, parks departments, hospital, fire, and library
services. Perhaps the highlight of his recommendations was the need for the
establishment of a metropolitan Atlanta planning commission. Dr. Reed’s
recommendations received both approval and silence, along with criticism from city and
county officials on the grounds of widespread changes. Ultimately, the bleak economic
outlook at the issuing of the report rendered it impractical and economically unfeasible,
causing it to be tabled for additional critical review.58
The momentum of the wartime economy sparked a spirit of revitalization for
Atlanta’s business and planning communities. Against this backdrop, many of the
recommendations of the Reed Report were adopted in some fashion, affecting both city
and Fulton County entities. The 1941 creation of the Central Atlanta Improvement
Association (later renamed Central Atlanta Progress or CAP), an organization of the
downtown business elite, signaled that “big money” in Atlanta had collective interests in
future planning and development. As it became increasingly clear that downtown
Atlanta was not assured of remaining the economic hub of an expanding metropolis and
region, the business elite used their influence to sway patterns of development in the
direction of downtown. Sprawl changed the character of downtown to reflect the growing
presence of large businesses and big money interests. CAP, in conjunction with major
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players in entities such as the Chamber of Commerce, launched long-range planning
initiatives and engaged in sustained actions in support of a comprehensive
redevelopment agenda.59
In 1947, members of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce rallied fellow members
to urge the enactment of state legislation authorizing the creation of a metropolitan
planning commission, yet another recommendation from the Reed Report. This
jurisdiction for commission included all of Fulton and DeKalb Counties. The enactment
of this legislation represented an investment in the future of planning not only for the
city, but the growing metropolitan area. The entity birthed from this organizing became
known as the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC). The commission was financed
by annual voluntary appropriations from the City of Atlanta, Fulton County and DeKalb
County. The new commission had the distinction of being the first official metropolitan
planning organization in the country supported from the beginning entirely by public
funds.60
The job of the MPC as defined by law was to make and, from time to time as it
deemed proper, amend a master plan of orderly growth and development for
Metropolitan Atlanta, including Fulton and DeKalb Counties. The commission was
given “advisory powers” and its Master Plan would be published as general information
at public discretion. The commission consisted of a staff of fourteen members, of which
ten were regular members serving three-year terms. The mayor of Atlanta appointed
four of the regular members (two from the DeKalb section of the city and two from the
59
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Fulton section). Three were named from Fulton Country by the Board of County
Commissioners of Roads and Revenue and the other three are chosen from DeKalb
County by its Commissioner of Roads and Revenues. The ex-officio members were the
mayors of Atlanta (William B. Hartsfield) and Decatur (A. Mell Turner), the chairman of
the Fulton County commissioner (J. Gloer Hailey) and the DeKalb County commissioner
(Scott Candler). The commission appointed Phillip G. Hammer as director for an
indefinite term. The newly created MPC began its first full-time staff activities in 1949. At
the start of the 1950s, MPC and its staff initiated a process of inventory, analysis and
plan formulation, culminating with its first regional master plan.61
The Metropolitan Planning Commission worked closely with local governments
and provided financing to assist in matters of overall planning. MPC’s tasks included
developing metropolitan plans, keeping those plans up to date and accurate, and
working with the various agencies and departments of the local governments in putting
the plans into action. MPC did not intend to diminish the work of the planning and
zoning bodies of local governments. It aspired to supplement their work by bringing to
their problems solutions from a metropolitan standpoint. The commission’s
recommendations drew considerable apprehension from local agencies concerned with
the regulation of private activities, those controlled and regulated through zoning. Their
concerns extended to the recommendations affecting local public works, utility and
facility programs. In these cases, the commission instructed the agencies to coordinate
the planning of public expenditures in their respective governments. The Metropolitan
Planning Commission promoted itself as a bearer of efficiency and concluded that no
61
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reasons existed as to why the advisory role of the MPC and the zoning and internal
coordination roles of local planning agencies could not “mesh easily and smoothly.”
Ensuring continuous regional planning resonated as perhaps the strongest reason for
creating a metropolitan planning body rather than having a “master plan” prepared by
an outside consultant. Having a metropolitan planning body promoted efficiency and
aligned with current trends in planning.62

Expanded Black Political Influence
John Wesley Dobbs suggested that the 1946 bond issue containing
improvements featured in the Lochner Report offered the first chance in the postwar
period for blacks to support an election in full strength and receive fairness and equality.
The fervor of that election linked to the dismantling of a storied history of
disfranchisement for blacks in Atlanta and throughout the South. Over the course of the
first half of the twentieth century, white supremacists triumphed in efforts to keep blacks
in subordinate roles and without political influence. Their platform of black
disfranchisement spanned all backgrounds of whites. It appealed to the less educated,
working class, marginal middle class, and the educated and well off. Disfranchisement
guided the white supremacists’ attitudes towards black politics and created a milieu of
racial hostility. That environment paved the way for the Disfranchisement Act of 1907,
Georgia’s county unit system, and the Democratic white primary, all of which kept voter
participation and the black political involvement at an abysmal level.63
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Nevertheless, disfranchisement did not eliminate the black vote altogether. A
small black electorate existed, leading intensely political lives in the pre-WWII period.
The tools of disfranchisement limited black participation in politics, particularly the
Democratic primary - a primary election in which only whites were permitted to
participate. It narrowed black participation to only special elections such as bond
referenda. Blacks used that small influence to bargain for improvements in the areas of
education and other facilities. A successful bond referendum required a two-thirds vote
of those registered to vote. By merely increasing registration before a referendum,
blacks could exert clout to influence the outcome. This made the black electorate a
sitting force, ready to participate in the political process without restrictions.64
In the ongoing struggle against the Democratic white primary, black leaders
stood firm on the belief in equality through the ballot. They realized the immense social
and civic responsibilities attached to voting. In the pre-WWII period, black leaders and
even whites were vocal in opposition to the white primary. An editorial in the
Constitution entitled “The Ballots of Democracy,” called the ballot the root of democracy.
It declared anything taking away the right of the citizen to vote as a weapon aimed at
the very foundation of the democratic system of government. It argued that when any
citizen, properly qualified as a voter, is deprived of the full balloting right, those
individuals depriving are striking at the very core of democracy. Though not written
specifically for support of black voting rights, John Wesley Dobbs, grand master of
Georgia Masons and president of the Atlanta Civic and Political League, agreed and
E. Bernard West. Living Atlanta: An Oral History of the City, 1914-1948. (Athens: University of Georgia
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called the editorial “one of the strongest arguments for the ballot” he had ever read. He
believed that this editorial summed up in dynamic language a dream of American
democracy.65
Black elites hoped that participation in the electoral system would end a system
of white patronage and open the door to a political coalition with moderate white elite
voters and elected officials. Blacks’ electoral votes would translate into political
influence, as white candidates would no longer be able to disregard black interests.
Whites would consider African-American interests when local government enacted laws,
issued civil service jobs, allocated municipal facilities and services, and formulated
policy. In this case, policy pertaining to the mobility and transportation issues of blacks
could reflect their interests and sentiments. A.T. Walden, lawyer and co-organizer of
the Negro Voters League with Dobbs,66 believed the ballot would be a “powerful force,”
and would help to usher in democracy that would work for African Americans.67 The
Atlanta Daily World, Atlanta’s leading black newspaper, emphasized messages in
stories and editorials, such as: “Voting is the key which ends police brutality,” and
“Voting is the way to better living standards, to greater justice in the courts, and it is the
fountain-head to equality of economic and political opportunity.” Even with election
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awareness in the black community, registration continued to fall short due to the
realities of the black voting power stifled by disfranchisement.68
Clarence Bacote, Atlanta University professor and director of the citizenship
schools at Atlanta University designed to educate black votes and increase registration,
explained that there were many challenges in convincing blacks to register and vote
because of the obstacles encountered.69 He added that even if they registered, blacks
did not have a voice in selecting the people to be voted on. In spite of the challenges
affecting the black electorate, the black leadership, represented through organizations
like the Atlanta Civil and Political League, persevered because no one knew when
change might come through the Supreme Court and the federal level.70 World War II
contributed to that change and inspired activists seeking solutions to black civil rights
issues. The war raised the idea of the contradictions inherent in fighting a war against
Nazism while maintaining racism in the United States. The struggle for black voting
power continued, setting the stage for a tumultuous political environment at the start of
the postwar era.71
The force of the black electorate gained strength with the dismantling of the
Democratic white primary. In 1944, the Democratic Party’s white primary was declared
68

Atlanta Daily World, January 2, 1944. Bayor, p. 20

69

Black citizenship classes began in 1932 and were held at Atlanta University in order to increase black
registration. Citizen Schools were later created using the framework of an idea by Lugenia Burns Hope
(community activist and wife of John Hope, Morehouse College and Atlanta University President) and
were under the direction of Clarence Bacote, an Atlanta University history professor. These programs
offered six-week courses about registration, voting, government powers and politics to the black
community. The classes were eventually held in the black churches and help spark mass voter
registration drives and a demand for voting rights, Bayor p. 19.
70

Interview with Clarence Bacote, Living Atlanta Collection, Atlanta History Center. Bayor, p. 20

71

Bayor, p. 20

51

unconstitutional through Smith v. Allwright, a federal court case in Texas. Because the
Democratic Party had controlled politics in the South since the late 19th century, most
southern elections were decided by the outcome of the Democratic Party primary.
Outlawing the primary had a significant impact across the South. 72 Historian Darlene
Clark Hine traced the two-decade long legal battle in Texas from the mid-1920s to the
mid-1940s. She suggested that the key to victory in civil rights cases across the South
linked directly to the efforts of black communities to mobilize their internal resources
against white supremacy and systematic disfranchisement. The resources of a
substantially reinvigorated NAACP also contributed to these efforts. She further
explained how the “constant reminder of their political impotence,” motivated blacks into
developing community-based political coalitions through which they persevered towards
gaining full entry in the political process. The federal court’s decision in Texas set
precedent, sparking debates and challenges in states across the South.73
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Challenging Georgia’s White Primary
While the Texas decision faced resistance in Georgia, organizations like the
NAACP mobilized in preparation for similar results. The NAACP played a major role in
the Texas victory, and Attorney A.T. Walden, working with national NAACP lawyer
Thurgood Marshall, prepared to mount a similar challenge to Georgia’s white primary.
Atlanta’s Mayor Hartsfield also recognized the implications of the Texas decision for
Georgia. In a 1944 discussion with Herbert Jenkins, future Atlanta police chief, on the
Texas decision, Hartsfield stated: “What the courts have done is give the black man in
Atlanta the ballot. And for your information, the ballot is a front ticket for any-damnwheres he wants to sit, if he knows how to use it. And Atlanta Blacks know how to use
it.”74
Though Atlanta’s black community leadership assumed they would be at the
forefront of the state’s white primary challenge, black leaders in Columbus believed
otherwise. In open defiance of the Atlanta delegation and Thurgood Marshall, Dr.
Thomas Brewer of Columbus both organized and financed Georgia’s challenge to the
white primary. Dr. Brewer maintained a preeminent medical practice, reputedly making
him the wealthiest black professional in Columbus. In the 1930s, he became
increasingly irritated by the restrictions placed upon blacks in the South by Jim Crow.
This provided the motivation for his gathering black professionals into a group directly
opposed to white supremacy and organizing a local NAACP chapter. Following the
decision in Texas, Dr. Brewer encouraged local Columbus minister Rev. Primus King to
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lead a small delegation to try and vote in the 1944 primary. That attempt became the
basis for the challenge to Georgia’s white primary.75
With the end of the Georgia’s white primary in sight, a shift towards a new
direction in Atlanta politics began. Robert Thompson of the Atlanta Urban League said
that leaders in the black community took great concern for the lack of black participation
in political affairs and launched a series of registration drives. The successful
registration drives more than doubled the number of registered black voters in the city
from numbers a few months preceding the special election. This dramatic increase
played a major role in the special election of February 1946, and foreshadowed future
elections with black voters. On the eve of the overthrow of the white primary, the special
election in February 1946 of Helen Douglas Mankin to Congress proved that Atlanta’s
black community knew how to strategically use their electoral force. Elected primarily
because of black support, Mankin’s victory foreshadowed the future of elections in the
city. Dubbed “the belle of Ashby Street” by Georgia governor Eugene Talmadge,
Mankin won by a narrow margin forged by the black turnout at the Ashby Street
precinct, thus becoming the first woman elected to Congress from Georgia. As a special
election, blacks voted without restrictions. Voter registration in the black community had
increased dramatically in response to the Primus King case in deliberation and hope for
the removal of the white primary.76
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In April 1946, U.S. Supreme Court let a lower ruling stand, ending Georgia’s
white primary. This action created a surge in black political activism although some
voting restrictions still remained. The impact of black voting up until this point carried
little force, so the removal of the white primary expanded the role of blacks in city
politics. The Democratic white primary had effectively barred blacks from voting where it
counted in an overwhelmingly one-party state like Georgia. Under the reign of the white
primary, the majority of the limited black political activities occurred through the limited
resources of the Republican Party. Black businessman and civic leader John Calhoun
stated: “And the Republican Party, because of slavery and Emancipation and
Reconstruction and all like that, didn’t have influence in places like Georgia.
Republicans had no influence over local governments. You’d never see a Republican
mayor or a councilman, or nothing.” The dismantling of the white primary supported the
growing black Democratic leadership and provided for a stronger presence in Atlanta
and throughout the state.77

Transportation Woes & Black Representation in Planning
In the immediate postwar period, social and political change like the ending of the
Democratic white primary developed against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding city.
Atlanta’s population had grown well past the three hundred thousand mark, and the
swift advent of the automobile challenged the city’s layout. A major issue on the horizon
was that of the changing role of downtown in an increasingly spread out metropolitan
area. Suburban sprawl took shape, traffic congestion was enormous, and downtown
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was divided by railroad tracks, adding to the multitude of traffic problems. The
automobile altered urban life, and movement away from downtown affected the civic
activities. The more pressing issues, those centered on mobility and transportation
planning, required immediate action. The automobile brought powerful technological,
economic, and social change that city policymakers would be challenged to cope with.
The emphasis on the automobile and transportation-related innovations in city life also
ushered in greater issues pertaining to metropolitan growth and the expansion of the
city’s infrastructure and facilities to accommodate. The social and political change,
along with the mobility and transportation issues, creates a framework to discuss
Atlanta’s progress in planning during the postwar period.78
In the earliest period of master planning for growth and development in Atlanta
and the metropolitan region, African American representation on planning boards was
unknown. Shortly after the Metropolitan Planning Commission began functioning, black
leaders requested of Mayor Hartsfield that black members be appointed to the various
boards that had the responsibility for carrying out the city’s colossal slum clearance and
redevelopment programs. Those persons requesting appointments represented various
fields of interest in their appointments. The delegation comprised of: builders T.M.
Alexander, committee chairman, Walter H. Aiken, president of Aiken, Inc., and Elmer
Lewis; political leaders A.T. Walden and J.W. Dobbs; Dr. Benjamin E. Mays, president
of Morehouse College; ministers W.W. Weatherspool, M.L. King, and Bishop J.W.E.
Bowen; civic organizations representatives R.A. Thompson and John H. Calhoun; real
estate representatives Q.V. Williamson, J.L. Wolfe, and Albert L. Thompson, racial
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advisor of the Federal Housing Administration; labor representative Charles Atkinson;
C.A. Scott, editor of the Atlanta Daily World; and Business League representatives C.W.
Greenlea, W.R. Cochrane and E.M. Martin, Vice President-Secretary of the Atlanta Life
Insurance Company.79
Black representation would combat and help prevent many of issues present in
city planning and redevelopment due to the lack of representation. Case in point, the
Lochner Report presented challenges for black Atlanta in areas including housing.
Planners had included various maps that proposed limited access highways being
placed in the direct paths of African American centers of population across the city. In
reference to the areas where proposed highways were to be constructed, the report
stated: “The neighborhoods of Atlanta through which it would be feasible to purchase
suitable rights-of-way, being the most depreciated and least attractive, are most in need
of this rejuvenation.” Included were captions reading: “Views of Sub-Standard Areas
Which Would be razed by the Expressways” -- with photos of period-styled houses in
communities with unpaved streets. Photos even depicted black residents in the streets
and about the community. Black representation could counter the blind insensitivity in
planning and provide the voice of the people occupying the places deemed the least
attractive by white planners and officials.80
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Figure 7: Views of Sub-Standard Areas, Lochner Report, 1946
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Members of the delegation and those to serve on the advisory committee to the
various planning commissions and the Atlanta Housing Authority were also all members
of the Atlanta Business League’s Committee on Housing. The Atlanta Business
League, an affiliate of the National Negro Business League,81 operated with the mission
of enhancing and expanding the business community at large while encouraging civic
pride and reinvesting community money within the community. Its housing committee
was established following a panel discussion in early 1950 hosted by the League on
slum clearance and housing to consider all matters pertaining to blacks in the Atlanta
area. Officials of the Federal Housing Administration, the Metropolitan Planning
Commission, and the city administration all participated in the panel discussion. The
goal of the committee was to protect the interests of black residents and businessmen
in the areas slated for slum clearance and to secure an adequate portion of government
funds for private homes and public housing. The delegation asked specifically that black
members be appointed to the Metropolitan Planning Commission, the City Planning
Commission, the Atlanta Housing Authority, the city building inspector’s office, and the
public works department. T.M. Alexander, chairman of the delegation, outlined the
group’s sentiments in a statement to the mayor. It explained the request for
representation, while also praising the progress of the administration. It also pointed out
81
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specifically how the decisions being made in planning, such as the housing and slum
clearance program, would directly and indirectly affect every human being within the city
of Atlanta.82
Blacks in Atlanta realized the crucial role that diversity and fair representation
could play in city and metropolitan decision-making. Already scarred by a history of
broken promises and discriminatory actions, especially the drastic measures already
presented by various commissions in the areas of housing and slum clearance, the
black community was leery about leaving the decision-making powers to panels of
people that did not represent them. In the statement to the World, Alexander and those
who had some political leverage expressed confidence in the fairness of the members
of the planning commissions and in the Housing Authority. They warned though that,
“however diligently they may work and however noble may be their objectives, it is
highly improbable and presumptuous to assume that they can interpret all the needs,
aspirations, desires, and what is for the best welfare of one-third of Atlanta’s population,
if there is no representation of this group on any of the planning committees.” Upon
receipt of the statement, Mayor Hartsfield assured the delegation of his desire to
cooperate and to do all in his power to see that their wishes were considered in city
planning.83
Raising the issues of black representation and getting the mayor’s attention was
only a miniscule victory for the delegation. Numerous challenges continued to impede
black representation on the various planning commissions. Although the mayor had
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given his assurance, he also explained that the issue was out of his jurisdiction and
beyond his immediate powers. He added that the Planning Commissions and Housing
Authority were limited by state law as to the number of members, and only through a
vacancy created by one of the present members leaving or through amending of the law
by the state legislature would he be able to appoint black members. He concluded that
in the case of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, Fulton County and DeKalb
County authorities had to share in the appointment of members. As a solution, the
mayor suggested the delegation accept the role of “advisory committee” as a temporary
expedient. In this role, the advisory committee would consult the various planning
commissions and the Atlanta Housing Authority in all matters pertaining to the city’s
black residents. To further appease the black leaders’ requests, Mayor Hartsfield
impressed upon the delegation that they should keep in mind that efforts would be
made to get real representation on the actual bodies [planning commissions] as soon as
possible.84
A.T. Walden and J.W. Dobbs both urged Hartsfield to take direct action in the
appointment of blacks to the various planning entities. Walden told the mayor that there
was ample precedent for the appointment of blacks to such planning bodies in the
South. He listed Durham, Winston-Salem, Nashville, Portsmouth, Richmond, and
Newport News as cities with blacks on the local housing authorities. Dobbs explained
to the mayor that the committee’s main reason for calling on him at that point was to
prevent any complications in the future after the programs was actually in motion. He
warned that with the federal government’s investment in housing and slum clearance,
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the local program could run into “trouble” if the interests of the black citizens were not
considered.85

Continued Struggle for Representation
Two years after the initial establishment of the advisory committee by Mayor
Hartsfield, the leaders of the delegation remained at a lesser, unofficial status. With no
black appointments to any of the planning commissions or the Atlanta Housing
Authority, the delegation continued to rally for representation on each board. At this
critical juncture, greater problems had arisen for the black leaders with the creation of
the Metropolitan Planning Committee’s report, “Up Ahead, A Regional Land Use Plan
for Metropolitan Atlanta.” In an April 1952 radio forum discussing the parameters of
MPC’s report, commission director Phillip Hammer accused the mayor’s black advisory
committee chairman T.M. Alexander and other civic groups of duplicity. He stated that
the same groups had already approved six expansion areas for blacks in 1947, and
three of those areas were included in the Commission’s report. Following that
statement, officials of the Atlanta Business League questioned the motives of the
Metropolitan Planning Commission’s efforts to divert criticism along with the continued
lack of black representation. The Planning Commission insisted that it had consulted
black leaders and the expansion areas for blacks were representative of those selected
by the black civic groups.86
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In response to the claims made by MPC, officials of the Atlanta Business League
called attention to a May 1951 report of the Commission, which cited the Atlanta Urban
League as the organization that had advised its staff on the subject of expansion areas
for blacks. The Business League also claimed that apparently the Urban League and
the Commission were using a report issued by the defunct Atlanta Housing Council in
1947. Several civic organizations in the Business League and the Urban League
endorsed the Atlanta Housing Council in 1946 and 1947. The organization led efforts to
find new areas where housing could be secured for the influx of blacks resulting from
the demobilization of the armed forces. These efforts also sought to relieve crowding
and tension on the fringes of existing areas. The topics of redistribution and relocation
did not even come up for discussion. The report entitled “Proposed Expansion Areas
for Negroes” identified six potential areas in which to expand housing for blacks. On the
city’s near south and west sides, the Council located land appropriate for the building of
multifamily complexes and single-family-home subdivisions adjacent to existing black
neighborhoods or distant from white residential areas.87
According to officials of the Atlanta Business League, the defunct Atlanta
Housing Council was organized to meet an emergency in October of 1946. The
Council’s status was similar to that of the “advisory committee” created in 1950
supposedly for an interim period. The purpose of the Housing Council was to assist the
Mayor’s Emergency Committee in securing expansion areas for blacks in order to
relieve housing tension. At that time, the discussions of slum clearance or the reference
to relocating blacks out of their current business and housing areas did not appear in
87
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the discussion. Robert Thompson, Atlanta Urban League housing secretary and
member of the Housing Council, circulated the report among black leadership, white
social, business, and political leaders, and a host of bureaucracies that governed land
use. The list of organizations included the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, the
Buckhead Trade Association, neighborhood associations, and area colleges and
universities. With no legal binding, the plan purposely sought comment and “approval”
to assist in easing land purchases and zoning approvals for new black housing
development.88
Both the Atlanta Housing Council and the Mayor’s Emergency Committee
functioned in 1946 and 1947, before the establishment of the Metropolitan Planning
Commission. National-level actions and concessions to black demands for proactive
development of black housing had little initial impact in Atlanta, causing ongoing
struggles for black housing developers and prompting white resistance. Similar
committees all over the country worked on housing problems in the various localities
made acute by the rapid demobilization, formation of new families, and other population
increases. The Georgia General Assembly established the Metropolitan Planning
Commission in 1947 for the purposes of easing such planning issues dealing with
housing. This organization’s goals included making and amending master plans for the
orderly growth and development in the Atlanta Metropolitan District. Master plans would
maintain orderly growth in the wake of the rapid and explosive growth and movement in
the postwar period. Other federal advances during this period also expedited the need
for such organization and stability in planning. With the passage of the Federal Housing
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Act of 1949 and the provision of financial tools for slum clearance and urban
redevelopment in America, committees interested in securing benefits hastily revised
their planning strategies to conform to the new legislation. Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court outlawed racial restrictive covenants in a historic decision that
prompted blacks all over the country to take new positions on matters related to housing
and planning. Black groups in Atlanta interested in housing and planning gained
motivation and momentum. They began thinking in terms of better locations and the
establishment of representative patterns of living; thus planning of the previous year,
such as that initiated by the Atlanta Housing Council and the Mayor’s Emergency
Committee became somewhat obsolete.89
The Atlanta Housing Council had gone out of existence prior to preparation of the
plan by the Metropolitan Planning Commission, as well as to the issuance of the
Supreme Court decision outlawing racial restrictive covenants. Leaders of the Atlanta
Business League took offense to the fact that the Planning Commission attempted to
use outdated and obsolete information and approaches to current problems for a longrange program. They considered it extremely unfair to the civic-minded individuals of
the previous council given the fact that so many advances had taken shape. Meanwhile,
the obsolete approach of the black leaders remained in use as the current standard.
For that matter, the Atlanta Business League continued to stress the importance of
black representation on the various planning commissions and within the Atlanta
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Housing Authority. By April 1952, black representation in planning remained nonexistent.90
According to Mayor Hartsfield’s appointment of the advisory committee with
quasi-official status, it was the responsibility of the Metropolitan Planning Commission,
City Planning Commission, and the Atlanta Housing Authority, to consult with the
advisory committee on all aspects of housing and planning as it affected blacks. Black
leaders proclaimed that as of April 1952, at no time had they been consulted or invited
by the Metropolitan Planning Committee to discuss the Commission’s master plan.
Phillip Hammer, chairman of the MPC, stated that he had expected the advisory
committee to seek him. In response, the committee emphasized that it had taken
proper initiative to reach out when its chairman, not the whole committee, visited him to
let him know the availability of their services and support. Hammer at that time promised
that he would call upon the committee from time to time. This action, the committee
explained, reinforced the agreement outlined in the mayor’s earlier designation of the
advisory committee and placed the responsibility directly upon the Metropolitan
Planning Commission to consult the committee. J.L. Wolfe, president of the Atlanta
Business League, called the attention of Mayor Hartsfield to the objections rendered by
the status of the advisory committee as ineffective and urged the mayor to appoint black
representatives in filling two vacancies on the Metropolitan Planning Commission when
terms expired on May 1, 1952.91
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To Appoint . . . or not
From the genesis of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, black leaders
engaged in an ongoing struggle for representation. At the center of the struggle was
Mayor Hartsfield who attempted to act as a liaison and keeper of the peace between the
black community and the planning commission. In spite of concerted efforts for black
representation on the MPC in early 1952, Mayor Hartsfield told the Atlanta Daily World
on May 9, 1952, that he would reappoint Oby T. Brewer, president of George Muse
Clothing Company, and George R. Bollinger, a well-known engineer, to succeed
themselves as members of the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The mayor
explained that leaders of the black delegation, including A.T. Walden, T.M. Alexander,
W.H. Aiken and several others whom he had discussed the committee’s vacancies,
supported his position in the matter. Hartsfield also acknowledged the many letters and
correspondences which he had received requesting black representation on the various
planning commissions, but noted that it would have been very difficult for him to remove
the two newly renewed members. He said removing them “would set up a chain of
political repercussions which, I really believe, would do your group much more harm
than good.” He continued, “People who do a good job expect reappointments.” He also
emphasized that he would be severely criticized if he replaced Brewer and Bollinger
with blacks – or “even whites.” He added, “I would be charged with interference in view
of the good job both are doing with the Commission.” To appoint black representation or
not remained a topic of contention as the protest of black leaders continued.92
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Throughout the ordeal on black representation, leading citizens and
organizations requesting black appointments presented more than 400 petitions to the
planning commission. Mayor Hartsfield attempted to contain the heated debate over
representation by repeatedly asserting that the Metropolitan Planning Commission
maintained only “advisory” powers. He strongly emphasized that the Commission’s
findings served merely as recommendations and not the final word. In spite of the
mayor’s attempt to persuade black opinion, the struggle for representation continued.
The black delegation deemed as undemocratic the Metropolitan Planning Commission
and all planning efforts and recommendations presented by the body, due to the lack of
black representation in the planning.93
T.M. Alexander and other black leaders responded to the mayor’s statements on
why he could not replace members of the planning commission whose terms had
expired. Alexander stated that members of the black delegation had not agreed with the
mayor’s refusal to name a black member to the Metropolitan Planning Commission. He
added that in light of the mayor’s refusal, the black delegation continued to discuss
plans for securing black representation on the commission, and the steps discussed
would be taken immediately.94
Mayor Hartsfield was unavailable for further comments. This lack of
representation further enhanced segregation already in place and used in shaping the
city. Black leaders called many of the recommendations of the Planning Commission
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“insulting and insensitive” and remained opposed to planning that would control black
mobility and enhance segregation of the black population.95

Conclusion
In the period addressed in this chapter, many changes came about in the area of
city planning, more specifically in transportation. At the close of World War II, cities
across America began preparing for unprecedented growth on the horizon. This growth
would be felt throughout the country and very heavily in the South. Early on, Atlanta
leaders realized the position in which the city stood and attempted to create and
implement measures to place Atlanta as the South’s leading metropolis. In doing so,
great efforts in planning ensued from the preliminary plans through the Lochner Report.
With planning and funding at the federal level, many of the initiatives conceived by city
and regional planners in Atlanta gained speed with more available resources.
This story follows the timeline of transportation planning and fills in voids of the
African American voice and participation in the planning efforts. In the period between
the Lochner Report and the Up Ahead plan, city planning systematically excluded
African Americans in line with the practices of segregation. Blacks struggled throughout
this period to make their presence known and gained momentum along the way. The
outlawing of the white primary in Georgia in 1946 along with unification in the black
community created newer avenues by which blacks could exert their rights as
Americans. Yet despite significant gains at the ballot box, African Americans remained
excluded from the planning process. They had hoped that increased political power
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would lead to formal appointments on boards that directly impacted the black
community. This era ushered in greater African American power, however, it was still
quite limited. All in all, this period contributed to greater challenges in both
transportation planning and the ongoing struggle of African Americans for equality.96

CHAPTER 2 – PHASE II, 1952-1960
At the beginning of the 1950s, most transportation planning activities focused on
highways and road networks. Federal intervention and the emphasis on highway
transportation and interstate commerce played a major role in highways and roads
gaining the most attention. For the city of Atlanta, the Lochner Report had set the
foundation for the postwar transportation plans to be created by the newly established
Metropolitan Planning Commission. Along with the MPC, city power players became
actively engaged in the layout of the highway system. The Lochner Report and plans of
the planning commission clearly displayed absence of black representation. They also
displayed ideas of maintaining segregation while moving Atlanta forward.97
While struggling for representation on the Metropolitan Planning Commission,
blacks continued to demand a greater role in the planning decisions that would affect
their fast growing population in the city. With the increasing political potency of blacks,
city leaders continued to debate the impact of the black vote. At the opening of the
1950s, blacks made up 37 percent of the city’s population and their vote became a
target of white leaders. With social change on the horizon, white city leaders sought
96
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solutions to maintain control of the city, while coaxing blacks to ensure that the
decisions made were in accordance with the traditions of the segregated city. By 1952,
Atlanta’s mayor William B. Hartsfield worked incessantly to maintain control and favor
from all residents in the growing metropolis to ensure that Atlanta become a great
economic center. In doing so, he set in motion a plan for improvement that paralleled
metropolitan planning and the racial challenges of the period. These actions contributed
to new planning issues that placed Atlanta at the center of social change in the 1950s.98

Hartsfield’s Plan of Improvement
When Hartsfield took over as mayor in 1937, the city was on the verge of
bankruptcy. And, he made the city’s financial status his first and most urgent concern.
The city had been operating on an antiquated system of budgeting that allowed it to
spend on a basis of anticipated revenues, which created an ever-increasing deficit. In
finding solutions in matters of fiscal responsibility, Hartsfield soon won the support and
full confidence of Robert Woodruff, CEO of Coca-Cola, and that of many of the city’s
other power players and business leaders. Their support prompted banks to willingly
help restore and stabilize financial obligations. From that success, Mayor Hartsfield
urged the legislature to pass legislation setting in motion a model budget system for the
city which provided that no department could budget more than 99% of the money that it
had actually received from the previous year. To ensure a margin of safety, the council
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limited the budget to 95% of the previous year’s receivables. With this system working
correctly, Hartsfield transformed other areas of city governance.99
One of his greatest accomplishments centered on his push for Atlanta to be a
transportation hub. Known as the “father” of the Atlanta Municipal Airport, he insisted
on improving Atlanta’s transportation facilities and investing in transportation planning
for the purposes of continued growth. With the city on track for growth and prosperity,
he promoted with great zeal throughout his tenure the development of Atlanta as a great
economic center tourist destination, and gateway to the American South.100
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Hartsfield’s political career progressed amidst a sea of change in southern race
relations. Early in his career, he came into office and served with the support of a white
electorate. Not until the 1940s with the outlawing of the white primary and the increase
in black voter registration did he make changes to his strategies. After 1946, he came
to see the potential in a new governing coalition. Historian Louis Williams states, “By
supporting the interests of black leaders and the moderate instinct of the business
community, Hartsfield was able to oversee the slow breakdown of the color line in
Atlanta and to maintain himself in elected office.”101
Hartsfield realized that his political future depended on being able to incorporate
the budding black electorate into his alliance. Since blacks constituted a large voting
bloc, he had to pay attention to them. The special election of Helen Mankin also made
him understand that blacks constituted a political force to be reckoned with in local
politics and elections.102
Hartsfield’s reelection in 1949 set in motion an era of new politics and black
participation in the city of Atlanta. Hartsfield avoided a run-off in this election by just 102
votes – a victory made possible only by the huge majorities he received in black
precincts.103 Hartsfield also received a majority of the white vote on Atlanta’s affluent
north side, but not an overall majority among white voters. Despite great appreciation
for the support from a growing black electorate, Hartsfield understood that whites still
represented the majority of the city’s voters. For that reason, he had to be careful in his
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pursuit of the black electorate and not stir up issues upon which his opponents could
build strong opposition. Hartsfield begin to realize that racial cooperation and good
relations played an essential role in the growth and progress of Atlanta; and he was
intent on maintaining a steady balance to ensure Atlanta’s economic momentum. He
also understood the role in which it would play in his political future.104
In order to maintain balance, Hartsfield had to figure out a way to capture the
black vote without abandoning his white constituency. He had to devise a plan gradual
enough to maintain the support of a substantial element of his white voting base. To
make his strategy work, Hartsfield sought to strengthen his connection with community
leaders throughout the city, both black and white, to forge a biracial coalition. He
maintained close ties with the affluent communities of the north side and later won their
support for annexation. Hartsfield’s goal early on was to recapture the out-migrating
educated and affluent middle class, the group that became the core of his constituency.
In doing so, he weakened his appeal to Atlanta’s white working class. Nonetheless, the
support of the affluent, white middle-class, coupled with the growing black electorate,
made way for Hartsfield’s Plan of Improvement that took shape in the early 1950s.105
To accommodate growth, the Plan of Improvement emphasized the expansion of
the city limits further outward. The migration to the suburbs of Atlanta’s moneyed elite
alarmed and angered Hartsfield, since this meant that the inner city would be dominated
by the working-class vote. In previous elections, Hartsfield drew his support from the
business and professional community, while the working-class vote tended to favor his
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opponents. He became determined to recapture by annexation his supporters in the
Buckhead area, the affluent area just north of the city limits. The successful annexation
of Buckhead, and other majority-white suburban areas came on January 1, 1952 when
the Plan of Improvement took effect. This plan, regarded as the most innovative
change in Atlanta’s municipal government in half a century, included sweeping
ramifications and effective changes in the governance of the city. Although annexation
(the term itself was removed from the final writings of the plan in order to gain support)
proved to be most beneficial to the Hartsfield coalition, it ushered in many new
responsibilities for the city.106
In winning support for causes such as the annexation of affluent white suburbs,
Hartsfield maintained constant communication with the affluent white middle class
communities. His quest for annexation had begun much earlier in his tenure as mayor.
During his first term, he wrote many letters seeking support. In one letter, he said:
The most important thing to remember cannot be publicized in the press
or made the subject of public speeches. Our Negro population is growing
in leaps and bounds. They stay right in the city limits and grow by taking
more white territory inside Atlanta.
Out-migration is good, white
homeowning citizens. With the federal government insisting on political
recognition of Negroes in local affairs, the time is not far distant when they
will become a political force in Atlanta if our white citizens are just going to
move out and give it to them. This is not intended to stir race prejudice
because all of us want to deal fairly with them; but do you want to hand
them political control of Atlanta?107
Upon securing the support of the whites on the northside, Hartsfield then turned
his political skills to mobilize Blacks. He argued to them that whites on the northside
represented a reasonable element, one capable of counterbalancing rabid
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segregationists. Black leaders were well aware of Hartsfield’s outlook and reservations
about their political strength. They believed that amidst all his reservations rested deep
wells of political wisdom, which over time caused him to modify his views. With both
factions on board, the Plan of Improvement, which included the annexation of the
northern suburbs and areas of southwest Atlanta, received a majority vote and was set
in motion. This plan expressed the strategy of maintaining a white majority city, but one
dominated by the affluent middle class. Though it reduced the Black electorate for a
short period, it helped to protect the coalition’s foundation of black participation at a time
when federal activity on behalf of minority rights was very limited. The Negro Voters
League supported the plan and urged the black community to vote in favor. The plan
included the incorporation of areas of black expansion on the city’s west side. Black
leaders made immediate plans to organize the “new residents” politically, adding
strength to the black voting bloc. The Plan of Improvement tripled the size of the city
from 37 to 118 square miles and added an estimated 100,000 to its population, bringing
the city’s total to 428,299. It also realigned functions between city and county and
created a smaller city council elected at-large.108

MPC and its Master Plan
“Planning is the key to our metropolitan future,” proclaimed the MPC. It added,
“Not that we’ll face complete chaos without planning. We won’t. But without planning,
neither will we realize the promise our future holds or the savings that can come with
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orderly rather than disorderly growth.”109 In 1950, the MPC had initiated a two-year
program to develop a basic master plan for projected metropolitan growth. This master
plan included recommendations about all aspects of the area’s growth and
development. MPC explained:
Metropolitan Atlanta faces a great epoch of its history. It can become
unique among U.S. cities for its open downtown area, its well-planned use
of rolling land, its decentralized homes and factories and its web of
efficient highways. Already the problems that come with its promise are
being felt. But the area has taken the first steps toward planning for its
future. There is now need for haste in developing the plans and putting
them into effect.110
The Commission and its staff began a process of analysis and planning, which in
its first year, included studies of the area’s economy, industry, population, commerce,
land use, and neighborhood patterns. The second year of master planning brought
about a series of technical studies, resulting in schedules of future needs for expansion
of water and sewer systems, rail and truck facilities, schools, parks, and community
services. This work also produced a general capital improvements budget to estimate
the cost of these expansion programs over the years. This phase culminated with the
1952 plan entitled Up Ahead: A Regional Land Use Plan for Metropolitan Atlanta.111
Based on the objective of controlling the outward expansion of the urban area,
this two county plan encouraged outlying cities to absorb growth beyond the planned
limit for the urban area. It also featured the essential component known as the Atlanta
Area Transportation Plan. This 1952 transportation plan embodied much of what had
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been set forth and recommended in the Lochner Report. In particular, it recommended
a vast web of coordinated arterial and trunk highways, improved downtown traffic
circulation, and a strong mass transit system. The goals of the Up Ahead plan reflected
the need to coordinate growth and the provision of public infrastructure. City officials
recognized that transportation was an essential component to growth and that
parameters must be set.112
Being created at the height of segregation, the planning commission and the
plans drafted reflected the discriminatory attitudes of the time. An example of
segregation written in the Up Ahead plan is clearly exhibited through the need for areas
of “Negro Expansion.” These areas provided ample space for the displacement of the
city’s African American population resulting from the vast highway and road networks
planned to penetrate heavily populated centers in which they currently resided. This
example of segregation provided a basis for black disapproval of the Up Ahead plan.113

Examining the Up Ahead Plan
The Up Ahead report provided a 25-30 year projected growth plan with
instructions for planning and creating sufficient infrastructure to make way for the
expansions in population, industry, trade, and commerce. In terms of physical land use,
the plan noted that the most important thing about this growth was the explosion over
an ever-widening area. At the creation of the plan, an estimated 550,000 people lived in
the urbanized core of Fulton and DeKalb Counties. The report projected an estimated
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900,000 inhabitants by 1980, along with 350,000 more located in the surrounding
hinterlands. Industry projections showed 30,000 acres for industrial purposes in use by
1980, increasing the industrial capacity by more than five times. They also displayed
most of the future industrial spaces to be on the fringes of the metropolitan area. By
1980, projections indicated the need for 20 million more square feet of commercial or
trade space, a number 50 percent higher than figures available at the creation of the
plan. With decentralization and sprawl into the suburban fringes, most of the new space
promoted migration of businesses and commerce to areas beyond the city center. This
in turn forced the central business district to become more specialized in its function.
The report concluded that the outward growth projected recognized no political
boundaries and upon approaching the boundaries on the fringes and the hinterlands,
nearby towns and cities would experience rapid growth and development.114
MPC spoke of the possibilities of the metropolitan region that could be achieved
if “we set out to get it.” The report stated that the trends and studies pointed towards a
future Metropolitan Atlanta of great comfort, beauty and efficiency. According to it, the
future could include:
“. . . 30 or more large “communities” separated by free-flowing arterial
highways. Within each community, 30,000 to 40,000 people can live in
pleasant “neighborhoods.” Each community and neighborhood can have
an independence of its own - combining the benefits of small-town living
with the advantages offered by a great metropolis. Population density can
be low. Green ridges and creek valleys can provide open park areas.
Industry can be concentrated largely in well-planned and convenient
locations on all sides of the area. Rail traffic can be dispersed to serve the
outlying industrial district. Truck terminals on designated arteries can give
fast circulation without congesting traffic or blighting neighborhoods. The
central business districts can be opened up and beautified. Downtown
property can be protected and made to play an increasingly important role.
114

Up Ahead, p. 3

80

The entire urbanized area can be tied together by a network of arterial
highways that would use the rolling land for a two-level system of express
routes. It can be a beautiful and efficient metropolitan unit with a proper
balance of homes, factories and stores.”115

However, the possibilities as proposed in the plan merited value and reasonable
consideration, fell short as elements of segregation appeared throughout the planning
process. Planning decisions in most cases disregarded African American voices not
present throughout the planning period. The MPC noted that the project’s projections
suggested the possibilities of a well-integrated, beautiful and efficient metropolitan
Atlanta. It also noted that answer as to whether the city of Atlanta and the metropolitan
region were capable of achieving this vision rested in the people placing trust in
planning.116
The Up Ahead Plan sought to equip the region with necessary methods for
coping with the explosive growth. The first item on the planning agenda and perhaps
the most important in accordance with growth and mobility rested in the success of the
vast web of coordinated arterial trunk highways. Through Up Ahead, the MPC
proposed an outline of the network and specified the general location of major future
routes, which prompted contention along racial lines. The commission also proposed
areas for industrial expansion with sites for dispersal and new warehousing districts.
Next, railroad patterns had to be revised in terms of industrial decentralization and
expansion. The commission recommended the future building of a railroad belt line to
encircle the entire area, with interchange yards along the belt. The current rail lines
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would be consolidated into three major lines. Finally, the trucking pattern was to be
amended with the proposed construction of four large consolidated truck terminals
located on a major truck loop highway to serve each quadrant of the metropolitan
region. These proposals placed transportation as a focus of the study for regional land
use and planning.117
Although the MPC placed great focus on outward growth and movement towards
the hinterlands, the central business district also received considerable improvements.
The Commission recommended specific action to improve downtown traffic circulation,
eliminate substandard sections in the downtown area, and provide facilities needed for
the central business district’s role as the thriving heartbeat of the metropolis.
Improvements included a combined transportation center for rail, bus and air travel; a
merchandise mart, a central transit depot, a government mall, a civic center and
downtown parks. Plans reserved outlying and suburban locations for large shopping
centers and retail districts. It also addressed the need for green spaces and green areas
along creek valleys, large parks, and an ample water supply to serve the growing
population.118
The commission suggested the need for a second municipal airport and several
smaller ports. It also proposed that attention be given to new policies for mass transit.
The commission tagged mass transit as essential to mobility advances in the
metropolitan area’s future. The commission suggested new areas to be provided for the
expansion of the black population, noted as “Negro expansion.” The plan presented a
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number of expansion districts where “colored” neighborhoods could be developed on
predominantly open and unoccupied land. These areas made way for slum clearance
and redevelopment programs in the areas centrally located to be vacated by a vast
number of black residents. The commission also urged the development of a uniform,
comprehensive set of zoning ordinances for the entire metropolitan area. These varied
suggestions in the Up Ahead Report unleashed a number of complications, especially
within the black community. This made advancing many of the proposed ideas very
challenging. Upon release, the Up Ahead Report immediately faced opposition,
especially from black citizens who had petitioned for representation in planning long
before the plan’s creation.119

Negro Expansion Areas
Philip G. Hammer sent a rush of anxiety and widespread speculation throughout
the black community of Atlanta. In interview after interview to the public, Hammer
explained the plan as a broad outline to guide city officials in the long range planning
and declared that it could become obsolete before the plans were even distributed. He
explained that because of the commission’s status with only advisory powers, the report
needed the approval of local governments in order to be transmitted into final form. The
discussion and plans for “Negro Expansion Areas” presented the greatest issue for the
black community. In regards to the areas delegated for movement and mobility among
blacks, the plans suggested that new areas must be provided for black expansion. The
commission suggested a number of expansion districts in which black neighborhoods
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could be developed on predominantly open and available lands. The plans also
recommended that the Auburn Avenue business district, the largest and most important
center of black business in the city, and the adjacent area bounded by Piedmont
Avenue, Edgewood Avenue, Boulevard and Cain Street-Highland Avenue be replaced
with a new civic center, an art museum, library, large convention auditorium,
recreational facilities and downtown parks.120
Historian Fitzhugh Brundage argues that blacks in the South, unlike whites, could
not control how market forces and government policy reshaped their communities.
Instead, they watched with mounting alarm as whites unleashed the forces of urban
renewal in black neighborhoods. Brundage adds that white power manifested in urban
renewal and threatened to radically degrade the traditionally black spaces that had
sustained black community life. Furthermore, urban renewal demonstrated white
determination to extend control over urban spaces that whites previously had ceded to
black control. Blinded by both superiority and insensitivity, many whites ignored the
value and wholeness of black community life in targeted areas. Instead, they saw only
degraded environments that impeded their ambitions for their cities. Brundage
concludes that whites took for granted that they had both the right and the wisdom to
dictate how public space, whether traditionally used by whites or others, should be
arranged and used. This persistent inequality of power exiled blacks and fueled the
demand for immediate representation in planning processes.121
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The ambitious proposals for the Auburn Avenue business district in the Up
Ahead plan provide an example for Brundage’s thesis. The proposed dismantling of this
space coincided with speculation that Atlanta was preparing for a bid for a World’s Fair.
Architect Cecil Alexander, who had been drawing plans for a World’s Fair, believed the
federal government would join Atlanta in buying up land designated for a future slum
clearance project. The land in question consisted of that within the Auburn Avenue
Business district. Alexander expressed his belief indicating that there was a strong
possibility that the city could stage a World’s Fair during the decade and this fair could
generate much revenue. This revenue would assist the city in financing much of the
slum clearance designated for the Auburn Avenue district and other areas throughout
the city. Alexander also explained that the permanent buildings left after the closing of
the fair could be used to house the proposed Atlanta Fine Arts Center. Alexander’s
theory aligned with the planning commission’s recommendation to replace the Auburn
Avenue business district and the surrounding heavily black populated area with a new
downtown cultural center.122
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Figure 9: Negro Expansion Areas as illustrated in the
Up Ahead Plan on the fringes of the city, 1952
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Figure 10: Possible World’s Fair Site,
Auburn Avenue Business District, Up Ahead, 1952

Approximately 20,000 Blacks lived in the Auburn Avenue district and were to be
most affected by the uprooting and relocation to the proposed “Negro Expansion Areas”
if city officials approved the plans of the Metropolitan Planning Commission to transform
the area into a “permanent park and civic center.” Piedmont, Forrest, Boulevard and
Edgewood bounded the area under consideration, the so-called “Black Bottom.” Within
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these borders, reverberated the heart and nerve center of Black life – social, religious,
business and political. The World noted, “Virtually all of the Negro mass behavior is
formulated, crystalized, and manipulated by the sensitivities and pounding pulsations of
this area’s ‘Black Heart,’ Sweet Auburn Avenue.” An area characterized by extremes,
contradictions, and paradoxes, the district housed the bulk of poverty and the bulk of
wealth among the city Black population. Property values ranged from $6,000 to
$90,000. Blacks owned businesses in the area whose values ranged from $60,000 to
$1,000,000. From this area, the city claimed $25 in taxes for every $1,000 in assessed
value. Again, the “Negro Expansion Areas” argument formed the basis for the black
protest to the Up Ahead plan.123
According to the MPC’s report, the area around the Auburn Avenue district
contained one of Atlanta’s worst slums. The commission explained, “As it now stands, it
is a definite menace to the future health of the downtown area (to say nothing of the
health of its residents) . . . It could be converted into a large civic center to contain an art
museum, library, large convention auditorium, recreational facilities and downtown park
areas. The buildings could be located along the ridge slopes with park areas and
possibly a small lake in the bottom.” The commission stressed this plan in conjunction
with the World’s Fair plans. The fair development “would wipe out slums and leave
permanent civic improvements,” explained the commission. “This idea is not to be
taken lightly . . . A downtown fair site would appear both economically sound and
psychologically attractive,” stated the commission. At the completion of the fair, after
two seasons or more, the commission believed that the “Black Bottom” and surrounding
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areas could be converted into areas of more usefulness and would open up the heart of
Metropolitan Atlanta, making possible the construction of new downtown housing and
hotels in the adjacent sections. With civic attention focused on the World’s Fair idea for
1957 or thereafter, the possibility of receiving federal redevelopment support for slum
clearance motivated the commission to continue exploring this possibility.124
One of the greatest challenges to black life presented by this proposal was that if
the “Black Bottom” area were to be redeveloped, it would eliminate the Auburn Avenue
business district. This district was the central commercial area of the Black population
and one of the foremost “Main Streets” within black America. The commission believed
in relocating the commercial center for the Black population, and that a large, new,
modern and thoroughly adequate black business district could be created on the
Westside in its place. Commission officials believed that “the Atlanta Negro population
badly needed a first-class central district.” The commission directed the migration of
Black population and the “colored” center of gravity westward. It suggested the
eventual commercial development of Ashby Street between Hunter Street and Simpson
Road. The commission’s plan designated Atlanta’s Westside to field the migration of
Blacks from other areas of the region.125
In addition to the focus on the “Black Bottom” area, the commission reiterated
that other blighted downtown areas also received consideration for possible
development. “These areas too contained concentrations of housing of such poor
quality that the cost of rehabilitation would be prohibitive,” asserted the commission. It
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continued, “These areas are harmful to the health and welfare of the residents and
costly to the community as a whole.”126
R.O. Sutton of the black-owned Citizens Trust Company denounced the proposal
relating to Auburn Avenue. He said the commission was protective of the so-called
“Golden Heart127” district – the area comprised of the downtown and uptown business
districts - and deliberately not protective of the Auburn Avenue district. He noted:
The commission seems to be operating on a false assumption that Auburn
Avenue is a so-called shopping center. What about Auburn Avenue’s
great financial and commercial institutions? One of our enterprises, for
example, not only serves Atlanta and the Southeastern region, but its
service can be described by an arc stretching all the way from Texas to
Michigan and its existence has not only contributed to the growth of
Auburn Avenue, but to all Atlanta.128
Sutton further elaborated that the businessmen of Auburn Avenue were seeking the
opportunity to participate in the economic life of the growing metropolis on a competitive
basis with regards to race, color, creed or national origin. Relocating the Black
businessmen to “some little shopping center,” would impede progress and create even
more barriers to equality. Black leader Walter “Chief” Aiken emphasized that Auburn
Avenue was about as valuable as Peachtree. He added, “the patronage of the Auburn
Avenue came from all over Atlanta alike.” Black leaders sought the chance for the
Auburn Avenue district to become a part of the “Golden Heart” district. According to the
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commission, repurposing blighted areas in the Auburn Avenue district showcased the
necessary improvements “needed for the expansion of Atlanta’s central functions.”129
Black continued to rally against the Up Ahead plan and the protest gained
momentum. “We don’t want all of our planning done for us,” proclaimed T.M.
Alexander.130 “We have grown up and have plans of our own for our future economic
and social development.” Known in Georgia as “Mr. Insurance,” Alexander founded
Alexander & Company, which grew to become one of the most successful minority
owned full-line independent insurance agencies in the country. It served major clients
throughout the United States. His emphatic statement was a rallying call for the
residents, patrons and businessmen of the Auburn Avenue district who stood firm in
their opposition. Alexander further stated that the relocation of Auburn Avenue
businesses would be considered especially insulting and insensitive. He added,
“Comparable White business interests would not have been treated so cavalierly.”131

Negro Housing
The proposed removal and relocation of blacks from the Auburn Avenue district
and the eastern edge of downtown coincided with another growing challenge of the
postwar period, available housing. One of the greatest problems for the Metropolitan
Planning Commission in drafting its plans was that of locating housing sites for the black
129
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population. By 1950, African Americans constituted a significant population in the city of
Atlanta and most were crowded in six areas: the Atlanta University section, Simpson
Road, Auburn Avenue, McDaniel Street, South Atlanta, and Parkway. The commission
reported that these areas contained about nine-tenths of the entire black population of
the city. It also explained that the Black housing issue stemmed from the inability of
African Americans to find either enough available secondhand housing or enough open
land to meet the growing needs of the community. The commission further elaborated
that most of the new housing from the housing boom in Atlanta during the postwar
period had been for the benefit of whites.132
In his memoir, T.M Alexander explained that like Blacks in other cities, Atlanta’s
Blacks followed patterns of expanding into housing vacated by Whites during an early
period of growth. He said that no shortage of land existed, but land had to be politically
cleared for black expansion to prevent housing tensions and not prompt bad race
relations. He explained that the suggestion of “Negro Expansion Areas” garnered
vigorous protest from Whites who owned the designated land and objected to the aid of
relinquishing it for Black housing. On the other hand, Blacks resented the designation of
segregated areas of black homes in the face of impending federal desegregation
rulings. “The segregated areas for black housing was based on a plan that was
supposed to foresee the picture 50 years hence,” he stated. And according to him, the
progressive element among Negroes anticipated the abolition of all segregation and
discrimination in housing and other areas in less than a half century. He concluded that
foresight, leadership and financial resources which blacks themselves made available
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served as one of the most important factors in clearing the way for black housing
expansion.133
In reporting on matters of black housing, the commission noted three things that
had blocked improvement in the past: (1) The pattern had been one of blacks taking
over houses vacated by whites. This resulted in numerous “ghetto” areas near the
heart of the city. Two or three black families moved into dwellings formerly occupied by
a single white family. The homes in those areas then fell into a poor state of repair as
little or no investment was made by the owners to keep structures up to standard after
blacks took over. (2) There were few areas available for building new black housing and
the most desirable areas were developed for whites. There was a general agreement
that new areas must be opened up for blacks, but it was difficult to get particular
acreage set aside for that purpose. (3) Blacks were seeking low-cost housing and a
large portion of the black population could not afford moderate or high cost housing.
This automatically eliminated the attractiveness of the black housing market to most
builders who were faced with high land and construction costs. It was also difficult to
construct low-cost projects within reasonable proximity to the downtown area.134
These barriers to improvement in Black housing contributed to a more acute
economic problem “with a fairly fixed supply and increased demand,” explained the
commission. “Properties for black occupancy took on a fictitious value, which
maintained no counterpart in the white housing market. Quality of housing considered,
local blacks paid more for housing than white people did.” With the lack of suitable land
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as one of the major barriers preventing the construction of new housing for blacks, the
master plan reflected the opinion that improving the situation rested with opening up
and developing expansion areas for black outside the central city and downtown core,
which many black residents endorsed.135
The proposed expansion areas for blacks were detailed in the Up Ahead plan
with various maps showing these places in outlying areas of the city. The commission
provided brief descriptions of the proposed locations along with their current statuses.
Westside expansion areas included the Sweat Road location, lying in the northwest
section of Atlanta, was bounded on the north and south by the Southern Railway and
Proctor Creek, respectively; on the east by the Rockdale Negro community; and on the
west by Brownsville, Hollywood and Bolton Roads. This undeveloped land could
support a community of at least 15,000 people. West Gordon Road expansion area,
west of the Atlanta city limits in Fulton County, was bounded on the north by Gordon
Road, on the east by Fairburn Road and on the west by the Botanical Gardens. The
largely undeveloped land was near the proposed new industrial district along the
Chattahoochee River west of the Botanical Gardens.136
Southside expansion areas included the Redwine Road location, lying west of
College Park along Camp Creek and Redwine Road. This area was another large
undeveloped area in Fulton County. Its east end would tie in with the existing Negro
development in College Park. The commission said the development of this area
located near the proposed Red Oak Industrial expansion district could make possible
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the elimination of several Negro slum districts in East Point and College Park. On the
Eastside, the Bouldercrest expansion was earmarked for future development. It was a
large area in southwest DeKalb County near the Clayton County line that was
completely undeveloped and could accommodate future population growth. Also on the
Eastside, the Washington Park expansion area was proposed near the existing
Washington Park Negro section north of Scottdale near Lawrenceville highway in
DeKalb County. Largely undeveloped except for scattered farms, the proposed
development was near the East Ponce de Leon and proposed Tucker Industrial
districts.137
Finally, on the Northside, the commission believed the existing Negro Community
known as Lynwood Park on Osborne Road north of Brookhaven in DeKalb County
could be expanded northward in Nancy Creek Valley.138 Historian Veronica Holmes
defined the area as an underclass African-American community settled in the late1920s in the then heavily wooded and rural northwestern DeKalb County. This enclave
provided safety from white racism during the Jim Crow era, and was in close proximity
to Oglethorpe University, and two exclusive golf clubs, which provided employment
within walking distance of the community.139
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Figure 11: Black Expansion Areas, Up Ahead, 1952
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The commission also proposed the development of a new black neighborhood in
Atlanta’s northside section, however suggested no specific site. The commission
pointed out in reference to the north side development: “At present there are small
Negro settlements on the Old Bottom Road, Moores Mill Road, Northside Drive, Lenox
Road and in several other scattered locations. Each of these settlements is surrounded
by high-value white property; in each, the black residents usually own their homes.
Most of the settlements are old, antedating the growth of the adjacent white suburbs.
Most are not expanding at present; some are in path of obvious white expansion. The
major problem presented by scattered settlements is how to provide adequate public
facilities especially schools. There are three substandard frame school buildings now
serving several areas.”140

Urban League and Up Ahead
“Social conditions which seriously affect a population often give rise to social
intercourse which result in the birth of institutions whose growth is developed and
stunted in proportion as they meet specific needs,”141 explained Robert E. Johnson, staff
writer for the Atlanta Daily World. Johnson described the birth of the Metropolitan
Planning Committee as “born against the backdrop of a postwar crisis in which Atlanta’s
growth was as controlled as a boil weevil’s behavior in a cotton patch.” Understanding
its origins also explains the lack of black participation on the planning commission and
in planning decisions. Johnson further elaborated that the lack of planning for orderly
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growth and development of the city created ongoing tensions in the area of housing.
The city was in dire need of adequate housing in the period in which wartime savings
had “fattened” pockets and created a growing market of those seeking to buy land and
homes. In a city where segregation ruled, housing the black population presented an
agonizing problem in planning. In order to maintain support, planners remained
cognizant of the opposition faced whenever customary segregative measures were not
followed. In order to prevent backlash in the planning stages, the planning commission
used the resources of other institutions and agencies, one being the Atlanta Urban
League.142
Whenever it faced problems in finding expansion areas suitable for the black
population, the commission turned its attention to the Atlanta Urban League. The Urban
League had already investigated independently the adequacy of several sites as
possible expansion areas for black residences. Its investigation recommended six
expansion areas, some of which differed from that of the planning commission. In
explaining the relationship between the Atlanta Urban League and the planning
commission, Mrs. Grace Towns Hamilton, league executive, explained: “The Atlanta
Urban League has used the Metropolitan Planning Commission and other planning
bodies as a resource for factual information needed in our program. The Metropolitan
Planning Commission has similarly sought our cooperation in securing factual
information on the program in which they were involved. We do not endorse the
proposed Up Ahead plan for Atlanta’s growth, but we sincerely believe that the proposal
should be studied carefully and that black citizens should participate as all other citizens

142

Atlanta Daily World, April 18, 1952

98

are asked to do in the revision of the proposal made. We believe also that the right of
criticism carries with it the responsibility for constructive assistance in improving the
conditions, which need immediate attention. We have a job of trying to work for the
greatest good for the greatest number. There are many ways in which black
businesses, as can all other businesses, profit by understanding and by looking ahead
of what will be the new Atlanta.”143
The Atlanta Urban League (AUL), officially established on March 15, 1920, ten
years after the founding of the national organization in New York City, aimed to improve
housing, living, and working conditions for blacks in Atlanta. It also aimed to promote
interracial understanding and cooperation. Grace Hamilton assumed leadership of the
organization in 1943 and received praise from the national organization for her calm,
rational approach to social problems and her experience with interracial groups. Most of
her activities with the Urban League focused on large-scale, fact-finding surveys
concerning the varying problems of the Atlanta’s black community. Hamilton initiated
programs focusing on the areas of education, housing, health, and voter registration
and citizenship. Hamilton’s tenure also focused on improving employment opportunities
and recreational facilities for blacks in Atlanta. Hamilton believed solutions to these
problems among many others facing Atlanta’s black community would facilitate full and
equal participation and viability in the city as a whole.144
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Black Atlanta Responds to Up Ahead
After being unveiled in early 1952, Up Ahead prompted vigorous protest among
African American leaders and activists. The World printed a series of editorials to
present Up Ahead to its readership. The paper sought to give as complete and
accurate information as possible, and to explain, clear up, and point out what was at
stake in the plan in order to help make intelligent opinions. It also intended to help
guide public opinion by pointing out what seemed to promise the greater good for the
greater number. With these goals solidified, writers at the World sought to express the
sentiments of black Atlanta in response to the recommendations of the planning
commission. “While we hasten to say planning is desirable, noted a World writer, “we
are equally hasty to say that planning is not subject to the rigid cross examination of
reasonability as trustworthy as daydreaming born out of unconscious rambling.” Black
Atlantans in general understood the importance of planning in the wake of tremendous
growth and expansion in the postwar period, and they called for recognition and
cooperation at every level of the planning and decision-making processes.145
In a rousing call for recognition and cooperation in planning, World staff writer
Robert Johnson noted some good recommendations proposed in the so-called master
plan for the city’s residents. Yet, upon initial review, blacks realized the repercussions
and high level of destruction proposed by the plan. Blacks also sensed racial
insensitivity and the lack of their own contributions in the planning process. Johnson
added: “When the plan is viewed from the generous frame of humanity, informed in
deep knowledge of Christianity and democracy, we immediately note some of the grave
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shortcomings.” He noted that the MPC, a legal body created by an act of the Georgia
General Assembly in 1947, had no black members, and failed to consult the advisory
board of blacks that had been appointed by Mayor Hartsfield. Also, the commission had
made a radical recommendation, which if approved, would have replaced the central
business district for blacks on Auburn Avenue, “thereby deadening the nerve center and
plucking out the heart of black life,” noted Johnson. Finally, the commission, apparently
ignoring a well-known fact that there was no legal sanction for restriction nor zoning on
the basis of race, proposed that six major black expansion areas be developed on the
outskirts of the city, bounded by railroad tracks and the Chattahoochee River. The
writer concluded that it was quite apparent that the commission kept a “sharp eye on the
folkways and mores of ‘Southernism’ and had no desire to break the cake of custom.”146
Central to black Atlanta’s protest of Up Ahead was the simple fact that there was
no black presence on the planning commission, nor had blacks even been consulted. In
an exercise of his power to appoint advisory bodies of lay citizens in connection with
certain problems, Mayor Hartsfield had named a ten member advisory committee for
issues pertaining to housing and urban renewal. In the wake of widespread planning for
highway/road projects and other renewal programs involving the demolition of black
housing and neighborhoods, this committee included black leaders. Nevertheless, as
historian Stephen Tuck has noted, these black leaders remained as “junior partners,”
with only minor consideration being given to their demands. Hartsfield noted that this
advisory board should be consulted during the formative stages of all matters relating to
housing and urban redevelopment that affected blacks in Atlanta. Yet T.M. Alexander
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noted that in the formative stages of Up Ahead, the advisory committee was not
consulted by the MPC. He also explained that, “Members of the advisory committee
accepted the appointments only as an emergency measure until there were vacancies
whereby they could be accepted into full membership. This, at least, afforded an
opportunity for Blacks to be in planning rather than being planned for.”147
An anonymous resident of the Auburn Avenue district denoted Up Ahead as
“such a bold insult . . . so evil in intent . . . so unreasonable and unfair to blacks that it
leaves me speechless.” Because of its harsh implications for the relocation of the
Auburn Avenue business district and its patrons to other areas zoned for black
expansion, these sentiments echoed throughout black Atlanta. One World writer stated:
We cannot see the need of blueprinting segregation for the future. We
believe that in 1980, when metropolitan Atlanta’s population reaches the
predicted million mark, racial attitudes will be so healthy that we will have
to dig deep into history recorded in our newspaper files to learn that once
upon a time there lived in this metropolis persons and groups who were
known as peddlers of prejudice and passion; vendors of venom and
verbosity; and dealers in deceit and defamation.148
Blacks demanded consideration when it came to issues directly affecting them
and were ready to protest to ensure that their voices be heard. Up Ahead invoked
discussions of transportation planning, housing, and urban renewal. In planning for Up
Ahead, whites maintained control over decision-making, which was evident in the
exclusion of blacks. Though blacks were given some token consideration, most of the
final decisions still reflected the goals of city leaders operating under the mores of
segregation and white supremacy. With these attitudes and sentiments engrained in
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leadership and in the decision-makers, postwar planning exhibited in Up Ahead and
throughout the decade reflected the absence of full consideration of black Atlanta. It
would take more moderate measures to make way for biracial cooperation to bring
about change. Change also came through the strengthening of black political power and
the direct action that it prompted. With issues of transportation planning and urban
renewal on the rise, the next few years ushered in more challenges stemming from the
persistence of blacks for equal participation.149

Outspoken Disapproval: Calhoun’s and Reddick’s Stand
The Up Ahead plan continued to face thorough examination and scrutiny in the
black community and fervent disapproval among its leaders. John H. Calhoun, realtist,
and member of Mayor Hartsfield’s advisory committee, stood adamant in his beliefs that
the “master plan” was against the interest of the black community. Calhoun, a member
of the Atlanta Business League and executive secretary of the Atlanta branch of the
NAACP, analyzed the report from the standpoint of segregation and found some of the
recommendations against the best interest of blacks, “especially in view of national and
international trends towards extending principles of democracy to all people.” The
fundamental ideal of justice and equality provided the basis of many a argument and a
rallying charge of black struggles. Calhoun explained, “When the commission issues
the valuable data as a basis for recommending the relegation of a class of citizens to
isolated sections, replacing Negro slums with white housing projects and destroying
business values, our faith in democracy is thereby weakened.” Central to Calhoun’s
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opposition was the relocation of residents and black businesses from the Auburn
Avenue district. He argued:
In the first place, the directing of Negro housing to seven specific areas,
outside the city limits and several in DeKalb County, in a report that should
receive general approval of the community, is not consistent with
democratic principles. Secondly, the fact that Auburn Avenue is an
integral part of the downtown business district, means that it cannot be
transplanted in a section outside the downtown area. Nor should any
representative group of citizens attempt to destroy the historical,
sociological and economic values, which have been developed in this
area, through generations of sacrifice and effort on part of intelligent
Negro businessmen and women.150

Calhoun also spoke of the political implications of the master plan, stating that in
the past blacks had been unprotected from zoning and planning bodies because they
lacked political influence. He explained, “Groups of white citizens, activated by whatever
motives, effectively secured approval or disapproval of projects in Negro communities
which met their desires.” And thus, in many cases, the value and beauty of the black
sections became depreciated. With the outlawing of the white primary, along with a
growing black electorate, blacks boasted some political strength that could bring about
some change. As a result of a little political force, the steadied depreciation of black
property declined. Nonetheless, he further elaborated that zoning and planning laws
didn’t protect black sections, nor provide for their development in a truly democratic
fashion, stating “That is why recommendations of the Metropolitan Planning
Commission carry such serious import in the future developments as they relate to the
Negro population.”151
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As for segregation embedded in the master plan, Calhoun criticized providing
new areas for Negro expansion as not a useful or acceptable approach to harmonious
development and biracial cooperation. He probed, “Why should Negroes be specifically
directed to land that is now predominantly open or to areas now generally inaccessible
to transportation and other facilities, or to sections which are not in line with the Negro
population trends that have gained momentum with the past few years?” He added that
forcing blacks into secluded expansion areas could result in the establishment of
ghettoes, which was certainly not in keeping with the principle of extending democracy
to all peoples. Furthermore, in a democratic society, he wrote, “free people will not
respond favorably to directions which are inimical to their best interests.” Calhoun
believed that it was unreasonable to expect intelligent and wise blacks to accept rigid
recommendations in which Up Ahead placed on housing. He affirmed that in general,
experience showed that as a distinct racial group, blacks tended to live more or less
together, in naturally developed communities. Expansion, like natural and evolutionary
tension and issues, should be approached and guided by civic-minded, courageous
leadership in both races, without government or semi-political intervention.152
Dr. Lawrence Dunbar Reddick153, historian and chief librarian at Atlanta
University, shared Calhoun’s sentiments. Knowledgeable in city and regional planning,
Dr. Reddick had observed practices in various locations throughout the country
including Los Angeles, Baltimore, Detroit, and New York; and realized immediately that
152
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some phases of the MPC’s master plan were not in the interest of Atlanta’s Black
communities. Dr. Reddick’s dissection of the Up Ahead plan provided insight from one
skilled in various fields of research. He examined the plan from principles of sound
sociological planning in a democratic society. He criticized the planning commission in
calling “Up Ahead” simply a land-use proposal, ignoring the wider implications. He
explained, “Of course, we want better paved streets, speedier communication, more
comfortable transportation and other physical improvements . . .But the end product of
all this is that there shall be better living for the people.” He asserted that a “good plan”
would provide for all the inhabitants of the city and offer a better chance for cooperation
and peace.154
Dr. Reddick deemed human relations as the supreme weakness and failure of
the commission’s plan. He added:
This plan violates the first principle of democratic planning in that the
composition of the planning commission is not democratic. We might ask,
how could the product of such body be democratic when that body itself is
not democratically composed? No Negroes are represented on the
commission or on its paid staff. If it is said, in answer, that those
appointed and hired represent all of the people, the best answer to that is
for us to take a look at the report that this body brought.155
Reddick argued the recommendations of the master plan were undemocratic and
if adhered to, they would: (1) “Cut the throat” and disrupt Auburn Avenue businesses;
(2) Under the banner of slum clearance, remove/relocate thousands of Black residents
who lived in the city limits; (3) In some cases, replace the Black residents with other
whites when new housing has replaced the slums; and (4) Scatter and disperse Blacks
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in six or seven ghettoes clustered on the periphery of the city. Reddick supported the
ideas and advances of slum clearance, but asked why not let the people who already
occupied blighted areas live there after those locations became fit to live in. He believed
it not necessary “to shuffle Negroes to the open country.” As for the proposed
expansion areas, Reddick noted that three of them were adjacent to industrial sites. He
even noted that one of the proposed areas seemed conveniently located for whites to
have their domestic servants live in close proximity. While labeling all labor as
honorable, including domestic service, Reddick said, “It is revealing when the
commission betrays its conception of a Negro neighborhood as a reservoir of domestic
servants.”156
The political implications of the Up Ahead plan appeared blatant and visible to
the black community. Already, the black electorate of Atlanta was rapidly growing, and
through community involvement and civic programming, this electorate was slowly
becoming a force in city politics. In early success as a growing force, the black
electorate contributed to the passage of the annexation plan of 1952. This aided in
stabilizing and maintaining a white majority. Reddick noted that the relocation and
removal of thousands of Black citizens from the old city into six or seven small blocks
was yet another ploy towards destroying the political strength of Atlanta’s Black
electorate. The Atlanta of the future would be a more segregated city than at the
present upon the recommendations of the commission, he explained. He continued,
“There would be less chance of Atlantans of different backgrounds and colors to know
each other as good neighbors; residential segregation would be greater than it is now
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and as ever, would be the mother of all manner of institutional segregation.” Reddick
further elaborated that riots and racial tension seemed less likely to take place in mixed
neighborhoods because good neighbors don’t assault each other. Ultimately, he
believed the Up Ahead plan to be a violation of provisions of good human relations,
such as those outlined in the Declaration of Independence. He stated, “Up Ahead points
to a rather dismal future in this regard, and is merely a the creature of certain political
and social forces.” Like Calhoun, Reddick declared this plan unjust and in need of
modifications to align with the ideals and values of the communities to be most affected.
He concluded, “I say change it and make it come closer to the democratic ideal.”157

Black Community Triumph
For the Black community, the greatest issues of the Up Ahead plan centered on
its lack of democratic ideals and equal representation in planning. Because the plan
was simply a proposal requiring support and approval before becoming final, the
planning commission hosted a 10-day public hearing for leaders and citizens alike to
voice opinions on aspects of the “master plan.” The hearing commenced on May 26,
1952, at the Municipal Auditorium, and featured representatives of business,
professions and educational institutions. Letters were sent to specific representatives,
individuals, and organizations of all racial groups. The commission instructed residents
who wished to be heard to contact them.158
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At the public hearings hosted by the Metropolitan Planning Commission,
representatives voiced grievances of the master plan. The biracial panel of guests
included black representatives, along with other leaders, including: Dr. Allen D. Albert,
Jr., of Lockheed Aircraft, Inc.; Robert Leopold, managing director of Greater Atlanta
Safety Council; Elbert Tuttle, Atlanta Community Planning Council; Richard H. Rich, of
Central Atlanta Improvement Association (CAIA); A.H. Sturgess, Atlanta Chamber of
Commerce; Pearce Matthews of Atlanta Title Company; and Harold Bush-Brown,
School of Architecture, Georgia Tech. At the hearing, varying disagreements existed
about aspects of the Up Ahead plan. The black delegation remained firm in their
grievances, which included the threat to the Auburn Avenue business district, the
relocation of Blacks to segregated expansion areas, and the lack of Black
representation on the planning commission.159
Many white from the greater Atlanta community found less criticism of the report.
Dr. Albert of Lockheed said the magnitude of the work that went into the plan in such a
short space of time was incredible. He also noted that the result of letting things grow
up had cost taxpayers lots of money, and planning was necessary because Atlanta was
undergoing such a tremendous transformation in economy and structure. Leopold of the
Greater Atlanta Safety Council hailed the plan as an outstanding achievement. Richard
Rich noted that a city, like a business, must plan for the future. According to Rich, a
poor plan was better than no plan at all. Sturgess and Matthews were both
“enthusiastically” in favor of the master plan and Bush-Brown of Georgia Tech also
favored it. He complimented the Commission for “planning democratically,” and stated,

159

Atlanta Daily World, May 27, 1952

109

“if we can’t plan successfully under our democratic system, we are in danger from
fascism and communism where planning can be and is being carried out by imposition.”
As the public hearings continued, leaders expressed and took into consideration the
sentiments from all neighborhoods, communities and cities in Fulton and DeKalb
counties.160
After months of public hearings and ongoing debate, MPC announced changes
in the recommendations of the Up Ahead plan. Robert H. White, chairman of the
Metropolitan Planning Commission announced at one of the final public hearings that
the recommendation to relocate the Auburn Avenue business district would be dropped.
This came after vociferous dissent from the members of the black delegation and the
community altogether. T.M. Alexander told the commission that blacks could not
support the relocation of the Auburn Avenue business district because it was the
“Golden Heart”161 of the community, and “its beats are our inspiration and our pride.”
This district also served the spiritual center of Black Atlanta. Epitomizing the vitality of
black life in the city, Auburn Avenue was the main thoroughfare which Black leaders
were adamant in protecting.162 A white spectator at the public hearings at the Municipal
Auditorium directed a question to Alexander, asking: “What is it that the Negro actually
wants in this expanding city?” Alexander passionately responded: “We want the same
thing that you want on an equal basis. We want an opportunity to develop to our fullest
160
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capacity – economically, socially and politically – without restriction, discrimination or
segregation. In other words, we want to run the same race that you run, with you, but
without the additional hazards.”163
So what caused this shift in the fate of the Auburn Avenue business district?
Was it the persistence of the Black community in creating a unified force of resistance to
recommendations that would drastically alter their way of life? Or did the members of
the commission realize the detriment? On the question of abandoning the proposal to
relocate historic Auburn Avenue, Commission Chairman White asserted that there was
quite a lot of work involved in planning and several “technical mistakes” were made in
printing. There was one mistake in particular, which was in the wording of the section
on Auburn Avenue. The commission felt that section had been misinterpreted and
needed an explanation:
“You’ll notice in the report what we said about the Central Business
District. We have found that there are certain consumer industries or
businesses that are moving outside of the Central Business District.
There is a decentralization trend affecting that type of business. They are
going out, they’re going closer to the people they serve. In studying
Auburn Avenue, which is part of the Central Business District, we found
that this trend had lagged behind the other parts of the Central Business
District primarily because of the presence of a rather large residential area
north of Auburn Avenue and running up to Forrest Avenue. So when it
was proposed that the Golden Heart be developed which would eliminate
the area as a Negro residential section, we then felt that Auburn Avenue
would begin to be affected by the same trends felt by other business
districts until it had ‘caught up’ with them in the decentralization of their
consumer business. Thereafter, the Auburn Avenue section would follow
the same trends as other sections of the Central Business District.”164
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The commission stressed that it was “never contemplated in our thinking” that
those businesses in the Auburn Avenue district whose functions were regional or more
than simply consumer businesses would be moved from the Auburn Avenue section. It
also explained that the word “eliminate,” which was used throughout the report in
referring to the Auburn Avenue district occurred in error. “They [Auburn Avenue
businesses] will stay and there will probably be more development of that specialized
type of business just as we have forecasted it for the other Central Business Districts.”
The commission reiterated that the ideas of elimination and removal were intended for
purposes of progress in the Auburn Avenue district as a whole community. In linking
this issue to that of trends affecting the other business districts in the area, the
commission members claimed they were thinking in terms of dispersement from Auburn
Avenue. They claimed that relocation would be voluntary, calling it advisable and
potentially economical for black from the area to move. According to final statements,
no one would be forced through government intervention and be removed. Removal
would only take place in voluntary cases. The commission used the final statements to
provide justification for the many concerns hovering around the elimination of the
Auburn Avenue business district. Finally, the commission reassured the unified Black
leadership that in the final report, the proposed elimination of the business district on
Auburn Avenue would be removed.165
Shortly thereafter, the Metropolitan Planning Commission removed its
recommendations for “Negro Expansion Areas.” The expansion areas, along with the
proposed elimination of the Auburn Avenue business district, had set the foundation for
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the hotly contested debates of the Up Ahead plan on behalf of the Black community.
The victories came about as a result of the public expressions voiced by citizens and
leaders alike during the series of hearings on the plan. Philip Hammer stated that his
organization was in agreement with an overall policy of removing the contested items
from the final plan, and that maybe it had been a mistake to make such designations in
the report altogether. Hammer also stated that the commission’s approach taken to
issues as sensitive as housing for the growing black population was not proper, but
housing was still a very critical issue. Moving forward, the commission vowed to
continue seeking solutions for this issue affecting residents of the region. Hammer said
it had been suggested that local governments settle problems growing out of locating
land for black expansion with direct community involvement. He said the commission
would attempt to find out the sentiments of governing officials and would ask them to
make suggestions to bring about solutions in the area of finding available land to
adequately house the growing black population.166
Apparently the feedback received during the public hearings had resonated with
the Metropolitan Planning Commission, bringing about some of the democratic change
for which many Black leaders had spoken fervently. The commission regarded the
hearings as an essential part of the planning process. It was through these hearings
that change came about in preparation for the final plan to be submitted to local
governments. Blacks saw the hearings as opportunity to engage, galvanize, articulate,
and leverage. The persistence and unity among the black community ushered in
changes at this stage of planning, but more aggressive physical changes were on the
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horizon. Over the course of about six months, two of the Up Ahead plan’s
recommendations with the most detrimental effects had been defeated, but many still
existed. Auburn Avenue had been spared in this instance, but black leaders would not
be as lucky in facing the next wave of challenges.167

Mobility via the Hartsfield Coalition and Biracial Organizing
In the aftermath of success in defeating detrimental recommendations of the Up
Ahead plan, an invigorated community continued to press for expanded roles in
planning and in all areas of city government. In a much larger city by 1953 through
annexation, greater strides in biracial cooperation ensued. The Hartsfield coalition
consisting of the upper class elite on the north side in conjunction with the large black
electorate initiated a chain of events that enhanced racial mobility and progress for the
black population. This coalition helped Atlanta elect its first black to citywide office in
the twentieth century, when Dr. Rufus Clement, president of Atlanta University, was
elected to the school board in 1953. In addition, A.T. Walden, prominent attorney and
member of the Atlanta Negro Voters League, and pharmacist Dr. Miles Amos were
elected to the City Executive Committee. The Plan of Improvement envisioned by Mayor
Hartsfield was making progress. The outlawing of the white primary together with the
strategies of the Plan of Improvement assisted in eliminating barriers for blacks through
a policy of racial moderation and negotiated gradualism.168
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Attaining support for the adoption of the Plan of Improvement presented a great
share of challenges. It required the support of many people, organizations and
institutions throughout the city. Key to the success of the plan was the support of the
city’s business leadership, which led the campaign to have it approved in the state
legislature leading to a successful referendum. The business leadership was successful
in acquiring the support of organizations including the League of Women Voters, and
with Hartsfield’s influence, they also received the confidence of the strategically
important Atlanta Negro Voters League. The newspapers provided a critical link in this
success. Along with the public campaign of the business leadership, extensive
background bargaining proved instrumental in the success of the plan. Hartsfield stood
as the public face of the program, staying away for the background bargaining. He
served as a mediator in the coaxing and dealing, rather than being involved in the direct
application of political pressure. He believed this method would limit opportunities for
racial conflict and unrest. Hartsfield’s incremental steps through the Plan of
Improvement, largely symbolic and extensively staged and planned, represented the
city’s modest steps in a more moderate direction.169
As a result of the tension caused by the lack of democratic planning and black
representation in creating the Up Ahead plan, Hartsfield sought to bring blacks and
whites together as a permanent planning committee to sort out the matters of the
growing developmental problems in the various sections of the city. On the west side,
the establishment of the West Side Mutual Development Committee (WSMDC) created
a biracial organization to play a pivotal role in determining the course of racial transition.
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WSMDC’s biracial charter roster included: prominent black leaders, builder Walter
Aiken, realtist T.M. Alexander, and attorney A.T. Walden. Giving the organization a
twist, Hartsfield selected top leaders in the growing white resistance movement as white
counterparts in mutual planning. Those members included: Sid Avery, engineer at
General Electric; Richard Florrid, executive secretary of the Atlanta Restaurant
Association; and Ernest Sewall, a serviceman for an adding machine company. T.M.
Alexander stated the overall goal of the WSMDC as: “to try to work out on the
community level the peaceful, orderly expansion of the communities of both white and
colored.” As a means for promoting the “orderly and harmonious development” of the
city, the creation of such racially balanced mutual development committees was well in
line with Hartsfield’s Plan of Improvement for the city of Atlanta and the growing
demands for progress and biracial cooperation.170
T.M. Alexander believed the biracial approach of the WSMDC to be a timely
approach to an increasingly intense problem as Atlanta’s population continued to
expand beyond its capacity to adequately and equitably house both races. He described
the beginning of the WSMDC: “The first meeting was ‘cold’ and cautious. There was a
definite lack of mutual understanding and sympathy on both sides. The forced
handshakes were limp and without warmth. There was even a feeling of inner tension
and resentment, and a wall so thick between the groups on opposite sides of the table
that it was almost visible.” Mayor Hartsfield reiterated the purpose of the committee
carefully and concisely. He generally believed that if the group could sit together and
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take an objective look at the mutual problems as intelligent citizens, they might be able
to work out a solution.171
In its capacity, the WSMDC monitored rumors of racial change and conflict
throughout the city. The committee’s purposes included:
(1) Providing channels of information to civic and other groups, Negro and
white, and bringing them into fuller participation in governmental and
community activities; and (2) Seeking to solve specific problems through
fact-finding and mediation.
The two most frequent, time-consuming and critical problems faced by the Committee
since its creation were how to handle controversy, violence or potential violence in
transition areas; and how to locate vacant land areas for Negro housing expansion. The
Committee’s success in solving problems of this type traced to a straightforward
approach. Backed by the city, the Committee invited all parties concerned to sit around
a table, review the facts together, and exchange viewpoints until a meeting of minds
was achieved. The backing of the City government provided a vital force in effectuating
and maintaining agreements reached in this way.172
The WSMDC investigated reports of racial transitioning and set in place mass
campaigns to organize and investigate via canvassing, written questionnaires, and
public meetings. Information collected provided leaders with detailed information and
insight into the processes of racial transitioning. WSMDC gained support and allies from
various groups. The information collected through their labor stood to limit the impact of
desegregation and racial transitioning in the city and assisted in maintaining peace on
its streets. The approval from city government proved critical in garnering support. City
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approval validated the organization’s purposes and provided a vital force in securing
and maintaining peaceful resolution. The committee also received the overwhelming
support of local newspapers and businessmen, and its members were also interwoven
in strong networks and institutions. As a result, recommendations from the WSMDC
carried clout on the subjects of race and residence in the city of Atlanta. Throughout the
1950s, the West Side Mutual Development Committee wielded tremendous influence,
using its prowess to negotiate conflicts and seek equity throughout the city.173
Land-use issues provided the next challenge. The wave of land-use issues,
many centered on expressway construction and redevelopment, implied massive
displacement. Coupled with changes on the state and federal level, these land-use
issues created many new problems and challenges that shook the coalition’s core.174

Now – For Tomorrow
Two years after publishing Up Ahead, the MPC presented a new report, NOW –
FOR TOMORROW: A Master Planning Program for the DeKalb-Fulton Metropolitan
Area. Like its predecessor, it provided a broad outline to serve as recommendations
only. The power and responsibility for more detailed community planning rested with
the city and county agencies. Now – For Tomorrow did not cause the kind of uproar that
followed Up Ahead. The new recommendations omitted the need for “Negro Expansion
Areas” and the relocation of the Auburn Avenue business district, two ideas that had
faced the greatest challenge from blacks in the city. This plan, like the previous one,
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focused greatly on economic outlook and upward trends in population as the necessary
steps towards orderly growth for the region. The plan stated:
“The timing of its growth is another factor which makes metropolitan
Atlanta a favored urban center. Real growth has come at a time of great
mobility, both of people and of industry and the greatest growth is yet to
come. There is a real opportunity to develop patterns of living, working,
and playing that were not possible in the late Nineteenth Century when
most of America’s larger cities grew into bigness . . .The physical layout
and terrain of the local area invite orderly community development. There
are no major physical obstructions to expansion in any direction. The
ridges and valleys can provide protection of one type of land use from
another to make it feasible to construct grade separation of major streets,
expressways, and railroad intersections . . . Our community has unlimited
opportunity for growth.175
In continuing the theme of metropolitan planning, the commission stressed that the
complexity of the problems in which the area faced were greater because they spilled
over municipal and county boundary lines, and required inter-governmental cooperation
for their solution. The commission stated, “No longer is the job of local government
administration a simple one. Every day brings new demands on the city and county
government.” And with these new demands, along with the growing constituency, came
the need for measures of this new master plan.176
The Now – For Tomorrow plan, like Up Ahead, placed particular focus on
transportation planning. Mobility issues amidst the rapid growth of the region remained
among the greatest challenges in planning, from traffic in Central Atlanta to the growing
paths throughout the region. The commission made many recommendations similar to
the previous plans with the intent of providing the easiest access to the central city.
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Many of the freeways and other methods of transportation in use today in the
metropolitan region, such as the circumferential highway (I-285) and the MARTA rail
system, made their debut in this plan. The commission outlined plans for central Atlanta
to include:
“Completion of the north-south connector to remove through traffic from
the downtown streets; location and protection of the right-of-way for the
east-west expressway; additions to the supply of close-in, off-street
parking facilities; elimination of on-street parking in the central area; more
efficient use of downtown streets through improved, expanded transit
service; greater restrictions on loading, stopping, and turning movements
on heavily travelled transit streets; substantial improvements to many
streets, particularly those which will carry vehicles from and to the new
expressways.”177
The particular interest of city leaders and the business community in increasing the
visibility and marketability of the area for economic development linked to their interest
in transportation planning for central Atlanta. The commission noted that most people
came to the central business district by vehicle, deeming vehicular transportation the
area needing the most investment. It further concluded that the systems of mobility
throughout needed to be efficient and accommodate the large numbers of people who
interacted daily.178
Highways and expressways drew a large amount of treatment as central topics
throughout the plan. With great federal advances on the horizon, the city and the state
remained fully engaged in planning routes to and through Atlanta, adding to its role as
the transportation center of the southeastern United States. Because movement within
and around the metropolitan area was viewed as “difficult, hazardous, and painfully

177

NOW – FOR TOMORROW, p. 10

178

Ibid

120

slow,” the commission in Now – For Tomorrow proposed a unified major street and
highway system. This included expressways and limited access roads to carry the
heaviest traffic volumes safely around the metropolitan area and major streets to
connect the metropolitan area with an efficient and safe expressway and limited access
roads system. This layout would facilitate crosstown movement and provide circulation
between residential areas and the commercial and industrial centers. The wheel and
spoke system which became a standard for many urban centers was prescribed in the
plan, and ultimately became the model in which highway development was constructed.
Planners strongly emphasized the urgent need for forward-looking transportation policy
for various reasons, including as a cost-saving mechanism. At that time, estimations
showed that traffic congestion and transportation issues came at a cost of sixty-five
million dollars every year to local citizens, businesses and industry. As such, it was
clear that the adoption of public policy on transportation could assist in solving issues
prohibiting economic progress.179
Two of the most valuable components of Now – For Tomorrow were the
Trafficways and Transit Plan. These plans contained the measures that were ultimately
used as the layout for the emerging transportation systems for the metropolitan region.
The Trafficways Plan consisted of a coordinated system of streets and highways to
serve all parts of the metropolitan area. It was integrated with the plans for other forms
of traffic, including transit, truck, railroads, and aviation. A main purpose of the plan was
to move future traffic as swiftly, smoothly, and safely as possible. Its goals were also
aimed at economy, both in construction and in motor operating costs. The Trafficways
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Plan was also designed to coordinate with plans for the National System of Interstate
Highways, which would contribute vastly to defense needs and the advancement of
interstate commerce. The schematic maps of the plan portrayed a system of radial
streets, ring roads and crosstown arteries needed to handle future traffic flow. The
central city was the focal point of the planned traffic system.
Although the Trafficways Plan received greater attention, advances in the Transit
Plan still provided significance. The commission noted that success at moving the
area’s traffic depended highly on the effectiveness of good transit. Transit, or public
transportation, provided the greatest source of mobility for those utilizing the central city
business district. Transit also provided greater convenience in the struggles with traffic
and parking. The commission ultimately believed that improved transit could be the
answer to the greater traffic issues, and made recommendations in favor of investment,
in rapid rail transit in particular. Altogether, improved transportation policy, which had
been a goal since the Lochner Report, was becoming more apparent and planners
sought to use Now – For Tomorrow to bring the recommendations of years of
transportation planning into fruition.180
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Figure 12: Traffic Flow Pattern in 1952 and estimated for 1980,
NOW – FOR TOMORROW, 1954
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Figure 13: Atlanta Region, NOW – FOR TOMORROW, 1954
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Figure 14: Schematic Sketch of the System of Radial Streets, Ring Roads, and
Crosstown Arteries, NOW – FOR TOMORROW, 1954
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Figure 15: Central Atlanta Plan depicting the reorganization of the Central Business
District with highways and interchanges included, NOW – FOR TOMORROW, 1954
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Federal Advances & Highway Legislation
NOW – for Tomorrow provided a new and improved master plan building upon
the strengths of the previous plan. It served as a revised version of Up Ahead, removing
the expansion areas for black residents and the relocation of the Auburn Avenue
business district. Though the new plan eliminated features that prompted the vigorous
protest of the earlier plan, it still lacked the representation of blacks on the MPC in its
creation. Blacks continued to demand representation as larger federal advances in
planning took shape. As Up Ahead provided an outline for NOW – For Tomorrow, NOW
– For Tomorrow would provide the outline for planning that would be aided by
impending federal legislation.181
By the 1950s, highway and transportation planning had risen to a top priority at
the federal level. The plans for the federal interstate highway systems added necessary
strength to the plans set in motion locally by the city of Atlanta and the planning
commission. The German Autobahn network served as a model for the U.S. Interstate
Highway system, opening the first segment in May 1935. President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, who during World War II was a U.S. Army general, saw the advantages
Germany enjoyed because of the autobahn network. He also noted the enhanced
mobility of the Allies when they fought their way into Germany. His first realization of
the value of good highways had come in 1919, when he participated in the U.S. Army's
first transcontinental motor convoy from Washington, D.C., to San Francisco. Shortly
after being elected president, during the State of the Union Address in 1954,
Eisenhower made it clear that the time had come to focus attention on the nation's
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highway problems. He deemed it necessary to "protect the vital interest of every citizen
in a safe and adequate highway system." Having held extensive hearings in 1953,
Congress quickly enacted the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954.182
When President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the states
had completed little over 6,400 miles of system improvements and only 24 percent of
interstate roadway was adequate for present traffic. This meant very little of the distance
had been reconstructed to meet traffic expected 20 years hence according to the
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR). In response, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954
authorized an additional $175 million for the interstate system. During the signing
ceremony at the White House on May 6, 1954, the president said, "This legislation is
one effective forward step in meeting the accumulated needs." Immediately, he realized
the pitfalls of the legislation and decided to do something about it. He began quickly
planning for a more elaborate interstate highway program for America.183
Eisenhower’s new plans, known as the “Grand Plan,” set a goal for a $50 billion
highway program that would be attainable in a ten year period. He argued that this
program be implemented because the current highway system was “inadequate locally,
and obsolete as a national system." He listed five "penalties" of the nation's obsolete
highway network: the annual death and injury toll, the waste of billions of dollars in
detours and traffic jams, the clogging of the nation's courts with highway-related suits,
the inefficiency in the transportation of goods, and the appalling inadequacies to meet
the demands of catastrophe or defense should an atomic war come. The president
182
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believed the grand plan would facilitate a properly articulated system of highways. The
president wanted a self-liquidating method of financing that would avoid debt. He
wanted a cooperative alliance between state and federal officials to accomplish the
federal part of the grand plan. And he wanted the federal government to cooperate with
the states to develop a modern state highway system. After two years of debate and
compromise, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, also known as the National
Interstate and Defense Highways Act, was enacted on June 29, 1956. With an original
authorization of $25 billion for the construction of 41,000 miles of the Interstate Highway
System over an anticipated 20-year period, it became the largest public works project in
American history through that time.184

Atlanta and Federal Advances
With the necessary support and funding in place at federal, state and local levels,
six planned interstate highway routes would radiate from Atlanta. These routes would
head northeast towards Spartanburg, northwest towards Chattanooga, westward
towards Birmingham, southwest towards Montgomery, southeast toward Macon, and
east towards Augusta. These proposed routes would penetrate the heart of the Atlanta
metropolitan area and serve the greatest feasible number of vehicles making trips within
the urban area. They would converge on the central business district, and at the core of
the system would be a downtown connector extending around the north, east and south
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sides of the downtown area. The construction of the downtown connector, along with
other links of the federal interstate highway system triggered an era of highway projects
that greatly altered the built environment of the city of Atlanta and the metropolitan area.
These large-scale civil engineering feats, coupled with other urban renewal programs
and the social goals of segregation, dramatically changed the lives and daily habits of
its citizenry. They dramatically changed the lives of the many African Americans whose
communities functioned in the very paths in which the interstate highways
encroached.185
By 1957, construction of the Downtown Connector neared completion. This
highway carried the north/south routes of Interstates 75 and Interstate 85, which
converged for the span of the distance through downtown. With a dramatic curve
around the rim of the Central Business District (CBD) to the east that began at the initial
approach of the CBD, the highway would not impede the flow of traffic within the city
center and harm valuable real estate. Rather, it would skirt around the edge and still
maintain the best access to the city’s core. In this planning move, directing the route
east of the central business district led to the heavily populated core of the city’s African
American business district, the Auburn Avenue corridor. Already labeled undesirable
and in most need of rejuvenation in the Lochner Report, this community and the other
centers of the African American population had been relegated to this condition after
decades of disfranchisement, segregation, and unequal distribution of resources to
them. Highway construction frequently served as a method of urban renewal, which
made the black neighborhoods even more vulnerable and by the standards of white
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leaders and highway planners, in need of rejuvenation. In the wake of planned
revitalization and rampant destruction, the black community became alarmed and
began to mobilize and voice their concerns over the growing issues of highway
construction and urban renewal programs.186
In Atlanta, wherever the highway/road system could possibly serve a racial
function, planners developed with that in mind. During the postwar decades, some new
highways became factors in the creation of buffers and barriers attempting to confine
blacks to certain parts of the city. The 1950s and 1960s produced various racial uses of
roads as the city attempted to maintain segregation while acknowledging the need for
additional black housing. The black community’s demands for more residential areas
also coincided with Atlanta’s extensive highway planning and road building during this
period. Though racial factors weighed heavily in planning highways, economic
concerns also played a major role. Nonetheless, race served as a significant factor in
highway planning and construction along with the use of roads as barriers.187
Amidst the tumultuous environment stemming from a faltering biracial
cooperation, blacks continued to voice their issues and make their opinions known.
They continued to challenge the lack of participation in transportation planning, the
housing crisis, and urban renewal. In a meeting of the Atlanta Business and
Professional Association in June 1958, Roswell O. Sutton, vice president of the blackowned Citizens Trust Bank188 and leader in the black business community, stated: “It will

186

Lochner, p. 11-12

187

Bayor, p. 61-62

188

Roswell O. Sutton, vice president of Citizens Trust Bank and leader in the Black Business community,
addressed the Atlanta Business and Professional Association on the problems of urban renewal. Atlanta
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be difficult to solve any problems in urban renewal or urban redevelopment as long as
we are forced to work with the bounds of segregation and discrimination.” In addressing
the construction of the downtown connector through the Auburn Avenue district, Sutton
stated that the expressway displaced many families and cut them off from the Auburn
Avenue shopping district. In his conclusion on highway construction and urban renewal
programs, he added that in the decision making and planning of such programs, those
persons affected needed representation on committees in authority. Sutton informed
that no blacks had been consulted or appointed to the planning committee for the
expressway. He asserted that the erection of this project disrupted or removed many
hundreds of black families. Sutton said, “Blacks should have the opportunity to know
who is in actual authority, and to appoint or elect our own representation, rather than
have them selected for us.” Black leaders, very aware of the parameters of operation in
a segregated society, realized early the damaging effects that would be caused by
rampant urban renewal in their communities. They showed concerted efforts to fight for
sustainability and long-term investments in their community.189
An opinions article appeared in the Atlanta Daily World in December 1959
entitled “The People Must Wake Up” and served as a call to action for the Auburn
Avenue community in the wake of the construction of the expressway and various other
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urban renewal projects. The article referred to that period of rampant urban renewal and
highway construction as a “sad picture in the municipal lives of blacks in the Auburn
Avenue district and Atlanta’s fourth ward.” It added that unfortunately, the racial issue
acted as the motive behind zoning issues and planning, and it should not be allowed to
influence urban renewal one way or the other. It concluded: “The entire black
community had better wake up. If the present trend of forcing displaced persons out of
the eastern portion of the city continues, the churches and business in the Auburn
Avenue district will die on the vine. And if this happens, the economy of our racial group
in the city in general will be undermined. Our people in general must wake up before it
is too late!”190

Conclusion
In this phase, planning took center stage as a major catalyst for growth and
prosperity in the city of Atlanta and the metropolitan region. The city’s leaders, both
black and white, engaged in an ongoing debate about plans that were to be most
beneficial to the city’s growing population. Perhaps the greatest issue in this ordeal was
that of proper representation in the creation of the plans. From Mayor Hartsfield’s Plan
of Improvement for the city to the Metropolitan Planning Commission’s Up Ahead and
NOW – For Tomorrow plans, race and representation played critical roles in the
acceptance and support. Without support, none of the plans could be successful in
satisfying neither the black electorate nor the white constituents of the expanding city.
Through public meetings, background maneuvering, annexation, unified leadership, and
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forceful resistance, the advances in planning for the city made way for the cooperation
instrumental in shaping the city. Cooperation would also be key in preparing the city for
more challenges on the horizon. Racial attitudes continued to influence policy decisions
in this period of desegregation and the battles heated up after 1954 as resistance to
change ensued. Federal advances seeking to bring about moderation and integration
arrived and faced great opposition in a place where traditions of segregation had long
delegated protocol. As Atlanta continued growing and planning, leaders continued to
cope with the challenges of segregation that had long prevailed.191
By the end of the 1950s, it had become increasingly clear that race and power in
the city of Atlanta remained intertwined with transportation planning and the physical
layout of the emerging federal interstate highway system. The swiftness of construction
and success of the Downtown Connector in increasing mobility and access to the
central business district while simultaneously serving as a barrier and line of
demarcation to the black population centers due east prompted more projects of this
nature. At the onset of the 1960s, plans for the West Expressway gained momentum.
Planners explicitly designed this project to separate the large and expanding African
American population on the Westside from their white counterparts. Transportation
planning and the struggle for equal rights and representation continued to be an
ongoing battle in the city of Atlanta throughout this period. Even as blacks became part
of a biracial political coalition that controlled city politics, they remained junior partners
throughout this era. Due to their voting power, there was some recognition of blacks;
however, this small advantage had no success in securing solutions to many of the
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community’s long-term problems. Without vested interest or even consideration for the
long-term problems of the African American community, the white power players
maintained the balance of power and continued on principles and traditions of
segregation.192

CHAPTER 3 – PHASE III, 1960-1968
After two decades of comparative racial progress, master planning, and
explosive growth, leaders and planners in the city of Atlanta aggressively pursued the
status of gateway of the American South. The 1960s and 1970s ushered in a new wave
of planning and growth for Atlanta and the region in general. In response to rapid
growth, the Georgia General Assembly established the Atlanta Region Metropolitan
Planning Commission (ARMPC), reorganizing metropolitan planning to create plans
aimed at making greater Atlanta a convenient and more desirable place. At this point,
expanded federal input and legislation brought more moderate measures to planning.
Problems stemming from the movement towards moderation and more liberal measures
grew as federal support created tension with the old and antiquated system woven in
the fabric of Georgia politics. Meanwhile, black residents of the city and the state
continued in the struggle for representation, rights and privileges. That struggle collided
with ongoing efforts in planning for city and metropolitan growth. Transportation
planning remained central in the planning discourse, now expanded to include rapid
transit.
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The establishment of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)
created a new avenue for black participation in transportation planning. Because
MARTA’s plans required voter approval for enactment, blacks used their growing
political power to their advantage. Also, with the Civil Rights Movement, city leaders and
boosters alike cautiously approached the handling of the impending change. They were
intent on presenting the city’s image as one of progress and promise, unlike Little Rock,
Birmingham, and other southern segregated strongholds. The motto, “A city too busy to
hate,” which had been coined by Mayor Hartsfield in earlier decades, would be put to
the test during the ongoing tumult of the decade.193
By 1960, the population of the metropolitan Atlanta region surpassed the
landmark one million mark. Rapid transit dominated the discussion of transportation
planning and growth management. With expanded boundaries and migration into the
surrounding unincorporated areas and hinterlands, linking and incorporating new
industrial and commercial developments into the transportation system became high
priority. The central core would be shuffled and reorganized as a result of the
transportation developments, urban renewal, rapid migration, and other federal
advances. Concurrently, the city’s spatial and built environment, and economic, political,
and racial structure experienced dramatic alterations. Approaching a new decade,
Atlanta emerged as an invigorated metropolis with advances in biracial cooperation,
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leadership, and rapid transit, and prepared for economic growth and development in the
decades to follow.194

Figure 16: Black Population: Atlanta and Vicinity, 1960 –
Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism,
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005

Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission
In accordance with growing trends in metropolitan planning and the accelerated
growth of the region, the 1960 session of the Georgia Assembly authorized the creation
of the new Atlanta Region Metropolitan Commission (ARMPC) and the agency held its
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organizational meeting that July. The amendment to the Metropolitan Planning
Commission’s legislation made way for the new agency, now a five county planning
commission. The restructured agency represented the city of Atlanta, along with
Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton and Gwinnett counties. As set forth in Georgia Law; was
It shall be the duty of the Commission to make comprehensive surveys
and studies of transportation facilities, land use, public utilities,
governmental facilities and services, natural resources, and other
physical, social, and economic factors, conditions, and trends that are
relevant to the probable future development of the district, and to make
and from time to time, as it may deem proper, amend, extend, or add to a
master plan for the orderly growth and development of the district as a
whole. Such master plan and amendments, extensions and additions
thereto, with the accompanying maps, plats, charts and descriptive matter,
shall be furnished to the governing authorities of the political subdivisions
participating in the fiscal support of the Commission and shall show the
Commission’s recommendations for the development of the district.195

With a steadily rising population, Atlanta ranked first in the Southeast and twenty-third in
the nation in terms of metropolitan population. ARMPC released an annual report on
population in 1960, showing outward growth of the metropolitan area in all directions
from the central city. With explosive growth radiating from Five Points, ARMPC placed
greater interest in joint efforts of planning for the expanding metropolitan area as a
whole. With more jurisdictions, ARMPC responsibilities and planning now affected
more people and its advisory powers involved interaction with more local municipalities
within the five-county planning area.196
The Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission composed of fifteen
members representing the six participating governments. Three members each were
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appointed from the City of Atlanta, DeKalb County and Fulton County; and two each
from Gwinnett, Cobb and Clayton counties. Leadership and protocol within the
commission was established and adopted once the full commission was set and in
order. The executive director served as the head of the staff with responsibilities
including overall administration and community relations. The planning director’s task
involved direct charge of planning programs, the supervision of projects and the
preparation of reports, studies and surveys. The work of the commission would be
developed from the continued review and analysis of the region’s problems and
potential. Projects would be reviewed on an annual basis, along with the submission of
program and budget requests. With reorganization set and in motion, ARMPC’s overall
purpose was the development of the best public policy for the entire metropolitan
region. In its introductory literature, ARMPC stated, “Metropolitan planning functions at a
new level of government; it serves as a vehicle for coordinating planning of municipal
and county units of government, relating it all to the area as a whole. Furthermore,
planning at the metropolitan level seeks to harmonize local plans with those of the state
and the nation.”197
The support of the federal government further expedited metropolitan planning.
President John F. Kennedy in a message on urban affairs stated:
The city and its suburbs are interdependent parts of a single community,
bound together by the web of transportation and other public facilities and
by common economic interests.
Bold programs and individual
jurisdictions are no longer enough. And increasingly, community
development must be a cooperative venture toward the common goals of
the metropolitan region as a whole.198
197
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With the four broad functions of maintaining research programs, making comprehensive
plans, furthering teamwork and coordination among all local governments, and
providing assistance and advice to local agencies and governments; ARMPC mobilized
to assist in the complex process of helping citizens give order, direction and guidance to
the growth of the expanding metropolitan Atlanta region.199

New Leadership on the Horizon
Along with the changes in planning, there were changes in city leadership. When
Mayor Hartsfield decided not to seek reelection in 1961, the biracial coalition that had
held the city together through racially charged adversity began to falter. After the
Egleston controversy in 1960, faith in Hartsfield and the continued assurance of the
coalition became lackluster. The controversy stemmed from proposed usage of the
former site of Egleston Hospital located on Forrest Drive in an area that had become
extensively black. The site, located near the all-white Georgia Baptist Hospital, had
been purchased by the Housing Authority for the construction of 350 units of public
housing. White citizens feared the hospital would become encircled by blacks with the
expansion of public housing in the area, creating an expanding eastside ghetto. The
city’s all-white Board of Aldermen ultimately voted not to allow the land to be used for
public housing, angering blacks that believed the site would provide housing for
residents of the Eastside being displaced by highway construction and other urban
renewal projects. In the end, Hartsfield came under considerable criticism from the
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coalition, and moderate white leaders became fearful that responsible black leadership
would abandon protocol in the biracial coalition.200
Now over the age of seventy, Hartsfield had served as mayor for nearly twentyfive years and some supporters begin to question his vitality in the role. The moment for
a transition in city leadership approached and the coalition, still struggling to maintain its
dominant role in the progress of the city, selected businessman Ivan Allen, Jr. as its
candidate in the upcoming mayoral race.201 As a member of the power structure, Allen
headed the Chamber of Commerce. His father had served as a Georgia state senator
and led one of Atlanta’s most prominent corporations, the office equipment firm known
as the Ivan Allen Company. Allen, Jr., born and reared in Atlanta in the manner of an
established white family with means, was oblivious to many racial issues early in his life,
yet ironically helped oversee a period of great racial upheaval. In his notes on the
1960s, Allen explained:
. . . A Negro woman named Bertha Lewis attended my mother as midwife.
But after that first moment of my life, when the first hand to touch me was
a black hand, it was a very long time before I came into close personal
contact with a Negro again – except with the succession of maids who
helped raise me and later, raise my own children. We were members of
the comfortable white Southern business establishment, and therefore had
no reason to mingle with the black except on a paternalistic boss-to-lackey
basis.202
He further explained that due to the “system” and traditions of the South, and the
upward mobility and status of his position in society, the “social problems” of southern
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society were considered those of poor whites in the rural South, rather than those of
blacks in America.203
The paradox of the role of race in Allen’s life is fascinating considering his role in
race relations, which was very critical to the growth, prosperity, and progress of the city
during this period. His story is consistent with the cycle of the racial issue in Atlanta and
is very similar to that of many other progressive white leaders throughout the South and
around the nation. From not even being able to recall the racial issue being mentioned
while enrolled at Georgia Tech, to it being a central issue of his platform and
administration as mayor, Allen’s approach to mending many of the city’s problems was
based on maintaining the ties of biracial cooperation, which had held the city together
thus far. In seeking advice on how to approach the racial issue as he geared for public
service, he fell short as many of the city’s leading whites were without knowledge or
innovative solutions. Even his own father, heralded as a moderate by the standards of
his time, and a big supporter of New Deal social welfare programs, was without sound
advice. Allen realized that he would have to be innovative in his approach to race
relations. With the inevitability of the Civil Rights Movement, moderation and equality
were prominent themes of the Allen era of leadership in Atlanta.204
Allen’s entrance into the full spectrum of Atlanta’s political life took place at a
critical juncture in the history of the city and the state. A much more conservative
attitude in terms of race persisted throughout the state of Georgia than in Atlanta and
other small urban centers. This difference in attitudes enhanced the growing divide in
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the state. With measures such as the county-unit system in place, moderate leaders
from urban centers stood no chance against the conservatism of the rural counties.
Racial conservatives were entrenched by the “system” which literally pounced the black
quest for rights and equality out in all areas. Scraping the thought of statewide
leadership, Allen turned his focus and attention towards the city of Atlanta and
answered the charge set for by the old guard of white leaders. In realizing that times
were changing and they were not prepared for the challenges of the second half of the
twentieth century, the old guard released their power to the new generation. This group,
Allen included, was younger and expected to function in similar fashion, and to make
the city a better place than it was when they inherited it. The transfer of power began in
the early 1950s, and in less than one decade, Allen assumed the position as mayor in
one of the most tumultuous decades in American history.205

Ivan Allen and the Direct Action of the Civil Rights Movement
Allen’s awakening to the problems of blacks in Atlanta came through his
association with Grace Hamilton, executive director of the Atlanta Urban League. He
became acquainted with her through the Atlanta Urban League’s association with the
Atlanta Community Chest, a social services organization in which he headed.
Traditionally, the Community Chest paid the $500 National Urban League dues for the
Atlanta branch and its director. In 1949, Allen became the first white man asked to
attend the black division of the Community Chest’s opening dinner. This event
reminded him of the historic closeness that he shared with blacks and evoked in him a
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spirit of compassion and gradual moderation. So when Allen decided to run for office in
the city, he solicited the support of Hamilton and some of the city’s major black leaders,
in particular president of the Citizens Trust Company L.D. Milton. Allen’s connection to
Milton also stemmed from his role at the Community Chest. Allen knew that without their
support, he would have an extremely difficult time being elected mayor of the city with
the political atmosphere of the early 1960s.206
The first two years of the 1960s proved to be pivotal years not only for Allen, but
also for blacks through actions of the civil rights movement. The birth of the sit-in
movement in Greensboro, North Carolina on February 1, 1960, launched the direct
action phase of the civil rights movement. Six weeks later, Atlanta entered this phase of
direct action known as the Atlanta Student Movement with a declaration from students
at the Atlanta University Center. An appeal for human rights drafted by the students
appeared as a full-page advertisement in the Constitution and struck Allen and all
leaders in white Atlanta with a jolt. The advertisement stated:
“AN APPEAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: We, the students of the six affiliated
institutions for the Atlanta University Center . . . have joined our hearts,
minds, and bodies in the cause of gaining those rights which are
inherently ours and members of the human race and as citizens of the
United States.”
Signed by the student leaders from the respective schools, the manifesto called for an
end to racial prejudice and injustice in all facets of life in Atlanta. Direct action and the
threat of sit-ins heightened racial tensions in Atlanta to such a degree that white and
black leaders feared not only widespread racial violence, but also a disruption of the
steadfast voting coalition of blacks and upper income whites. They believed this

206

Pomerantz, pp. 176-179. Mullis, p. 202.

144

disruption would result in the election of a racially insensitive mayor and further
exacerbate racial tensions.207
As racial tension grew over the sit-in movement, Ivan Allen realized that his role
in the matters of desegregation could greatly affect his political future. By the fall of
1960, as the student movement unfolded, Allen was on the brink of change, about to be
recast by changing laws and political realities into a southern liberal. As the student
boycotts of downtown stores gained support among blacks in the city, students
intensified plans and challenged the leadership of the old guard of blacks leaders. By
this time in the Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. had entered the scene in
Atlanta and brought national attention to many of the actions of the student movement.
On October 19, 1960, the series of sit-ins began at Rich’s, Atlanta largest department
store, and continued to other department stores across downtown. This event ended in
the arrest of Martin Luther King, Jr. and over fifty students. Most of the protesters
refused bail and remained in jail, a tactic they hoped would increase pressure on the
white merchants of the downtown businesses.208
Meanwhile, as the student movement progressed, Allen developed a
comprehensive proposal for his role as president of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce.
Entitled “The Six-Point Program,” the proposal seemed to reflect a platform for an
aspiring mayor rather than a blueprint for a Chamber of Commerce leader. The
proposal called for the construction of a coliseum-auditorium and a stadium, and the
support of urban renewal and low-income housing opportunities. Interestingly, it called
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for the completion of all projected expressways by 1970 and the development of a rapid
transit system. The proposal also called for a nationwide advertising program called
“Forward Atlanta,” a concept and name borrowed from an earlier chamber program
which his father helped implement. Finally, the proposal supported the desegregation
of schools. Though leery of his motives, especially his willingness to compromise with
blacks, leaders of the Chamber of Commerce reluctantly appointed him to the
presidency.209
As president of the Chamber of Commerce, Allen took a leading role in the
negotiations to end the sit-in demonstrations. He had impressed the old black elite with
his growing moderation on racial matters during negotiation meetings, but his role in the
sit-ins settlement had not garnered him favor among the college students. Allen had
orchestrated the parameters for the negotiations and hosted the sessions in the
fourteenth-floor boardroom of the Commerce Club. He even met with editors of the
Atlanta newspapers to explain the negotiations and requested that the newspapers
minimize publicity to prevent fear. He recognized that fear could undermine chances for
settlement. The negotiation meetings included members of white business community
and core black leaders including members of the old guard, student leaders, and
business leaders. After weeks of tense negotiations, the two factions reached an
agreement. Announced on March 7, 1961, the agreement stated that lunch counters
would reopen immediately on a segregated basis, but would be desegregated in the fall
in concert with desegregation of city schools. In the meantime, the black student
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protests would end. Through this role as negotiator, black Atlantans began to know Ivan
Allen, Jr.210
On June 19, 1961, Allen announced his candidacy for mayor. For the first time
since 1937, Atlantans had an opportunity to elect a new mayor. Hartsfield announced
that he wouldn’t seek a seventh term and declared himself mayor emeritus. The white
power structure had already selected Allen as Hartsfield’s successor. Privately,
Hartsfield told his friends that if a segregationist won the primary he might enter the
general election. With the impending desegregation of the public schools, Hartsfield
knew that racial matters would be the central issue in the mayor’s race. Already
experienced in peaceful negotiations in racial matters, Ivan Allen Jr. stood poised to
assume leadership in the city’s highest office.211

A Westside Story
Throughout his tenure as mayor during the 1960s, Allen faced challenges across
the city’s racialized landscape. He worked with officials to pursue aggressive measures
in planning to accommodate rapid growth and changes over the decade. The city’s
Westside provides the perfect backdrop to view this period’s changes as they
happened. The story of the Westside of Atlanta in transportation planning including the
development of the West expressway parallels that of earlier highway construction
through the Auburn Avenue district. With lines of racial demarcation made evident in
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events like the Peyton Wall fiasco, the Westside story ties transportation planning with
white flight and racial transition.
Since the late nineteenth century, the immediate west of downtown extending to
Ashby Street had been an area with a concentration of black residents. Through the
establishment of black schools, colleges, and churches, the black population grew and
flourished on the Westside of town. By the turn of the twentieth century and well into,
many of the city’s black residents lived in the area surrounding the Atlanta University
Center, including Vine City and the West End. Segregated communities created
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century contributed to many of the
issues that arose in the postwar period, especially those associated with black
population growth, expansion, mobility and movement throughout the city. The
expanding Westside of Atlanta, including Washington Park, Mozley Park, and east of
Ashby Street, became an area of great contention and racial transition, and provides a
great background for a story of race, mobility, and transportation planning in Atlanta.212
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Figure 17: Map of Atlanta’s Westside, showing the West End, Black Colleges of the
Atlanta University Center, and neighborhoods beyond Ashby Street, 1950 –
Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005
Atlanta’s great investments in highway and transportation planning of the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s geared the city to continue in its role as the transportation center of
the southeastern United States, while simultaneously coinciding with the black
community’s demand for racial equality. Postwar transportation planning in the form of
highway and road building faced great opposition with the construction of the downtown
connector through the heart of the Auburn Avenue business district. This highway
came even after the black community in that area rallied to prevent such destructive
measures. Lacking representation in planning efforts, blacks continued to face such
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measures in other areas of the city, most notably the Westside. During the postwar
period, some new highways, including the west expressway, became a factor in the
creation of buffers and barriers to try to confine blacks to certain parts of mainly west
side Atlanta. At the point of highway construction on the west side, the issues of
residential segregation had boiled over into highway planning. In the west side
community of Adamsville, a 1960 planning report noted that there was a general
knowledge that the west expressway would serve as a boundary between the black and
white communities. And there were many understandings of this nature where city
leaders and highway planners listened to the white citizens of the area.213
The specific functions of the west expressway as listed in the Now – For
Tomorrow plan in 1954 included providing a new interstate route to Birmingham. The
west expressway would also encourage the development of the Chattahoochee
Industrial District and link the district to industrial and commercial facilities in the central
city. It would provide a direct interchange with the north-south expressway and the ring
roads already planned or completed. Moreover, it would provide highway access to the
sprawling westward populations.214
The use of the west expressway as a racial buffer appeared destined, as its route
traversed one of the most racially contested areas of the city. The Westside in many
cases became the site of expansion for blacks during the rapid of urban renewal and
redistribution of population as a result of displacement by major projects such as that of
the highways. Large black populations being displaced ended up in the west near
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sections like the Atlanta University Center where black neighborhoods already existed.
Black expansion deeper into the Westside coincided with the growing need for black
housing during the postwar period and the growing political presence and fight for
recognition during this period.215
By 1960, the racial line on the Westside was firm, and white citizens were intent
on maintaining the boundaries of separation by any means necessary. With an influx in
planning associated with the west expressway and other large-scale projects,
redevelopment on the Westside had become steady. The Atlanta University Center
(AUC) and other areas further west became the focus of many of the new
redevelopment plans. Although the new expressway received much of the focus, the
plans also included urban renewal programs, housing projects and industrial
development. Black leaders affiliated with the AUC urged city officials to include
consideration of the needs of the center and its constituencies in the redevelopment
process.216
Robert Thompson of the Atlanta Urban League stated the west expressway
posed a great threat to the Atlanta University Center community and the surrounding
areas. He continued that if the proposed expressway were placed in its planned route,
it would destroy the continuity of the campuses in the AUC. He also stated that the
construction of a large number of public housing projects in the area would create a
concentration of black population in one area of the city, which would help to stifle black
mobility and political potential. Congregating blacks in such specific areas would
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diminish black political presence in other wards and districts across the city. His
recommendations were hardly taken into consideration as white citizens often
requested of city leadership that highways, as well as urban renewal, housing projects,
and industrial development be used as lines to racial demarcation. Fighting racial
transition by any means necessary, and protecting the “integrity”217 of their communities
became the clarion call of white citizens on the west side of Atlanta. From Adamsville to
Center Hill to Mozley Park, these citizens sought to thwart the undesired encroachment
by the growing black population and use whatever methods, tools and connections they
had available to hinder black mobility.218
Perhaps one of the most well-known challenges to black mobility took place in
the rapidly transitioning west side of Atlanta. The “Peyton Wall” was highly publicized
and garnered unfavorable attention on a city where maintaining a peaceful and
progressive image was everything. Peyton Forest Subdivision, a white development,
secured approval from city officials to close and barricade sections of Peyton and
Harlan Roads to maintain the “integrity” of the white neighborhood. City construction
crews placed barricades as barriers to prevent blacks from encroaching upon yet
another contested neighborhood on the city’s west side. The roadblock stood at the
precise location between black and white sections, with wooden beams painted black
and white, bolted to steel I-beams, and planted into the pavement. A member of the
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delegation before the city’s aldermanic board gave the following reason for closing the
streets:
To preserve the area, the homes, and what is already. Our main point is
to preserve this area because the road [Peyton] is not essential to get
anywhere . . . I am interested in the stability of our community. Closing of
the two streets is absolutely necessary for the welfare of our community.
As a result of closing the streets no one will lose, but everyone will gain.219
Unified black leadership in the city called the Peyton Wall an “indefensible bar to
Atlanta’s progress,” and stated that the move to “wall-in” blacks would not be tolerated
at election time. Elsewhere, the national press compared this fiasco to the Berlin Wall.
Blacks rallied intensely against the “Atlanta Wall,” as it would become known, exerting
some political clout and threatening economic boycotts of merchants who supported the
idea. Attorney Donald Lee Hollowell stated that permitting such actions as the Peyton
Road barricade would be an extraordinary bad precedent to set in 1962 in Atlanta. He
added, “at a time when our nation is struggling to maintain the leadership that it has,
Atlanta cannot set precedents in building walls at this time when we look across the
waters and see what buffers do.” In another statement to the Greater Atlanta Council on
Human Relations, black leaders noted, “this is not the time for irresponsible action,
which could only compound, not solve our problems. It is not time for Atlanta to start
building a Berlin Wall.” In the end, black resistance and the negative publicity in which
“the city too busy to hate” received, forced an end to the “Atlanta Wall” and any further

219

Atlanta Daily World, December 14, 1962

153

use of city planning and zoning policies for the purposes of maintaining racial
boundaries and limiting black mobility about the city.220

Figure 18: Peyton Wall, Atlanta History Center

Challenging Georgia’s County-Unit System
Throughout its existence, rural Georgians argued that the county unit system was
their only mechanism of defense against the cities, in particular Atlanta. Without it, they
believed farmers and rural constituents would have no voice in state government. The
county unit system ensured victories in most cases for the rural population and they had
been so supportive of the virtues of the system that they defended it with their all. The
220
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county unit system was a burdensome, costly and grossly unfair process for electing
state officials, and most politicians and practically all urban, middle-class Georgians
knew it. Yet for 45 years, this system dominated Georgia politics and disenfranchised
various segments of the total state electorate.221
The county-unit system was deeply unequal from the beginning and increased
over time. The inequities became more pronounced as the boll weevil caused an
exodus from the farms, the Great Depression, New Deal programs leading people to
leave farms, and the urbanizing effects of World War II. Thus, the inequities became
even greater as the population became increasingly urban. In 1960, the state’s three
smallest counties, with a combined population of approximately 7,000, together, yielded
the same unit votes as the largest county, Fulton County, with a total population over
550,000. Case in point: to be elected governor, one would need 206 of the 410 county
unit votes. Under the auspices of the county unit system, a candidate could bypass all
the major urban centers in the state and still receive enough units to be victorious. The
candidate could have simply targeted units in 103 of the 121 two-unit counties.222
Units were assigned according to population, and placed in three categories:
urban, town, and rural. The urban counties constituted the state’s most populous
(Fulton, DeKalb, Chatham); town counties included the next 30 in population (Floyd,
Lowndes, Baldwin); and rural, the most dominate in the equation, encompassed the
remaining 121 (Echols, Glascock, Quitman). Using this scale of assignment, the urban
counties received six unit votes, the town counties received four, and the rural counties
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received two. And because the county unit vote superseded the popular vote,
candidates often concerned themselves with winning unit votes rather than the popular
vote. Staunch segregationist governor Eugene Talmadge famously said that he never
campaigned in a town that had a streetcar, meaning he never campaigned in urban
counties.223
The county unit system effectively disfranchised the people in large population
centers, virtually placing state leadership and decision-making power in the hands of the
rural electorate. The prerequisite for winning a state election was thereby through the
keenness of dealing with political leaders in those counties whose combined units would
automatically ensure a majority. With rural dominance at the helm of Georgia politics,
the protection of rural interests in the case of such policies as legal segregation and
other aspects of white supremacy remained at the forefront. In many cases, diluting the
influence of more liberal urban and black voters became the goals of rural interests
under the county unit system.224
In the spring of 1962, the elimination of Georgia’s county unit system hit the
state’s political scene like a bombshell. The challenge to the system presented to the
federal courts by activist Fulton County citizen James O’Hear Sanders, against James
Gray, chairman of the state Democratic Committee, and Ben Fortson, secretary of state,
along with top officials in both the party and state government. Sanders contended that
the county unit system gave rural counties a disproportionate share of votes and
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discriminated against city voters. Sanders v. Gray tested the legality of Georgia’s laws
and antiquated customs that had protected rural dominance and maintained white
supremacy. The three-judge Federal Court of Appeals declared that the system
constituted “invidious discrimination” and violated Sanders’ rights under the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.225
This momentous decision in the political life of Georgia was handed down only
one month after Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court decision in Tennessee that carved a
legal path for such ruling. In the landmark decision of Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down practices throughout the United States that permitted gross political
inequities among both individual citizens and communities. This decision set the
precedent for federal courts to take jurisdiction in such state political matters. The “one
man, one vote” ruling strengthened the popular vote and propelled the democratic ideal
that representation be based on population. In his memoirs, Jimmy Carter noted that the
outcomes of these two cases transformed the political scene in Georgia and a new day
was on the horizon.226

Extended Black participation and the Election of Leroy Johnson
The elimination of Georgia’s county unit system made way for the upward
movement of blacks in Georgia politics. It especially assisted those in urban centers
like Atlanta and Savannah where larger populations could greatly determine elections.
The county unit system had decided primary elections, representation in the state house
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and Senate, and allowed politicians to win with less than a majority of the popular votes.
The system also contributed to the lack of recognition for Fulton County and its
invigorated black electorate. The “one man, one vote” policy that came with the removal
of the county unit system ushered in the measures of reapportionment in the state
senate based on population and required candidates to qualify from their particular
districts. Rural legislators had long controlled the Georgia senate and house, and their
domination created legislative bodies underrepresented with individuals from urban and
heavily populated areas since representation was not based on population. With the
court-ordered reapportionment in place in the Senate in 1962, the possibility of blacks
being elected into the Georgia state became a reality and black citizens became
prominently mentioned as possible Fulton County senatorial candidates for the first time
in Georgia’s modern political history.227
With the removal of barriers to political mobility, electoral politics became a more
useful and powerful weapon in which the black community used in the fight for equality.
In the fall of 1962, attorney Leroy Johnson entered the state legislature as Georgia’s
first Black senator since 1870. A special session in the fall of 1962 reapportioned the
Senate, resulting in increased black representation for Atlanta and Fulton County.
Johnson challenged and successfully defeated four white candidates in the Democratic
primary, along with T.M. Alexander, the black Republican candidate in the general
election. Johnson carried District 38 in Fulton County and Atlanta, and his election
marked the integration of the Georgia State Capitol. In various instances, Johnson
acknowledged his election as groundbreaking and assured that his representation
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would not be for blacks alone, but for all people. With the possibility of blacks actually
being elected to such positions, this election created waves of participation and
mobilization efforts. It set the precedent and invigorated the forward charge for the full
incorporation of blacks into the democratic processes and liberties already enjoyed by
white citizens of Atlanta.228

“Urban Renewal . . . or Negro Removal”
While political change altered the social and governmental structure, federal
advances and available funding in the postwar period led to great alterations of the built
environment in cities across the country. During this period, urban decay became more
pronounced as aging infrastructures could not accommodate widespread growth. City
planners and leaders were intent on finding solutions to the problems of urban decay.
Economic depression along with the war efforts had halted construction and prevented
needed repairs on the infrastructure of many American cities. As a result, physical
decay and acres of slum and blight were visible in cities across the nation.229 In the
rapidly growing metropolis of Atlanta, as in other cities, urban renewal was complicated
by race and the system of American apartheid, which dominated planning and decisionmaking. With public policy decisions in the hands of white leaders in favor of
modernizing and economic progress, the renewal of the city’s urban core reflected
large-scale projects that enhanced business and commercial activities and
simultaneously displaced mostly the poor black population. Investigating urban renewal
228
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in Atlanta in the postwar period reveals the intent of white leaders to maintain traditions
of segregation and restrict mobility among blacks.230
The Citizens Advisory Committee for Urban Renewal, a biracial committee
designed to promote understanding of Atlanta’s urban renewal programs, became the
leading authority on issues pertaining to urban renewal. Mayor Hartsfield established
the committee in 1958 for the purpose of advising him on the city’s multi-million dollar
investment in urban renewal programs. In its fact sheet for Atlanta’s urban renewal
programs, the committee defined urban renewal as a national program dedicated to
conserving and rebuilding cities, implemented by the National Housing Act of 1954. It
further explained that the goals of urban renewal were: prevention of blight,
neighborhood conservation or rehabilitation, and slum clearance and land
redevelopment. In financing urban renewal programs, one-third of the net costs would
be met by the locality, either in cash or by local improvements such as streets, sewers,
and parks. The remaining two-thirds was to be paid by the federal government.
Federal assistance hurried urban renewal, and the city was intent on capitalizing on
these resources, which aided business and commercial interests. Though well intended,
urban renewal programs in the city of Atlanta often created adversity rather than
solutions to the issues which the programs were designed to solve.231
Members of the black community grew skeptical of urban renewal tactics from
the very beginning in the 1950s. Leaders questioned the “silent tactics” used by white
leaders of the city’s Urban Renewal Committee. L.D. Milton, president of the Citizens
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Trust Company and a black leader of high regard, served as a member of the Urban
Renewal Committee. Ivan Allen referred to Milton as a proud black man who was
obviously better educated than him. He also regarded him as one who would defer to
no one and a leader of the black community whose caliber and status he wished he had
in his own community.232
As a vocal committee member, Milton relayed stories of “cover-up schemes”
back to his constituents. He stated that neither he nor any other black leaders had been
able to persuade renewal officials to honestly pinpoint how renewal would impact the
black communities. Milton elaborated that each black citizen affected by proposals of
urban renewal had the right to know how all property seized would be used in the
redevelopment plans. Further investigation of the urban renewal plans revealed what
Ron Bayor has referred to as “not simply incidental by-products” of the process. Milton
believed that there was no reason to believe the urban renewal plans would directly
affect Auburn Avenue businesses and other black businesses in general. He argued
that there could be a scheme to “freeze out” black businesses by removing all potential
customers. For that matter, Milton urged black citizens to exert as much pressure as
needed to guarantee equal opportunity in reclaiming lands in clearance zones. Urban
renewal zones became areas of contention and racial divide as white leaders sought to
bring economic and business development to the urban core, even if it was at expense
of the black community and businesses who occupied premium downtown and
peripheral space.233
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Highway and transportation planning directly linked with urban renewal in Atlanta
and in cities across the nation. The creation of the national system of interstate
highways was an undertaking on the federal level in the works since the early postwar
period. By the 1960s, this program had matured greatly and the impacts were felt and
seen all about the nation. In Atlanta, the routing of the interstate highways through the
urban core altered the landscape dramatically and caused displacement of those living
in the residential sections, which were mostly black. Although intended on using routes
as methods of revitalization and redevelopment, the actions of highway planning
dramatically increased the need for housing. Planners labeled areas in the path of the
encroaching highways as blighted, uninhabitable and in most need of renewal. These
slums, as they were referred, impeded the progress of a city on the move like Atlanta.
Likewise, federal policy that created the emerging highway systems would bear the
responsibility of finding solutions to amend the problems created by it. Urban renewal
programs, which originated in housing, were now needed even more in the area of
housing for the city of Atlanta. Because of measures and restrictions of segregation,
the programs contributed to the ongoing issues of the racially charged city.

Rapid Transit Discussion
Expressed as one of the highlights of the regional planning program in the early
1960s, rapid transit rose to the forefront of planning by the Atlanta Region Metropolitan
Planning Commission. This shift to rapid transit came as Atlanta embarked upon its
ambitious highway and expressway building campaign, like other major American cities.
With the passage of the Federal Interstate Highways Act in 1956, which made 90
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percent federal aid available in the construction of the interstate highways, the state was
more than eager to pick up the 10 percent remainder.234 With that assistance, Atlanta
was able to begin in the construction of a vast network of highways. Though deemed
efficient, planners realized that even the ambitious highway plan would not be enough
to accommodate the growth and facilitate the mobility for the millions in the region. In
the early stages of planning, the Metropolitan Planning Commission wrote of the need
for rapid transit in NOW – FOR TOMORROW, which was presented in 1954. Further
supporting the rapid transit discussion, in Crosstown and By-Pass Expressways,
published in 1959, MPC suggested that in the design of future expressway routes, the
eventual accommodation of a rapid transit line in conjunction with the expressway
“would have the double advantage of providing for eventual relief of the expressway and
of facilitating the acquisition of rapid transit right-of-way which would otherwise be
difficult to acquire.” It concluded that drastic transit innovations, such as rapid transit,
was essential and should be studied as a solution to the growing transportation issues
in the wake of explosive metropolitan growth.235
At the onset of the rapid transit discussion, ARMPC published various reports
and felt that rapid transit had reached the stage in Atlanta by 1963 where it could be
characterized in a regional plan ready for implementation. What You Should Know
About Rapid Transit, published in 1960 and the Atlanta Region Comprehensive Plan,
published in 1961, both provided the metropolitan area with literature on the benefits of
rapid transit. Another publication, Rapid Atlanta, published in 1960 by the Atlanta
234
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Transit System, was the first of the literature created to promote rapid transit. The
earlier publications were only meant to introduce the concepts and benefits of rapid
transit, while latter publications produced specialized reports intended to garner serious
and professional consideration. With more support for rapid transit along the realization
of its benefits among city leaders and planners, the likelihood of a program for Atlanta
became more viable.236
The discussion and implementation of rapid transit paralleled the discussion of
progress and economic development that guided city leaders and boosters in the
postwar decades. Many cities and states across the country joined in extensive quests
for financial and administrative solutions to critical mass transportation problems.
Created in 1951 by the California Legislature, the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit Commission recommended a rapid transit system as part of a unified network of
local and interurban transportation. In Washington, D.C., the National Capital Planning
Commission completed land-use surveys of the Washington metropolitan area as a
basis for determining the future rapid transit system. In 1960, Congress created the
National Capital Transportation Agency for the purpose of establishing a regional
network of rail rapid transit facilities focusing on downtown areas and extending into
Virginia and Maryland. Cleveland also made the decision to construct a rapid rail transit
route and other improvements to the transit system. By 1960, the Cleveland Transit
system operated one of the fastest transit lines in the country, bringing people
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downtown in fifteen minutes from points as far as seven miles away. Atlanta’s rapid
transit story fits directly in the national narrative on rapid transit in the postwar period.237
Planners viewed rapid transit as an “unusually useful tool for improving the
Atlanta metropolitan area.” In The Impact of Rapid Transit on Metropolitan Atlanta, a
study produced by planning consultants vying for rapid transit and the contracts it would
create, preparers noted that, “no single activity will direct the shape and forge the
character of Atlanta metropolitan area as will the proposed rapid transit system.” In
speaking of the progress that it would bring, the planners stated, “over the next three
decades, most office construction and high-rise apartments as well as many public
buildings, commercial facilities and places of work may be located in regard to the
system.” Rapid transit would therefore help to create the high quality and efficient urban
environment, which was the objective of metropolitan planning.238
Proponents of rapid transit argued that it could offer a suitable solution to the
transportation needs of the rapidly expanding metropolitan area. Along with the system
of interstate highways and expressways, construction and implementation of rapid
transit would not only meet the transportation needs for the new few years, but well into
the next century. Planning consultants explained:
Rapid transit has within its power the ability to help create an urban
environment of high quality. It can improve the efficiency and reduce the
cost of living in the metropolitan area. It can make the urban area safer,
more beautiful and more habitable. It can elevate the lives of all citizens:
improve the level of schooling of its children, enliven the growing amount
of leisure time, bring the arts closer to people, improve job opportunities,
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help eliminate the problems of the poor, and expand the choices for
housing.239
Tremendous growth around such a system aligned with projected progress and growth
for the metropolitan area. Rapid transit added a new element to transportation planning,
which would require the participation and representation of all citizens, regardless of
race. Rapid transit would expand the roles of city leadership in transportation planning,
and require more cooperation. Rapid transit planning provided a new avenue for black
participation in public policy and another means of achieving the goal of getting blacks
on the metropolitan planning commission. With more active political participation and
prowess within the Atlanta political arena, blacks were well on their way to demanding
that the void of representation be filled in the area of transportation planning.240
Atlanta’s plan for a rapid transit system gained momentum in January 1962 after
a series of public hearings before the Board of Aldermen brought greater attention to
the benefits. The proposed rapid transit system comprised of a chain of rail lines to
bring fast commuter trains from outlying areas of the metropolitan region into the heart
of the city. A proposed act of the State legislature providing for a constitutional
amendment to enable a self-governing “Rapid Transit Authority” to be created had
already caused raised questions among local officials and those in the surrounding
counties and towns. In accordance with the onward plans for economic development of
the central business district, Mayor Ivan Allen had advocated the project during his
mayoral campaign. Questions raised from the original proposal stemmed from the fact
some members of the aldermanic board felt the that city should have sole control over
239
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the proposed rapid transit authority to the exclusion of any voice by Fulton, DeKalb, and
outlying towns and counties of the metropolitan area. They felt that this measure would
best protect the interest of Atlanta taxpayers. The public hearings helped to bring clarity
and definitive plans for a final proposal to be submitted to the General Assembly. After
hearing the opinions of business, labor and civil leaders from the metropolitan area, a
final proposal included the necessary changes and addenda. The resolution in the final
form outlined the establishment of a rapid transit authority with representation from
Fulton and DeKalb counties and other outlying areas, which the system would serve.
The essential point outlined was the fact that the city of Atlanta should have equal
controlling power and representation on the transit authority.241
The authorization of a six-government Rapid Transit Commission by the 1962
General Assembly to study the present and future transportation problems of the areas
represented a great task for those chosen to function on the 11-person committee. The
members represented Atlanta, and Fulton, DeKalb, Clayton, Gwinnett, and Cobb
counties. The five county region of the Atlanta metropolitan area had surpassed the
million mark by 1960 and was rapidly growing in all directions. According to planners, a
high quality regional rapid transit system would complement and relieve the expressway
system. It was urgent in preparations to meet future transportation demands. ARMPC
recommended an initial rapid transit system with 60 miles of high-speed lines serving
the five counties. The recommended system, at an estimated cost of 200-215 million
dollars, included right-of-way purchases, rolling stock, structures, stations, and
installations. ARMPC estimated the construction of the system to take 5 – 8 years, to be
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completed by the end of the decade at a time when the need for rapid transit would be
extremely necessary. The creation of the Rapid Transit Study Commission represented
the continued need in planning for orderly development and solutions for good
transportation for the rapidly growing region. It also represented continued progress in
black mobility with the appointment of a black representative among the four Atlanta
members of the study commission. The appointment was highly commended by the
black community.242
In a move consistent with his progressive attitude and the changed realities of
Atlanta, Mayor Ivan Allen appointed C.A. Scott to the 11-member Rapid Transit Study
Commission. Scott, editor of the Atlanta Daily World, accepted the appointment and
began work with the study commission on defining and establishing a solid program of
rapid transit for the region. Scott’s post as the head of Atlanta’s leading black
newspaper could assist in promoting rapid transit in the black community. In a speech
before the Atlanta Frontiers Club, Scott pointed out the explosive growth of the region
and the need for rapid transit. He explained, “some sort of rapid mass transit will be
required if the people are to be able to get into and out of the downtown area. Atlanta is
about where Cleveland, Ohio was some years ago when it began a study for rapid
transit, and today it has a fine rapid system.” Scott further explained that with the
recommendations of ARMPC, and the aid of an engineering firm with experience in
rapid transit study and operations, the Study Commission would determine “what should
be built and where and find the approximate cost.” The commission voted to employ the
firm of Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade, and Douglas, a New York engineering firm, to
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begin the study to be presented to the General Assembly for the authorization of an act
to establish and operate a rapid transit system.243
At a cost of $200,000, the report produced by the Rapid Transit Study
Commission to determine the feasibility of rapid transit in Atlanta was completed by
December 1962 and released in January of the next year. This strategic move occurred
in order to prevent the significance of the report from being detracted by the Christmas
season, explained Dr. Howard K. Menhinick, chairman of the commission. The report
needed the attention of all citizens to gain much needed support for the adoption of its
measures. Glenn E. Bennett, executive director of ARMPC, applauded the engineers for
completion of the report in a timely fashion, and described it as being “optimistic,
scholarly, and exciting.” Bennett explained that the report indicated that rapid transit
was feasible in the Atlanta region and could be obtained if the region was willing to pay
for it. He also explained that if the region was not willing pay, ultimately, not having a
rapid transit system would cost the region a high premium in the long run. Once
presented, the next step in the process required the support of the affiliated counties of
metropolitan Atlanta. From that point, the state legislature would have to authorize an
official authority in the capacity of rapid transit to implement the plans of the report of
the study commission.244
The 117-page report on a proposed rapid transit system consisted of 42 stations
and 66 miles of track grade-separated, electrified rail lines. It included 46 miles of
construction on grade, 17 miles of aerial structure, and 3 miles of subway or tunnel
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construction. Approximately 49 miles of the system would be in close proximity and
parallel to existing railroad lines. The report indicated that the estimated date for the
opening of an initial, operable, rapid transit system was January 1, 1971. Construction
on the full system would steadily continue and by 1975, a basic system consisting of all
lines would be in operation. The target date of completion for the entire system would
be 1980. The report suggested three phases of development: First, a main line running
North-South through the downtown area between the airport and Oglethorpe University,
which also included East Point and West End. This main line would cost about $131
million with most of the money borrowed by the governments of the metropolitan
governments involved. This line was slated for operation by 1971. The second phase
would include the addition of an East-West line, the western portion extending to
Hightower Road. The cost of this would be $72.8 million and would be completed by
1975. The third and final phase of the system would extend to Marietta, Norcross and
Forest Park, and be completed by 1980, costing approximately $88.2 million.245
In great detail, the report highlighted the benefits of rapid transit for the
metropolitan region. Based on the complex transportation issues for the metropolitan
region at the creation of the report, it estimated that rapid transit could provide a
capacity of 25,000-seated passengers per hour in either direction to and from
downtown. The rapid transit facilities could travel at speeds approximately 45 miles per
hour, including time for stops, and could reach peak traveling speeds safely at 70 and
75 miles per hour. The 42 stations planned for the proposed system would be points of
public entry and exit, and were designed and strategically placed to encourage and
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facilitate patronage. At stations where parking lots were proposed, free parking on
paved surfaces would be provided. The report called for six transit lines running from
the proposed downtown central station with the cumulative miles from the transit center
as follows: Downtown to Marietta: 18.3 miles; Downtown to Norcross: 18.2 miles;
Downtown to North Druid Hills Road: 10.3 miles; Downtown to Avondale Estates: 7.4
miles; Downtown to Forest Park: 12.9 miles; and Downtown to Hightower Road: 4.5
miles. Rail lines would effectively travel to various cities included in the study
commission jurisdiction.246
As the black representative on the Rapid Transit Study Commission, C.A. Scott
informed the African American community of the advances of rapid transit by providing
updates in the World. The transit line to most impact the black community would be the
west line, which would extend from downtown to Hightower Road. The shortest of the
proposed lines, it would service the rapidly developing area of homes west of Hightower
Road in Fulton County, as well as the residential areas closer in and the business
district in the Ashby and Hunter Street vicinity. The west side of town contained a
significant portion of Atlanta’s black population and was continuously growing as more
blacks were moving or being relocated to the section. Stops on the west line included
Northside Drive, Ashby Street, Chappell Road, West Lake Avenue, and Hightower
Road. Scott, in his support for the report, concluded that other alternative means of
additional transportation were considered for the region, but rapid transit seemed to be
the best manner to adequately meet the future situation.247
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With the process in motion, the Rapid Transit Study Commission and ARMPC
predicted the passage of a constitutional amendment by at least the counties involved in
the study to authorize their governments to invest in rapid transit. It was also expected
that a new statewide amendment for the creation of a rapid transit authority be
proposed to voters in 1964. In short, the plans and recommendations of the rapid
transit study commission’s report could not succeed without two things: voters’ approval
and authorization from the Georgia General Assembly for the creation of a rapid transit
authority to operate the system, and in that order.248
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Figure 19: Proposed Rapid Transit System, Atlanta History Center
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Movement for MARTA
To pursue regional support, along with legislation for the enactment of an official
rapid transit authority, Atlanta leaders and the regional governments created the
Metropolitan Rapid Transit Committee of 100. Comprised of members from the fivecounty area, the committee launched a public information campaign designed to take
the need for rapid transportation to the public. The Committee of 100’s roster included
25 Atlanta representatives, 20 members from Fulton County, 20 members from DeKalb
County, 15 members from Cobb County, and 10 from Clayton and Gwinnett counties. It
created the public campaign for the purpose of soliciting approval for a constitutional
amendment to provide modern transportation in the area. Mayor Ivan Allen appointed
former governor of Georgia Ernest Vandiver and Robert Sommerville, president of the
Atlanta Transit System, as Atlanta representatives on the campaign. Allen noted, “I am
delighted that the City of Atlanta will have such fine representation on this committee
which has ahead of it, a task of such vital importance to the metropolitan areas.” He
added that Governor Vandiver possessed wide experience in his long and distinguished
career in state administration, and Mr. Sommerville had shown his comprehensive
understanding of transit problems and solutions through his role and leadership with
Atlanta Transit System. Vandiver would be chosen to direct the campaign and
Sommerville was selected as co-chairman. The Committee of 100 took on the
responsibilities in an endeavor geared to take the metropolitan area to a new level in
providing a good and efficient transportation system.249
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The Committee consisted of a biracial group of leading citizens of the
metropolitan region. “The civic-minded citizens on the committee will perform services
of invaluable service for the benefit of all,” explained Mayor Allen. The citizens on the
committee were regarded as well and widely known for their public spirit and the faith
and devotion to this cause. The committee included black members from Atlanta, but
none from other jurisdictions. The black representatives included Margaret Davis Bowen
of the League of Women Voters, C.A. Scott, editor of the World, and Robert Thompson,
Atlanta Urban League housing secretary. In completing the appointments, Allen stated
that he could not stress enough the importance of the work of this committee because
the future of the entire metropolitan area hinged on the caliber of work performed. Early
in the work of the committee, polls by an Atlanta public relations firm indicated that a
majority of citizens were in favor of rapid transit even at the risk of taking an extra tax
burden.250
Congressional approval of President Kennedy’s mass transit bill also provided
support for the committee’s cause shortly after its formation. In the spring of 1962,
Kennedy in his transportation message to the Congress called for federal financial
assistance for local urban mass transit systems. Funding for mass transit systems
would coincide with the various loans and grants that had already been made available
for housing programs. Kennedy’s message became reality with the passage of the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. This new measure would provide $375 million
in federal grants to help cities get commuters in and out of towns at a faster pace.
Under the bill, federal grants would be made available over a three period to help cities
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build rapid transit systems to include the purchase of land, right-of-ways, parking
facilities, rail cars, stations, and terminals. The bill also carried a provision guaranteeing
loans, which communities could make on their own to build rapid transit systems. In
order to be eligible, an area seeking aid must have worked out a coordinated urban
transportation system as part of a comprehensive plan for the region. As official across
the region planned for rapid transit, so too did their state representatives. The
addendum of an interim committee for rapid transit in the Georgia Legislature further
strengthened the quest for rapid transit in Atlanta. Senator Joseph E. Loggins headed
the special committee and Senator Leroy Johnson, the Senate’s lone black member,
also served as a member. The possibility of a metropolitan rapid transit system took
shape, still with great challenges on the horizon.251
Dr. Robert C. Weaver,252 African American head of the federal Housing and
Home Finance Agency and the person chiefly responsible for administering any federal
rapid transit funds, found the case of the Atlanta rapid transit system “quite interesting,”
as Atlanta was the first in the Southeast to engage in this type planning. Not only did the
case of Atlanta gain national attention in the quest for rapid transit, but it also received
continued publicity for its metropolitan traffic congestions and issues. An Atlanta
Journal-Constitution article explained:
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Traffic congestion is creating a crisis for metropolitan areas in getting
millions of people to and from work. Congestion is so bad that in some
areas it takes more time now to travel through a town than it did in the
horse and buggy days. Highways alone will not do the job. The federal
government is spending $41 billion to help build a highway system for the
1970s. But it won’t solve the problem of commuting within metropolitan
areas. And the problem will get worse if the government doesn’t provide
some help. The population is growing rapidly and there is increasing
concentration of people living in the great complexes beginning to do the
nation.253
Experts predicted that by 1975, the population of the United States would total more
than 280 million, and at least half of those people would occupy and settle in 40
crowded urban complexes. Each of those areas would have a population of more than a
million. Proponents viewed mass transit as the solution to traffic issues to be created in
the crowded urban areas. They argued that if the federal government helped build
highways, why shouldn’t it help to build improved mass transit systems? Opponents
viewed mass rapid transit as a local problem, and nothing for the federal government to
get involved with. They added that localities should decide whether they needed mass
transportation systems and if the government started passing out grants, it would
discourage local initiative and promote federal handouts. The federal discussion
resounded in Atlanta as supporters and opponents of mass rapid transit continued to
debate the issue.254
The Committee of 100 prepared for the creation of a new constitutional
amendment to be submitted to voters for the authorization of a five-county metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit organization. That organization would then create and operate the
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rapid transit system. Planning organizations, including the Atlanta Region Metropolitan
Planning Commission, also appealed to state lawmakers for a provision in a new state
constitutional amendment to allow cities and counties to levy taxes for the financing of
rapid transit. Glenn Bennett, executive director of ARMPC, said the Atlanta region could
not continue to function at it its present capacity in the future without supplementing its
present system of roads and expressways. He didn’t think that a taxation provision for
rapid transit in the rewritten constitution would be controversial if voters were properly
informed.255
Ed Hughes, managing director of the Atlanta Traffic and Safety Council, told a
subcommittee of the state Constitution Revision Commission that barriers to rapid
transit must be struck down. In a prepared statement before the group, he proclaimed
that rapid transit would soon be an absolute necessity to the continued progress and
development of the Atlanta area. Roy A. Blount of the Committee of 100 told the Slum
Clearance, Redevelopment and Rapid Transit subcommittee that a rapid transit system
would benefit all Georgians. He further elaborated that parking spaces occupied 54
percent of downtown Atlanta and predictions estimated the number of automobiles to
double in a decade. With that rising number in mind, he explained the necessity of a
rapid transit system in helping to cope with that problem. Rapid transit interest and
support continued to grow through the coordinated efforts of the various planning
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bodies, along with the advances of the federal government. This definitely helped to
shape and strengthen the campaign for an official rapid transit organization.256
With former governor Ernest Vandiver leading the Committee of 100, support
came from local and state organizations. This support proved invaluable in the Georgia
State Senate for the passage of the new amendment. The Commission’s
recommendations before the General Assembly in February 1964 provided much
needed publicity for the coordinated efforts of rapid transit. The recommendations
showcased the advantages of rapid transportation for the Atlanta metropolitan area and
outlined how the constitutional amendment if approved, would give local governments,
alone or in conjunction with others, the power to construct and operate rapid transit. It
would also provide the power to issue bonds or otherwise finance the system. The
campaign for the amendment became even more widespread with organizations
including the Chamber of Commerce, ARMPC, and the Senate Commission fully
engaged in obtaining an amendment to the Georgia Constitution enabling rapid transit.
Finally, Senator Ben Johnson of DeKalb County constructed and introduced the
amendment to the Georgia State Senate. As a member of the Senate’s interim
commission on rapid transit, Johnson had developed an interest in a more swift form of
mass transportation when he realized the positive impact for DeKalb County.257
Johnson recalled: “I drew up the legislation to create the Metropolitan Atlanta
Transit Authority. I was new in the legislature, and I had traveled to other cities, Boston,
New York and others to study their legislation to help me draw up the MARTA Act.” To
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help assure the passage of the amendment, it was introduced to the General Assembly
under the local courtesy rule. Under the provisions of that rule, if approved by a certain
percentage of the delegates from both houses of the General Assembly in the areas
affected, it would not have to go through mandated channels, moving more swiftly
towards acceptance. As a result, the amendment faced no real challenges in passing
the General Assembly. It required a majority of those voting in each of the five counties
of the metropolitan area only, as opposed to statewide, in order to avoid the negative
results of earlier attempts for such an amendment.258
With the measure passed by the legislature, Johnson and advocates of rapid
transit set out to continue to educate the general public and provide support for the
enabling amendment. The various committees also focused on fundraising efforts to
provide the financial backbone for the growing movement. Also at this point, the
Commission of 100 disbanded as the objectives of obtaining the constitutional
amendment to create a rapid transit authority and support for the federal Urban Mass
Transportation Act had been accomplished. Although that objective had been achieved,
the goal of rapid transit still seemed far off, as an official authority had not been created
and approved. Still in pursuit of the goal of an official transit authority, Ben Johnson
began drafting the necessary legislation. Realizing that it would be of no benefit
politically to have the rapid transit authority legislation develop as a City of Atlanta,
Fulton County, or Atlanta Chamber of Commerce plan because of the hostility towards
the city of Atlanta from outlying metropolitan counties, he enlisted the consensus of
officials representing the other counties involved. A committee of ten formed with two

258

Johnson, p. 46-48

180

representatives each. Within the committee, opposition from the Cobb County
delegation appeared at the onset. Cobb County officials feared ultimate control of the
proposed authority by the city of Atlanta. Ultimately, a mandatory referendum allowing
voters to decide, as stated in the enabling amendment, was required for the official
establishment of the transit authority.259
After it passed both the Georgia State House and Senate, Governor Carl
Sanders signed the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act into law on March
10, 1965. The act officially established that a rapid transit system through the joint
efforts of the local governments within the metropolitan area was a reasonable
approach to the growing transportation issues that plagued the region. This act also
legally created and named the rapid transit body to be known as the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA). Since MARTA could not officially begin until
1966 if approved through the 1965 referendum, the MARTA act called for the creation of
an interim study commission. This commission would function as the governing body
until an official board of leadership could be established for MARTA. With the MARTA
Act active, the Committee of 100 was reactivated and joined with the various planning
organizations to mount a campaign of support before the special referendum was to go
before the general public for a vote. The new campaign stressed the fact that a vote for
the authority would not involve any immediate long-term commitment to public funds.
The publicity campaign reassured and informed voters that in order for taxes to be
levied on behalf of MARTA, elections similar to bond referenda would be required. It
emphasized that MARTA was not a super-agency with any powers to institute neither
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taxes nor eminent domain. Importantly, it also exclaimed that support existed from the
top officials of all local governments within the auspices of the transit authority.
Opponents also mounted a more conservative campaign to counter, warning against
the domination of the city Atlanta in the processes of the transit authority.260
The greatest opposition to the MARTA Act, just as earlier in the planning
process, came from Cobb County. Supporters of rapid transit in Cobb County warned
the Committee of 100 that there would be great challenges to overcome in obtaining the
necessary votes for the passage of the referendum in the county. Opposition in Cobb
County stemmed from various issues, in particular race. Some residents in south Cobb
County, who had left the city of Atlanta via white flight, blamed having to leave on the
policies of Atlanta leadership. These residents harbored resentment towards the city
and Mayor Allen’s liberalism and progressive measures enacted over the course of his
tenure. They also feared that blacks would settle along the rapid transit lines, prompting
the same issues in which they had fled. Residents objected to the fact that Cobb
County would not be included in the proposed system until the latter stages, tentatively
1980, but would have to pay taxes anyway. They believed that the city of Atlanta would
benefit much greater than Cobb, and that they would be stuck with paying higher taxes
while reaping little to no benefits. The negative sentiments prevailed in Cobb and
outweighed the support of rapid transit. On June 16, 1965, the referendum for the
MARTA Act successfully passed in all of the metropolitan counties, with the exception of
Cobb County.261
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The momentum for the failed Cobb referendum did not come as a surprise, for
the campaign mounted against rapid transit had been so strong. Supporters of rapid
transit throughout the metropolitan area remained disappointed. However, the MARTA
Act had successfully passed in the remaining counties, providing for implementation of
a rapid transit system in spite of. The participating counties immediately began planning
a rapid transit system that would meet the needs of the counties involved. Without the
participation of Cobb County, earlier proposals and plans had to be amended to adapt
to the results of the 1965 referendum vote.

Yes

No

Fulton County

31,167

11,452

DeKalb County

15,285

6,321

Cobb County

5,276

6,869

Clayton County

3,049

2,135

Gwinnett County

1,421

1,284

Table 1: Referendum Results, 1968

The Interim Study Commission formed immediately after the local referendums passed,
creating the preliminary backbone for the MARTA. In its short existence, the Interim
Study Commission successfully selected engineering and financial consultants for
future planning, and operated in official capacity until January 3, 1966, when MARTA
officially launched.262
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MARTA Starts Planning
From inception, MARTA’s activities revolved around planning for its first
referendum for funding in 1968. Activities were divided into three categories:
administrative, which consisted of selecting more consultants, hiring employees, and
launching public relations efforts; legislative, working for new laws, on both the state
and national levels; and planning, the largest and most important element of the task of
creating an efficient rapid transit system. Administrative efforts during this period
moved forward the plans set forth by the Interim Study Commission in many cases.
Many of MARTA’s newly appointed Board of Directors had been involved in efforts
creating the Authority. Richard Rich, chairman of the board, had been the chairman of
the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce’s Rapid Transit Authority. Roy Blount, vice
chairman of the board, had been the vice chairman of the Committee of 100. Glenn
Bennett, secretary of the board and director of ARMPC, received the appointment to
facilitate coordination between the Metropolitan Planning Commission and MARTA. In a
move of biracial cooperation and progress, Mayor Allen appointed a black member to
MARTA’s Board of Directors. L.D. Milton, president of Citizens Trust Bank. He
represented the sentiments of the black community in the rapid transit program. From
the beginning, MARTA officials realized the role the blacks would play in the success of
the rapid transit program, therefore, it was essential to make sure that blacks had
representation, which proved to be a critical link to success.263
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In completing the hiring of staff, MARTA made important appointments to steer
the implementation of the rapid transit program. Henry L. Stuart, former director of
Service Control for the Southern Railway system, became general manager. His
responsibilities included the overall development of the rapid transit system from the
preliminary engineering and design, through construction, to the overall operations.
Next, MARTA hired King Elliott, former director of WSB Radio, as the public information
director. His job included the development and implementation of a complete public
information and education program about rapid transit. MARTA also solidified the final
engineering consultants composed of three experienced companies. The joint firm now
known as Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Tudor and Bechtel, received a contract to plan Atlanta’s
rapid transit system. Already involved in the designing and construction of San
Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, the firm brought much needed
experience to the planning of Atlanta’s system. MARTA also successfully obtained
funding in its first year of operation. A $300,000 pledge from the participating
governments in the region provided funds to set up offices and matching funds for
applications for federal funding. As a result, federal funding received approval and
provided $369,000 to assist in planning efforts. MARTA then received more funding
when Governor Carl Sanders made provisions in the state budget for the organization to
receive $500,000 in efforts to show state support for the rapid transit project. In the first
chairman’s report, Rich proclaimed, “The acceptance of the project by Federal, State,
and Local Governments, and by the people of the State At Large, and in the
Metropolitan Atlanta Area, has been most gratifying and inspires us to increase our
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efforts in 1967 for even greater strides towards our ultimate goal of providing our
citizens the most modern, efficient, and economical rapid transit system possible.”264
Planning served as an essential component of MARTA in the first two years of
existence and the organization placed great focus on creating a coordinated rapid
transit system to be presented to voters in a referendum. The legislation creating
MARTA called for a referendum to be passed to provide the necessary funding for the
massive transit project. The referendum would appear as a bond referendum because
voters in the counties involved would vote to raise their property taxes to underwrite a
bond issue to partially finance the construction of the system.265
MARTA’s goal became creating a system to gain widespread support and satisfy
the transportation needs of the sprawling region. The planning efforts during this period
remained geared towards updating previous transportation plans to include rapid transit,
unifying transportation planning in the region, and developing a detailed proposal for a
feasible transit system to be presented for a bond referendum in November 1968.
MARTA’s planning approach broadened when planners realized that plans could not be
developed for a stand-alone rapid rail system only. MARTA officials believed that in
order to plan a most effective system as an integral member of a balanced
transportation system for the region, bus service should accompany the rapid rail
system. “Rail rapid transit, along with an effective bus service, a highly developed
network of arterial and surface streets, and an expanded expressway system, if properly
264
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coordinated, could effectively reduce traffic congestion and make transportation faster,
more efficient and more comfortable,” explained Richard Rich. To obtain the desired
results, MARTA fully participated in the Atlanta Area Transportation Study to jointly
coordinate and design the most effective system for the metropolitan area.266
In June 1966, ARMPC, in coordination with MARTA, received an Urban Planning
grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to revise and update the
1962 Regional Transportation Plan. The revised and updated report became known as
Rapid Transit for Metropolitan Atlanta, serving as the basis of the plan to be presented
before voters in the future referendum. This amended report contained both an
engineering and financial component for the proposed rapid transit system. Several
topics discussed in the 1962 report proved to be outdated or no longer pertinent to the
discussion of rapid transit in metropolitan Atlanta. Perhaps the greatest change
stemmed from the fact that the earlier report included a rapid transit system planned for
the five-county metropolitan region including Cobb County, rather than the current fourcounty composition. The amended report, or the 1967 report, featured updates including
the technological advances that had emerged since 1962. It outlined a system complete
with at-grade, aerial and subway configurations for the rapid rail lines. A high degree of
automatic control would guide rail cars that could reach speeds between 70 and 75
miles per hour and travel times of only 90 seconds between stations during peak hours
in Central Atlanta. The 1967 report placed great focus on stations because they would
serve as the entry and exit points of the system. Stations were planned with specific
functions to serve the areas in which they were placed, i.e., business, commuter, or
266
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residential. The introduction of rapid busways and coordinated bus service to link with
rapid rail stations also provided an addendum to the new plan for rapid transit. The 1967
report, along with other proposed plans were debated upon to be the final plan for the
future referendum.267
Once completed by contracted engineers, MARTA presented the preliminary
plans for the 1968 referendum to the general public for approval through a series of 14
well-attended public hearings. Following the hearings, many local leaders endorsed the
plan. Recommended changes from the people attending the forums would be adopted
in the final product. Some of the recommendations included the requests of local
businessmen that the proposed West End station be moved to another location.
Decatur citizens requested that the Decatur station to be moved closer to the City
Square and residents along Peachtree Street requested that the Northeast Line follow
the Southern Railway tracks rather than go through Brookwood Hills, Peachtree Hills,
and Garden Hills. Black leaders requested a longer West Line along with rail service to
the isolated black community in the Perry Homes housing project on the Northwest.
The recommendations received only consideration while others would be implemented
in the final proposal. After MARTA and its consultants carefully examined all preliminary
reports and recommendations, they adopted the final plan. MARTA revealed the plan in
September 1968 and it featured a total system of public transportation that included
40.3-mile rapid rail and a feeder bus system. The estimates of system costs included
the purchase of the Atlanta Transit System which would not only provide feeder service,
but would also provide service to those areas not directly served by rails. The proposed
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40.3-mile rail system consisted of the basic routes proposed in the 1967 report with
some visible changes according to public accommodations.268
The 40.3-mile rail system included an East-West Line, from Kensington Road in
the east through the Central Transit Center, to Lynhurst Drive in the west. Planners
extended the west line extended from Hightower Road in earlier reports to move it
nearer to I-285. On the West Line, the Rhodes Street Station, renamed University
Station, had been moved westward to better serve the Atlanta University Center and the
urban renewal areas of the west side. On the East Line, the Kirkwood Station, renamed
Candler Park Station, was shifted westward to obtain better access and better serve the
East Atlanta Urban Renewal Project. Renamed Grant Station, planners shifted the
former Boulevard Station to better serve Grady Homes. Planners also realigned the
East Line to better serve Downtown Decatur, as requested by the citizens of the area.
The Northeast Line would extend from the Pershing Point Station to Doraville and the
junction with I-285, and the Northwest Line from Pershing Point to Northside Drive to be
started in hope that Cobb County would eventually join MARTA. The proposed South
Line would run from the Central Transit Station to the Atlanta Airport with an additional
station named Tri-Cities Station. Planners added this station to serve the business
district of East Point. They also moved the Oakland Avenue Station northward for better
east-west access. The overarching idea of the proposed 40.3-mile system presented in
the 1968 referendum offered service in four major directions and provided adequate
service for the total area inside the boundaries of I-285.269
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Figure 20: Typical Distances and Travel Times from Stations to Transit Center in
Proposed Transit System, Atlanta History Center
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Figure 21: Station Distance and Fares for Proposed Transit System,
Atlanta History Center
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Figure 22: Proposed Rapid Transit System, 1967. Atlanta History Center
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The 1968 Referendum and the Black Community
If passed by voters in the November 1968 referendum, MARTA would authorize
conceptual designs, begin surveying, and acquire right-of-ways in a phase extending
until January 1971. At that point, MARTA would begin the general construction. The
first line to open for service would be the East-West Line in July 1975, and the system
would be completed by July 1978.270
These lofty plans reached a standstill when the referendum in November 1968
failed in all jurisdictions involved. The official returns indicated that in the city of Atlanta
alone, only 43.6 percent of voters favored the outlines of the referendum. The defeat of
the referendum came in spite of the optimism of MARTA supporters. Much of MARTA’s
success had come from support in the City of Atlanta, Fulton County, and DeKalb
County. The 1968 referendum reflected a change in the consensus of the residents. In
particular, opponents launched boisterous campaigns against the proposed plans to be
initiated by the referendum. Conservative factions on the Northside opposed the
financial aspects of the plan and opponents like Governor Lester Maddox opposed for
more radical reasons of a segregationist agenda. Perhaps in the most organized
manner, the greatest opposition came from the black community, who opposed for
many reasons. Particularly, the lack of services and participation in planning prompted
the greatest unrest. Since the incorporation of transportation planning in Atlanta, blacks
had protested their lack of participation. This stage of MARTA planning occurred an
apex in the mobility struggles of blacks in Atlanta.271
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MARTA’s proposed plans for the rapid transit system featured too many flaws, as
voters did not approve the 1968 referendum to fund the program. Members of the black
community in particular hesitated to support MARTA’s plans. The Metropolitan Atlanta
Summit Leadership Conference (MASLC), an umbrella organization of nine civil rights
organizations, stated: “If MARTA wants to secure the support of the black community, it
must come by, not pass over, around, or miss completely the low-income areas.” In a
list of suggested recommendations to MARTA officials, MASLC also called for the hiring
of blacks within the planning of MARTA. Officials of the Summit Leadership team, along
with members of the respective organizations met with MARTA officials to give notice of
“final requirements” for MARTA to receive the support of the black community. The
requirements included the requests for changes and additional service to adequately
meet the needs of blacks in the low-income areas. Mary Sanford, president of the Perry
Homes Tenant Association, included a rousing argument for improved transportation
and services to the growing concentration of apartments in the Perry Homes area. State
representative Julian Bond also joined the Summit in taking a closer look into rapid
transit for Perry Homes and other areas. He urged citizens in need of improved
transportation to stay aware of its status and the affects it would have on certain areas.
The summit requested additional service for the Perry Homes area, Thomasville, Poole
Creek, Hapeville and the Model Cities area, along with extensions of the west line
further into the areas in which blacks continued to relocate.272
MASLC believed that the city’s power players had not demonstrated that Atlanta
was ready for a rapid transit system, stating: “It’s not to imply that the city does not need
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a rapid transit system, but the city had not shown an honest, integrated system or
consistency in the equal opportunity around the development of the system.” Leaders of
the MASLC made specific requests of the MARTA commission including the
considering proposed lines, additional black representation, and proposals for
employment and training in the system. MASLC stated that MARTA attempted to
appease them with the “false impression” that a Perry Homes-Proctor Creek line would
be established and the inclusion of black members as representatives on the trip to
Canada to explore the transit system of Toronto. However, the group was certain that
MARTA didn’t grasp the full magnitude of their ultimatum. Furthermore, MASLC leaders
concerned themselves with the displacement of blacks as a result of the rapid transit
system. One community in particular, the Johnson Town community near Lenox
Square, had been slated for demolition to make way for the Lenox Station. Leaders
stated that the rapid transit project “will be just like urban renewal, it will be black
removal.” As the plan stood, MASLC and its supporters vigorously prepared to
campaign against the referendum.273
Summit Co-Chairman Reverend Samuel Williams elaborated, “The system is
planned for the rich at the expense of the poor.” He added that the Westside line, the
one most critical to the black community, was the shortest of all the lines. Summit
officials believed that the people who needed the line the most received no
consideration. “These people want to get to and from as quickly as anybody else,”
argued the Summit leadership. Julian Bond, representative of the section in which the
proposed Westside line would pass through, elaborated that he would also seek
273
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solutions for those families displaced by the construction of the Westside rail line.
Senator Leroy Johnson implored, “no one should make a mistake that we [blacks] are
against rapid transit, we just want to strengthen it.” He continued, “It ought to serve
Negroes and whites equally and ought to employ them equally. Our position is firmly in
favor of rapid transit.” Summit leadership’s recommendations included a firm request
that blacks be included in job opportunities and the recruiting of future personnel and
future inspection teams that visit various other cities with rapid transit. Johnson
elaborated that at the time of planning for MARTA, there were no blacks involved. He
also urged that, “rapid transit be brought down to the masses of people who didn’t know
what it [rapid transit] was. Those people could not identify with it; therefore, they had no
reason to support it.”274
Summit leadership informed MARTA that unless changes happened, they would
not recommend the rapid transit plans to the black community. Using MARTA’s own
criteria, the summit concluded:
“We find inconsistencies that result in the neglect of Negro communities
and poor white and poor Negro areas . . . We are proposing two additional
transit routes and the extension of the proposed Westside line . . . We are
urging all citizens to attend the rapid transit hearings.”
Next, they requested a clearer understanding and assurance of job opportunities for
blacks, a list of all current staff positions of MARTA personnel and job descriptions, and
that blacks be included in all future recruiting of personnel and on future inspection
teams. They also requested a list of all firms doing business with MARTA, a detailed
description of Transit route right-of-way plans and land acquisitions, and a description of
the various types of stations and the proposed location of each. Bond said that he
274
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hoped that the black community would attend all meetings and hearings, for this would
be the only chance to express their feelings and concerns about the system. In the
midst of the black community efforts to derail the plans of the MARTA referendum,
studies initiated by MARTA indicated that the highest percentage of undecided voters
for the referendum included low-income black residents. The survey indicated that this
group was suspicious of the white community trying to “put something over on the
them.” Nevertheless, the black community would continue to be a critical link to the
development and realization of any plans set forth by MARTA. From this point forward,
its support proved necessary and crucial.275
The 1968 referendum was a turning point for blacks in transportation planning. It,
along with other events including the outlawing of the county unit system, the election of
Leroy Johnson, and the appointment of blacks to the Committee of 100, illustrated the
changes of the decade that brought blacks representation, rights, and privileges that
had not existed before. With its establishment amidst the changes of the decade,
MARTA experienced and was subjected to the increasing power and sophistication of
blacks, facing challenges never before presented in transportation planning in Atlanta.
Increases in population throughout the 1960s, along with the changing social
environment put blacks in a position of demand. Moving forward, black used this
position to ensure full participation not only in transportation planning, but also other
areas affecting their lives and communities.
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CHAPTER 4 – PHASE IV, 1968-1975
At the end of a very turbulent decade, the city of Atlanta remained intact. As an
epicenter of the Civil Rights Movement, social change unfolded throughout the city as
citizens sought equality. From the desegregation of schools, neighborhoods, and public
spaces to the assassination of Atlanta’s own, the national civil rights leader Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., citizens contested traditions of segregation and endured the
repercussions of change. National influences and grassroots protests called attention to
controversies over racially based exploitation and discrimination, while those opposed
to moderate change provided strong resistance, ultimately removing themselves
altogether. They fled to spaces surrounding the city with the intent of maintaining their
private and personal preferences. The resulting change within the city promoted
commerce, growth, and reconfigured commercial life. This change also provided for
enhanced planning, restructuring, and redevelopment to accommodate equality in all
functions of the city. While many inequalities persisted, participation rested more freely
in the hands of all citizens, regardless of color.276
This chapter describes a new era of city politics in Atlanta, one following the
changes ushered in with civil rights period legislation and advancement. With more
barriers removed, black leaders along with those outside of the established coalitions
stood the chance of being elected or appointed to positions of high authority. Citizens
elected the first Jewish mayor along with an African American vice mayor. With the new
leadership came the increased appointments of African Americans and other minorities
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to positions of civic authority. Also, by this time, the city had reached a black majority in
population, truly changing the face of city politics. Blacks took advantage of this
newfound power, using it to gain mobility in areas of city life. With advances in biracial
cooperation and leadership, rapid transit, and economic development, the metropolis
resembled a completely different city than it did just one decade earlier.

New Era of City Politics & Leadership
Changes in leadership and the power structure came at the end of the decade.
Atlanta elected its first Jewish mayor in October 1969 after a run-off election. Sam
Massell, the incumbent vice mayor and a Democrat, defeated Rodney Cook, a
moderate Republican in a 62,632 to 51,289 vote. The black vote played a major factor
in Massell’s victory. Two weeks earlier, voters had elected the city’s first black vice
mayor, Maynard Jackson. The New York Times reported, “In a political year that has
seen law-and-order candidates emerge victorious elsewhere, Atlanta, a progressive city
that likes to be known as ‘a city too busy to hate,’ will enter the 1970’s with a Jewish
mayor and a Negro vice mayor.”277
From the onset, Massell presented himself as an underdog fighting the monied
business interests and corporations whose backing generally determined elections. He
identified as an unapologetic liberal and believed most people in the city shared his
philosophy, especially on human relations. He put together a new coalition of white
liberals and poor blacks who noted a fraying of the business community’s publicized
“progressiveness.” He noted that the business community’s plan catered to the needs of
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the business climate rather than a genuine concern for the poor. Massell’s criticism of
the business elite placed him at odds with the city’s white power structure. His
underdog approach received sympathy and support necessary for victory. Massell’s
plan of action as mayor included a top priority of improving race relations. “This isn’t
accomplished by simply maintaining an attitude of goodwill,” he explained. “It’s achieved
by doing specific things. For instance, there is a big gap in the number of blacks
employed by the city – a gap caused by 100 years of neglect. The answer is not just
equal opportunity, but an active recruitment of blacks for jobs.” He noted other
challenges of the growing metropolis to be given high priority, including a new airport,
new low-cost housing, and importantly, new roads and rapid transit systems.278
Both mayoral candidates actively sought the black vote in a city, where at the
time of the election, blacks represented 48 percent of the population. At this point, the
black vote was essential for victory in city elections; however, the election of 1969
provided a unique and specific challenge. For the first time, black names appeared on
the ballots as viable candidates for mayor and vice mayor. Dr. Horace Tate, the third
mayoral candidate, stated, “after 122 years, Atlanta is ready for a black mayor.” Tate, a
noted educator and only the second black elected to the Atlanta Board of Education,
rallied support from the black community but faced dissension. Tate ran into conflict with
Senator Leroy Johnson who also had interest in becoming Atlanta’s first black mayor.
Tate’s declaration of candidacy short-circuited Johnson’s projected candidacy. In
response, Johnson challenged Tate’s candidacy by seeking to put the decision of the
best candidate in the hands of Atlanta’s black power structure. Despite such measures,
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Tate deemed himself viable and continued his campaign. He rallied the support of Rev.
Ralph Abernathy and Hosea Williams of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC), Georgia House Representative Julian Bond, and noted Civil Rights leader Rev.
Jesse Jackson. Senator Johnson, with the support of local black leaders including
insurance executive and MARTA board member Jesse Hill, Jr., withdrew his candidacy,
and urged the support of Vice Mayor Sam Massell with support for black candidate
Maynard Jackson as vice mayor as a means of racial compromise.279
A split among black voters along with support of the established black power
structure behind Sam Massell caused Tate’s candidacy to fall short. Voters eliminated
Tate in the general election prompting a run-off between Massell and Cook. Now with
the major support of blacks, Massell progressed to the run-off with victory in sight.
When faced with negative propaganda aimed at discrediting Massell’s candidacy, black
supporters continued to rally in support. Atlanta’s two major newspapers, The
Constitution and The Journal, under the influence of the city’s white power structure,
endorsed Cook editorially. In past elections, the newspapers had backed Allen and his
predecessor William B. Hartsfield. Massell’s campaign and election illustrated the
necessity of the black vote. It also showcased some reluctance to change from the
established power structure. Andrew Young, aide to Rev. Ralph Abernathy, head of the
SCLC, explained that he saw a “raw power coalition” going to great lengths to preserve
itself. No matter the case, the election of 1969 brought about moderate change. On
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Inauguration Day, 1970, the Daily World commented that for the first time since
Reconstruction, city government reflected all people of the city.280

Figure 23: Black Population, Atlanta & Vicinity 1970

Monumental gains in black political participation during this period of transition
came when attorney Maynard Jackson became the first black man to ever be elected
vice mayor of the city of Atlanta. Jackson, founding partner of the all-black law firm
Jackson, Patterson, & Parks, deemed the time “right and ripe.” He ran on the platform of
enforcing anti-discrimination laws and defeated his white opponent, veteran alderman
Milton Farris, by a substantial margin. This victory came one year after Jackson’s
280
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attempt to unseat Georgia’s longstanding Democratic U.S. Senator Herman Talmadge.
He had achieved national attention as he opposed a candidate who even white men in
Georgia were afraid to challenge. Benjamin E. Mays declared, “I supported Maynard
Jackson in his race against Talmadge and I believe I was the largest black contributor to
his campaign fund.” He added, “It surprised most of the people when Jackson polled
200,000 votes. It was significant that he received more white votes in Atlanta than
Talmadge.” Jackson’s gains in the former election prepared him for the challenges of
the next. He campaigned for “action programs that give hope to people.” He promised to
enforce existing anti-discrimination laws and fair housing codes, and to eliminate scare
tactics and block busting authorized by some realtors. Jackson appealed for votes both
black and white, with success in both communities. Estimates showed 50 percent of the
87,000 black registered voters went to the polls and that 90 percent of blacks voted for
Jackson. Jackson also won over 17,000 white votes.281
The election of October 1969 represented more black gains with the election of
Benjamin E. Mays, the 74-year-old retired president of Morehouse College, to the
Atlanta Board of Education. Even more groundbreaking, following his election to the
post, the 10-member board, with only three blacks, elected him to the board’s top post.
In his initial term as a board member, Dr. Mays immediately assumed board leadership.
At the helm of leadership, Mays placed the overdue full desegregation of schools and
faculty in line with a federal court order as the first order of business. The school system
faced a deadline of January 12, 1970 for coming up with a plan to shift faculty to reflect
the racial makeup of the city’s schools. The significant deadline marked the twelfth
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anniversary of the original school desegregation order for the city of Atlanta. The
impending changes, shifting of faculty, and pay disagreements from previous sessions
of the board spurred discontent among faculty and personnel, threatening strike at any
moment. Dr. Mays played a pivotal role in overseeing the full, peaceful integration of
Atlanta’s schools, while managing the list of inherited challenges faced the new board.
Conclusively, the elections of Sam Massell, Maynard Jackson and Dr. Benjamin E.
Mays showcased the expanded role of black voting and participation at the end of the
1960s, and foreshadowed an even greater role that blacks played in the politics of the
following decade.282

MARTA Regrouping Phase
In the wake of political changes along with the failed referendum of 1968,
MARTA officials went back to the drawing board to devise new strategies on how to
move the rapid transit program forward. “Too much uncoordinated planning, which
helped defeat the rapid transit bond issue, still threatens to further complicate efforts to
solve Atlanta’s transportation problem,” said MARTA official Rawson Haverty to the
Atlanta Constitution. He also added that weak communications, too little coordination,
and conflicting local governments also hindered efforts in creating the rapid transit
system. Strong racial and class-based issues also served as hindrances in the passage
of the MARTA referendum. Although black community members generally believed in
the promises of rapid transit and agreed that it was needed in Atlanta, they recalled how
the city previously handled the issues of race and class. Blacks were convinced that
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they would not get their fair share with the program and even alluded to rumors that
MARTA had secret maps and plans that were not reviewed by city officials or available
to the public. Black community leaders decreed that before full support would to be
given, the MARTA board would have to come out and clear the air of all secrets. In
order to gain greater support from the black community for rapid transit, MARTA officials
continuously attempted to reach deeper into the community, attempting to fulfill many of
the demands which the community set forth.283
First, MARTA hosted a series of forums to allow neighborhood residents and
groups to offer their suggestions and opinions as part of the process of planning the
rapid transit system. A MARTA briefing luncheon on March 5, 1970 at Paschal’s
Restaurant on Hunter Street was held for a cadre of black aldermen, city leaders, state
officials, leaders throughout the communities, and interested citizens. Those in
attendance included Jesse Hill, Jr., an insurance executive with Atlanta Life Insurance
Company, Senator Leroy Johnson, Alderman Q.V. Williamson, and Alderman Ira
Jackson. With this meeting, MARTA intended to establish better communication with the
black community, and to discuss new plans for the future of MARTA and rapid transit in
Atlanta. The meeting revealed many of the desires of rapid transit in the black
community. Leaders and concerned citizens alike were concerned about the level of
black participation in MARTA decision-making. Participant observation forms completed
by attendees revealed some of the issues and questions among blacks in response to
MARTA: Some of them included: (1) what major changes were to take shape from the
original design? (2) Would the plan deal with social problems created by inadequate
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transportation in low-income communities? (3) What consideration has been given to
the proposed Perry Homes line in the new design? (4) In seeming to serve primarily the
needs of the business community (CBD) and the suburbs, what services will serve
travel between the inner city and to the perimeter area? (5) How can black consultant
firms get involved in MARTA planning? (6) Will blacks be actively recruited when
MARTA begins recruiting staff? (7) Will all sections of the city be provided the same
type of system? These were some of the questions and challenges which MARTA faced
in securing the support of the black community in preparation for a new referendum.284
Gradually, MARTA hired more blacks and named to various board appointments
and other leadership roles. With three strategic assignments, MARTA placed blacks in
roles critical to gaining the support of the Atlanta’s black communities. When MARTA
appointed Lauren Hanks as assistant to the public information director in 1970, she
became the first black female to be employed by MARTA. Hanks, a graduate of Clark
College, became responsible for assisting in the preparation of new releases and other
informational materials. She also had the duty of developing exhibits, displays, and
other materials to be presented at the rapid transit public forums. MARTA appointed
Morris J. Dillard, a Morehouse College graduate and former labor affairs representative
with the National Urban League’s southern regional office, as a senior staff member
charged with developing and directing communications between MARTA and various
communities and neighborhoods, as well as conveying MARTA information to the
people. Board member Rawson Haverty explained that Dillard would play a vital role in
the planning development and implementation of all MARTA projects. “He will provide
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extremely valuable leadership as we try to develop an acceptable plan for rapid transit,”
stated Haverty. These appointments followed Mayor Allen’s appointment of Jesse Hill,
Jr. as a board member. With Hill’s appointment, MARTA’s board included of two black
members. In appointing Hill, Mayor Allen acknowledged the role blacks played in the
defeat of the 1968 referendum and answered the call for broader-based representation
of the MARTA board.285
With the appointment of more blacks to key positions, including those on the
board, MARTA continued to reach out and involve the black community in much greater
roles in planning for the next referendum. Also, the establishment of the Action Forum,
an organization linking white business elites and top-level black leaders, helped foster
communication and create greater responsibility for blacks. This organization grew out
of the realization that if MARTA were to make a comeback after the 1968 referendum,
black support would be essential. The brainchild of prominent black real estate broker
W.L. (Bill) Calloway and Mills Lane, chief executive officer of Citizens and Southern
National Bank, the Action Forum comprised of white business leaders, mainly chief
executive officers, and a host of black leaders from diverse backgrounds. They
included heads of social agencies, college presidents, and business executives. The
organization met once a month, with no minutes or officers, for the purposes of
facilitating open discussion about major community issues. The discussion of MARTA
took center stage as one of the major community issues for which the Action Forum
sought solutions. Lyndon Wade, executive of the Atlanta Urban League and member of
the Action Forum, explained the organization as “a great forum for people to talk about
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things . . . we finally decided that MARTA would be great for everybody.” Wade believed
that credit should be given to the Action Forum for moving along the ideas of MARTA.
Jesse Hill agreed with Wade and added, “The Action Forum was a key entity, not the
Chamber, but the Action Forum.”286
The Action Forum served as a springboard for ideas and planning for the new
referendum, but also facilitated the integration of blacks into the economic lives of the
white business elite. Lyndon Wade said the black leaders within the Action Forum
initiated a plan to show how involving the black community and working together would
move MARTA and the economy forward. Wade proclaimed:
. . . But the bottom line was that people began to talk to each other. You
know, this was a real issue; This wasn’t just somebody sitting up,
daydreaming about race issues – you were talking about real stuff, and it
was fascinating, and it was dynamic – it was just something for the whole
town – it began to flow out, you know - because then guys would begin to
have conversations with each other, when they were not at the Action
Forum, I mean things here - things there. And so MARTA was more than
just a transportation system. MARTA was an economic catalyst for this
region. It was a system that empowered people from the standpoint of
mobility to be able to have access to jobs. It created, you know, jobs.
And, we found a way to share in this community. I mean, there was not a
thing left uncovered.287

The Action Forum provided the foundation for the new referendum which the
failed referendum lacked. Communication and connectivity between the white business
community and the leadership of the black community had not existed. The elite status
of the Action Forum helped spread the revised plans of MARTA and drew support from
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major community and business factions throughout the city. It also helped to increase
the black visibility associated with MARTA, which would be key to the overall success of
the new referendum.288

Black Demands of MARTA
The Atlanta Coalition on Current Community Affairs (ACCCA), composed of
black leaders and individual citizens, presented MARTA with a list of issues which they
described as “crucial” to the city of Atlanta, especially the black community. Senator
Leroy Johnson explained that this list was divided into two areas: issues that should be
acted upon immediately, and those that should receive formal commitments. The areas
to be acted upon immediately included: the hiring of 35% minorities on the MARTA staff
at all levels maintaining a policy that all of its consulting firms do the same, and to
increase the black voting membership on the MARTA Board. Johnson particularly
emphasized the need for increased black voting power on the MARTA board. By July
1971, the board only had two black members, Jesse Hill, Jr. and L.D. Milton, one active
and the other inactive respectively. Vice Mayor Maynard Jackson was also involved in
the presentation to MARTA. He discussed the fact that opposition existed from the
planning commission, which did not favor extensive black representation. In response,
Jackson stated, “We do not want to take over the programs, we merely want to share in
the planning and coordination of issues which affect our lives.” An overall common
theme presented by the black leaders and the community in general was the need for
MARTA to provide better service to the areas where people depend on public transit.
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Rapid transit at first took on a planning process similar to that of public housing
development: blacks being planned for, not with. However, unlike public housing, mass
transit needed voter approval in the various phases, including design and financing. In
the case of MARTA, blacks commanded power that forced officials to seriously take into
accounts the needs and demands of the black community.289
In the request to MARTA, the ACCCA presented the list of issues, which required
formal commitments in order to gain the support of black leadership and the community
in general. This detailed list appeared provided an outlined as to how MARTA could
better serve the black community. The top priorities on the list included: establishment
of fifteen cents fare for ten years, high-speed rail service to Northwest Perry, priority to
those dependent on public transit, the purchase of Atlanta Transit System (ATS) and
implementation of immediate improvement programs, and public transit service from all
inner city communities to major employment centers. Next, the list called for high-speed
rail service to Fulton Industrial Park, East Atlanta-Kirkwood areas, Carver Homes-South
Atlanta area, and Southwest Atlanta-Cascade, Ben Hill. Moreover, the list demanded at
least 35% minority manpower utilization at all levels of MARTA staff, at least 35% of
each services and goods contracts to minority firms and consultants, and that no
contracts or agreements be extended to any organization that prohibits or limits hiring
an/or promotion of persons because of race, sex, and national origin. Finally, the list
called for an adequately staffed equal employment office and provisions for transporting
Atlanta Public School Children.290
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Black leaders also noted other transportation-related issues plaguing the black
community and requiring formal commitments. The group called upon the metropolitan
business community and political leadership, including MARTA officials and supporters,
to address a list of issues. The issues were in conjunction with the perceived faults of
the rapid transit proposal, and included: (1) The widening and realignment of Simpson
Road, (2) Improvements to Gordon Road, (3) Moratorium on planning and construction
of freeways and expressways through residential areas; (4) Exit ramp from I-20 West to
Gordon Road, (5) Representation on the Regional Planning Commission and all
regional and state planning boards; (6) Black Chief Administrative Officer or Deputy of
City of Atlanta; (7) Definitive land use plan for Fulton and DeKalb Counties to include
disbursement of low-income housing; (8) Minority manpower in county governments, (9)
Minority judges in municipal, civil-criminal, and superior courts. As illustrated, black
leaders used the requests to MARTA to call attention to various other problems in the
community. They used the political power illustrated through transportation planning to
demand changes in many areas of black life in the city of Atlanta and the region.291
The demands of black leadership and the black community as a whole were
rooted in the distrust harbored towards white leadership. With moderate change over
the past two decades, blacks still lacked full faith in the promises of white leadership. As
explained by the leaders of the ACCCA, “Historically, the black community has given full
support to programs and individuals claiming to improve the quality of life in the entire
metropolitan community, only to find that once the goals of the white community have
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been realized, no further consideration is given to the needs, desires and interests of
the black community.” Black leaders believed rapid transit to be the issue that could
bring about the change and the push needed to move forward in many areas. Rapid
transit therefore became the “call to action” launched by the black community to draw
closer attention to the neglect by white leaders on other issues of the black community.
Knowing that their support was critical to the success of the programs of MARTA,
blacks touted their clout, stating “MARTA officials and Atlanta’s leaders must convince
the black community that they must consider rapid transit as only one component of a
forward Atlanta thrust, and that other social and civil matters will be given equal
attention.” The black community in effect, held MARTA hostage in order to demand
widespread changes. MARTA was urged to use its authority and influence to see that
action was taken on all issues set forth before the black community would give its full
support.292

Changes in Planning
In the midst of planning for the referendum to fund the MARTA plans, the
boundaries of metropolitan and regional planning faced restructuring. The Atlanta
Region Metropolitan Planning Commission experienced reorganization in accordance
with the Area Planning and Development Commissions’ standards set forth by the
Georgia General Assembly. During the 1960s, planning became widespread, and other
organizations were created: the Metropolitan Atlanta Council for Health (MACHealth),
the Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments (MACLOG), and the Atlanta
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Area Transportation Study (AATS). Each organization, focusing on their respective
areas, created alternating views on topics and issues of the metropolitan area. The
organizations lacked interconnectivity and each maintained its own board of directors
and individual programming. This widespread approach to holistic planning for the
region became monotonous for local governments involved, furthermore, making
coordination and unity much more difficult. Local governments envisioned a single
metropolitan agency for comprehensive research, studies, advice and review. This
organization’s responsibilities would include land use and transportation planning, law
enforcement planning, health planning, social welfare planning, planning for parks and
recreation, water and sewer planning, and other similar activities.293
The purpose of the new planning body was to strengthen the means for
intergovernmental cooperation and coordination by acting as the official planning body.
The new planning body would be referred to as the “Commission” for the Atlanta
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. The phasing out of ARMPC and the
implementation of the Atlanta Regional Commission signified “a new
comprehensiveness” in the goals and approach to regional planning. The creation of the
new planning organization also strengthened the push for the participation of blacks in
planning Atlanta. Since the inception of the metropolitan planning committee, blacks
had called for representation on the official planning board. After three decades, the
new Metropolitan Planning and Development Commission answered the call with the
appointment of Ira Jackson. Jackson became the first black member named to the
commission and would represent the Atlanta Aldermanic Board. With his appointment,
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black leaders expected the appointment of more blacks from the general community.
Jackson noted that one of his main concerns was that blacks get fair representation on
the commission. He added, “this is an important commission where the planning for the
future will be done. This is where the basis will be laid for federal assistance funds; for
programs like Model Cities.” The Model Cities project south of downtown in the area of
the Atlanta Stadium was an urban renewal program promising to significantly impact the
displaced black communities in the area. With “a new comprehensiveness” as the
forward goal, the new Commission had a new name, a new charge, and a “fresh
start.”294
After a series of forums and solicited participation of residents to be affected by
the rapid transit system, planning consultants revealed a revised and improved major
transportation plan. The improved plan now faced public hearings in each of the four
counties and the city of Atlanta before being studied and reviewed by the MARTA board
of directors. In reviewing, the board paid close attention to the recommendations of the
public before adopting a final plan. These measures were to try and ensure ratification
of the transit plans in the November referendum.295
The improved plan featured many of the recommended changes to the plan
included in the 1968 referendum. This plan outlined approximately 70 miles of bus and
rail rapid transit, 52.09 miles of rail transit and 17.6 miles of rapid busways. It included
40 rail stations and eight rapid busway stations with six additional on and off ramp
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locations. The purchase of the Atlanta Transit System, proprietor of the city’s bus
transit system, was also included in the plan. MARTA’s plan included acquiring the
system and improving it by providing more frequent service and new routes, more than
doubling the system’s mileage. Upon the completion of the rail lines, the bus system
would serve as a feeder service between the rapid transit stations and the
neighborhoods of the region. The planned bus transit system to serve the rail transit
station would include over 1,530 route miles. Of the total mileage, approximately 775
lay miles in Fulton County; 540 miles in DeKalb County, 100 miles in Clayton County,
and 115 miles in Gwinnett County.296
In the case of the rapid rail transit system, the improved plans outlined seven
lines extending in virtually all directions of rapid development. The South Line would
extend from Forest Park, north to Garnett Street. Stations along this line would be
located at Hapeville, Atlanta Airport, East Point, Lakewood, Oakland City and West End.
The Southwest Line would extend from East Point to College Park. Serving the central
business district, the Central Line would extend from Garnett Street, north to a point
north of Pershing Point. From there, the line would diverge to the Northeast and
Northwest. Stations along this line would be located at Five Points, Cain Street, Civic
Center, North Avenue, Tenth Street, and Pershing Point. Serving areas above the
central business district, the Northwest Line would extend from the junction with the
Central Line due north of Pershing Point veering westward to Northside Drive. A station
would be located at 26th & Peachtree. The Northeast Line would extend from the
Central Line junction north of Pershing Point to Norcross. Stations along this line would
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be located at Lindbergh, Piedmont, Lenox, Brookhaven, Chamblee, and Doraville. The
West Line would extend from Fulton Industrial Boulevard to the Five Points, with
stations at Lynhurst, Hightower, West Lake, Chappell, Ashby, and Vine City. Finally,
the East Line would extend from Five Points to Indian Creek, with stations at Georgia
State University, Grant Street, Moreland Avenue, Candler Park, East Lake Drive,
Decatur, Avondale Estates, and Memorial Drive.297
About two-thirds of the total recommended rail system would be located on railroad
right-of-ways with seven miles of subway, 21 miles of aerial structures, and 24 at-grade
levels. Four rapid busway routes included in the improved plans would provide service
to East Atlanta, Northwest Perry Homes, North Atlanta, and North Decatur. With the
improved outline for the bus and rail rapid transit lines, estimates showed approximately
90 percent of the population in the Perimeter Highway would be within walking distance
of a bus route, and all buses would connect with the rapid transit stations. With
improved plans outlined, MARTA faced the challenge of ensuring a majority vote for the
impending referendum.298
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Figure 24: MARTA Map including Clayton & Gwinnett counties, 1971
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After reviewing the tentative plan produced by consultants and the
recommendations from the citywide public hearings which included black residents, the
MARTA board scheduled official action on the plan with major changes reflecting the
public reactions. Maintaining the favor of the public served as a major goal of MARTA
through the improved plans. The major changes included: Termination of the West
rapid rail line in the vicinity of the Perimeter Highway (I-285) instead of extending to the
Fulton Industrial Boulevard, and the elimination of the Chappell Road Station on the
West Rail Line. Other changes included the inauguration of new bus service to
Alpharetta in north Fulton County and to Lithonia in eastern DeKalb County. Perhaps
the most striking of the addendum was the addition of a rapid rail branch to the Perry
Homes area in northwest Atlanta instead of rapid busway. This had been one of the
primary objectives of the black coalition for support of the rapid transit program. That
particular change by the MARTA board represented the force of the black electorate in
the rapid transit planning process. In addition to amending and finalizing the official
plan, the board also scheduled action on policy statements relating to fares; and
pledged non-discrimination in hiring practices, construction, and operation of the total
system. MARTA also vowed to provide monetary and other assistance in relocating
persons and businesses displaced by transit routes and facilities; however, since 70
percent of the rapid rail system was designed to use existing railroad right-of-way or city
streets, relatively few residences or businesses would be displaced.299
The MARTA program would entail the largest construction project ever
undertaken in the South and would provide employment for thousands over the
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construction period. An estimated 3,000 persons would be employed at the peak of
construction. As for financing the massive undertaking, the plan would take maximum
advantage of federal funds aimed at improving transportation systems in urban
America. The largely pay-as-you-go plan would also save taxpayers $150 million in
long-term interest, according to the MARTA board. Under the plan, two-thirds of the
$1.4 billion capital cost of buying and improving the service of the Atlanta Transit
System and constructing 70 miles of rapid rail and bus transit would be covered by the
federal government under the Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970. Sources at
the federal level predicted that federal funds would be guaranteed with the approval of
the referendum by the voters of the metropolitan area. A sum total of more than $938
million over the eight-year construction period would be provided. The remaining onethird of the cost, approximately $469 million, would come from a one percent sales tax
to be levied in Fulton, DeKalb, Clayton, and Gwinnett Counties with voter approval in
each jurisdiction in the November 1971 referendum. In addition to the capital costs,
operating costs of the total system were projected at $806 million over an initial 15-year
period. These costs were to be met by the sales tax, along with revenue generated
from passenger fares. The plan for rapid transit and improved transportation in the
metropolitan Atlanta region continued to gain momentum with seemingly only one road
block left: the November referendum.300
In the period nearing the 1971 referendum, the improved regional transportation
plan set forth by MARTA gained the support and key endorsements, in particular, the
support of black leadership and black voters. The ACCCA, with Vice Mayor Maynard
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Jackson, State Senator Leroy Johnson and Community Relations Commissioner
Andrew Young as spokespersons, endorsed the plans, adding that the entire process
would remain under watchful eye. The coalition emphasized the real necessity of
transportation being administered by a public agency, and noted that the agency should
concentrate on excellent service as opposed to profit. The coalition also continued to
stress the idea that public transit and better access to efficient transportation systems
was readily needed in the areas of the city where people depended on it. Vice Mayor
Jackson added, “to remain a viable and complete city, Atlanta must have a
transportation system that is responsive to the needs of all its citizens, and it is
imperative that the system provide service, not only to commercial districts, but to
industrial areas, residential clusters, and all other institutions in our area.” Ultimately, the
coalition felt that the MARTA program was a step in the right direction and that MARTA
had addressed itself to the needs of the total community, urban and suburban, black
and white. The black leaders endorsed the improved plans and collectively expressed
that MARTA’s job was to see that its commitments “be lived to.” The coalition vowed not
only to endorse the November referendum, but pledged its support during construction
and all other phases without dropping the watchful guard.301
Throughout the planning and construction phases of the rapid transit project,
MARTA made it clear that residents, businesses and supporters would have significant
voice in the planning, location and designs of buildings, parking lots, street
improvements, and other factors. Final detailed designs of the project would not begin
until it was certain the voters were in support of the project through the successful
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passage of the referendum. Once overcoming that hurdle, MARTA pledged to continue
to seek the preferences and ideas of the people who would use it. Also, MARTA
officials continuously urged support for the rapid transit program which they predicted to
trigger a $4 billion economic boom for metropolitan Atlanta, extending through the
1970s. This great sum of money would be the direct and indirect impact of the
implementation of the rapid transit system, which would affect area employment,
manufacturing, retail trade, service industry and other commercial activity. The most
dramatic impact would be the thousands of new construction jobs created. The
proposed impact of the construction was compared to that of the Lockheed Corporation,
which had revolutionized the economy of Cobb County and the surrounding area,
bringing tremendous growth and employment. According to MARTA officials,
economists at Georgia State University estimated that every dollar spent on
construction would turn over three and a half times through the generation of supporting
activities, such as housing for construction workers, retail purchases, consumer
services, banking, auto sales, and many other areas of life.302
On the day of the November 1971 referendum C.A. Scott, editor of the Atlanta
Daily World, published in his editorial corner a call for support entitled “Rapid Transit Is
Necessary.” Black leaders like Scott recognized the role that the black community would
play in ensuring that passage of the referendum. Scott had also been appointed by the
mayor to serve on the exploratory committee for MARTA preparations. In his editorial,
he wrote:
The voters in Atlanta, Fulton County and other areas, except Cobb
County, which make up Metropolitan Atlanta, will decide in a referendum
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whether Atlanta will be stagnated or provided with an opportunity to move
forward and grow. Already there is a problem here in traffic and
transportation from one point to another. It is obvious that more people
will move to Atlanta and more business will come here, so transportation
will become a more acute problem unless the voters follow their official
leaders and civic and business leaders in supporting today’s referendum
by voting yes . . . Negro organizations and prominent leaders in all fields
have expressed approval and support of the present Rapid Transit Plan,
so the balloting today should be overwhelmingly in favor of it. Some
Negroes are saying it will help white persons who have moved to the
suburbs get back into the city at a low fare. Some white opponents to the
plan are arguing it will help mostly those who use the public transportation
system and those persons reportedly are about 75 percent Negroes.
There may be a little truth in both the charges, but there is not enough to
oppose the plan. They rather suggest that all the people will be benefited
by Rapid Transit.303
Scott believed that in spite of the charges against the plan, MARTA was needed for the
progress of the city. He elaborated that no plan would be perfect, and necessary
adjustments could be made if they were deemed desirable in the future. To further
encourage support, Scott noted that mayors from across the country supported
Atlanta’s plan for rapid transit. “When one is in doubt over an issue, it is helpful to listen
to disinterested competent sources for information,” added Scott. He believed these
mayors of cities comparable to Atlanta were abreast on how adequate transportation
benefited and progressed large cities and metropolitan areas. He added that they
praised Atlanta’s efforts for rapid transit and believed that it would be a mistake if the
city failed to take advantage of this monumental opportunity.304
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MARTA Plans: “Yes”
Despite the support, MARTA barely passed in two counties. Voters in Fulton and
DeKalb voted “yes” to the November 9th referendum, authorizing MARTA to proceed
with development of a coordinated bus and rail rapid transit system with the local share
of the cost to be funded by a one percent sales tax in those two counties. The
referendum was overwhelmingly defeated in Clayton and Gwinnett Counties by a 4-1
margin. In Gwinnett County, returns showed 2,475 in favor of the proposal to 9,506
against. Clayton County returns showed 10,903 rejected while 3,189 supported. Voters
in Fulton and DeKalb narrowly approved the measures. Voting returns in Fulton County
showed the referendum passing by a little more than 2,000 votes – 55,736 for to 53,
725 against. DeKalb County illustrated a slightly higher margin with 38,886 for and
35,752 against. Voter turnout for the referenda surpassed expectations as 42 percent of
eligible voters casted ballots, compared to the 33 percent predicted.305
With overwhelming defeat in Clayton and Gwinnett counties, suburban, tax
paying whites who felt they would foot majority of the bill for rapid transit had succeeded
in preventing mass transit from making way for unwanted elements into their prized
spaces. Resistance also came from blacks who felt that MARTA would simply work out
as a means for whites who had fled from Atlanta to avoid taxes and integration. In
general, race, rather than issues of financing or alternative transportation, dominated
the MARTA campaign. Some suburban opponents characterized it as a plot to scatter
blacks throughout the metropolitan area and bring about metropolitan school
integration. They suspected that the bus and rail lines would be used to transport poor
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black students to lily-white suburban schools. Others feared that such joint association
between city and suburb, even unofficially, as “metropolitan Atlanta” would prompt the
courts to view them that way in all matters other than rapid transportation. Conservative
elements objected to the referendum and linked it with other issues such as annexation
and consolidation. And because those in favor of consolidating Fulton County and the
City of Atlanta also supported MARTA, the more radical conservatives continued to
oppose the referendum. One writer to a suburban weekly newspaper wrote: “If you want
the drug pushers, muggers, rapists, and other degenerates who are now stalking the
streets of downtown Atlanta to invade your community, the vote for rapid transit . . . A
speedy 15-cent ride will drop them off near your front door and your neighbor’s front
door.”306
At a public hearing in Clayton County, residents expressed disapproval in the fact
that MARTA would only provide one rail station in the county at Forest Park. They
argued the need for additional service, especially rail service to Jonesboro in a more
timely fashion. Others believed Clayton County deserved more consideration in the
overall system. In Gwinnett County, residents argued the need for cross county service
and assurance that their rural lifestyle in the countryside would not be harmed or
altered. In speaking about Gwinnett and Clayton counties, Sam Massell later stated,
“You know, they were never strongly supportive at all. The best we could get out of
them was they didn’t oppose; they never strongly supported it.” The major racial issues
coupled with political issues, lack of service, and the long projected arrival of the rail
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system to outlying areas ultimately deterred suburbanites in Gwinnett and Clayton
counties from supporting the MARTA referendum.307
Despite a “no” vote in Clayton and Gwinnett counties, the approval by DeKalb
and Fulton counties initiated a series of events to create the system to function as a
two-county system. With the necessary approval, MARTA General Counsel conferred
with Fulton and DeKalb Counties, along with the state revenue commissioner to
coordinate the levying of the sales tax and the drafting and publications of rules,
regulations, and procedures as necessary to carry out the collection of the tax and the
other purposes of the MARTA Act. Next, MARTA began the procedures to acquire the
Atlanta Transit System. The acquisition of the system had been included in the
planning and development of an efficient rail and bus rapid transportation system.
MARTA also initiated procedures to acquire new buses for expanded bus routes within
the new system. The successful vote in the two counties made necessary the acquiring
of right-of-ways and a land acquisition program. This program, along with the
amendment of the Technical Studies program, which had been created earlier in
MARTA’s development, began solidifying the physical realizations of the rapid transit
system. The Technical Studies program worked on financial support for the full scope
of the expanded work program, including such work as title searches and environmental
studies associated with land acquisitions and rail and facilities construction.308
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At the behest of MARTA Chairman Roy Blount, MARTA Director Jesse Hill, Jr.
met with MARTA General Manager Henry L. Stuart concerning the development of a
training program to prepare local minority citizens to qualify for the jobs to become
available with the rapid transit program. The Daily World reported that in order for
blacks to get a fair share throughout the whole system, the earliest phase of the MARTA
plan required swift action. To ensure fairness, MARTA instituted a plan of equal hiring
and opportunity in all phases of employment and construction. MARTA stayed true to
this promise made during its campaign for referendum support. MARTA also intended
on establishing means to safeguard the plan from those who profited from the city’s jobs
and rapid transit without paying taxes because they lived outside the city limits. In many
cases, those same people resided in the counties that rejected MARTA, but could
benefit just as much from the convenience of the rapid transit program.309
To show further commitment to honesty in the rapid and transit plans, MARTA
had to set a top priority of making sure bus and train lines went through black
communities in full equity with white areas. They also had to guarantee that old and
poor people being uprooted would be transplanted with as little fear, pain, and suffering
as possible. A Daily World writer explained that in order for MARTA to have a fair
chance, it took a real effort for democracy, and “many an old timer has seen such efforts
fail; and there is reason today to mistrust efforts for fair play . . . but it is a fact the Negro
leaders have not all been weak or wrong; black organizations have brought about some
changes; and our black public office holders have done much more than is seen
directly.” The writer continued, “The picture is changing, and blacks can force a better
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hour upon us now by seeing to it that MARTA stays honest.” Affirmative action efforts
on behalf of the city’s leaders also sought to ensure honesty and fairness in not only
MARTA planning, but also all aspects of city and metropolitan planning. The Equal
Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 created measures to prevent job discrimination
at the state and local government level. Through annual reports to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, cities had to show that they did not practice
discrimination in hiring. Affirmative action enjoyed a high priority in Atlanta city
government as a result of both the Massell and Jackson Administrations.310
Citizen participation, recommendations, and suggestions from residents
throughout the metropolitan area proved critical to the success of the rapid transit
program immediately following the approval of the referendum. MARTA continued
hosting meetings throughout the region, informing residents of studies being conducted
to determine the impact of the system on the environment. The meetings allowed
citizens to present to MARTA and their consultants a series of specific concerns
regarding environmental aspects in the neighborhoods. The suggestions and
recommendations reflected their sentiments, ranging from requests that MARTA ensure
that the system added to and not detract from the area through which it passes; to
MARTA providing community facilities such as linear parks and recreational areas
during construction. Likewise, throughout the metropolitan region, residents voiced
concerns about disruption caused by construction, noise from the system, the date of
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completion, displacement of people due to construction of the rail system, and the
overall impact of the MARTA system in the metropolitan area.311
MARTA intended to take positive and affirmative steps in the carrying out of the
rapid transit plan. It prepared an environmental statement elaborating the commitment
of the plans to ensure a high quality of life in Atlanta for the betterment and benefit of all
residents. Other studies conducted concerned historic preservation, aesthetics of the
system and related components, ecological aspects, air and water quality, noise
pollution, and economic considerations. Citizen participation in the various studies
allowed MARTA and its consultants to create a more comprehensive total impact study
to be presented to the federal government for final approval. It also allowed them to take
necessary actions to uphold promises and enhance the maximum benefits of the rapid
transportation system.312
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Figure 25: Approved Referenda System, 1971 – Atlanta History Center
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Figure 26: Rapid Transit Forum Announcement for event held at
Archer High School near Perry Homes, Atlanta History Center
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Figure 27: Rapid Transit Forum Form, Atlanta History Center
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Figure 28: Completed Rapid Transit Forum Form, Atlanta History Center
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Equal Opportunity
From the beginning, black leaders made it clear they “weren’t kidding about black
participation in MARTA.” Serving as “watchdogs” throughout the entire planning process
of MARTA, safeguarding interests and promoting honesty, fairness, and equal
opportunity occupied the agendas of black elected officials and community leaders.
“We’re not trying to throw the baby out with the bath water,” explained Senator Leroy
Johnson to MARTA officials. “We are trying to keep the baby in the bath. But all we’re
asking is that you let us minorities get in the bath water too.” Johnson and the
delegation of black leaders met with the MARTA board periodically to bring forth
grievances with the racial policies and practices of the transit company. They also
noted that staying visual and vocal alerted transit officials to the severity of black
demands and the need for participation.313
In a January 1973 meeting, the employment practices of MARTA came under
heavy criticism as Alderman Q.V. Williamson pointed out that in one MARTA division
some thirty white supervisors had the right to fire any black employee at any time.
Williamson explained that “low mentality ideas about race” still existed within MARTA
operations. Major controversy also arose over the small number of blacks employed by
the rapid transit authority in executive positions. Johnson expounded on the fact that
whites occupied forty-six of the top positions, while backs only held 10 high posts. “We
take the position that 50 percent of the MARTA work force should be black from the top
down,” explained Johnson. Adding to the debate, Johnson stated, “We take the further
position that there should be a moratorium on all hiring until we’re caught up.” At this

313

Stone, pp. 98-102. Bayor, pp. 194-195. Atlanta Daily World, January 21, 1973

233

time, while under the scrutiny of the black delegation, MARTA sought to fill thirteen staff
vacancies. Johnson continued, “with thirteen vacancies, just as sure as I’m sitting here,
you’d hire ten whites and three blacks.” Calling forth more issues, the delegation of
black leaders from the ACCCA protested the use of firms and contractors with
questionable business practices and most importantly, not in compliance with equal
employment policies.314
Accusations of non-compliance surfaced in the case of the hiring of the firm of
Huie and Harland as legal counsel. Black leaders disapproved and MARTA officials
defended the hiring by explaining that the firm “had added one minority law school
graduate to its professional staff and one minority employee to its clerical staff.” The
firm, which originally employed 14 people, benefited $396,095 from MARTA contracts.
In order to be in compliance with MARTA equal employment policies, the requirements
included: a contribution of $1,000 to the Emory University Law School Scholarship
Internship Fund; depositing funds in a minority banking institution; and sub-contracting
$21,000 in title work to a minority law firm. State Representative Julian Bond further
explained that the firm’s affirmative action plan dealt in “tokenism,” as the black staff did
not work in the same offices as the white lawyers. This firm also came under fire for
taking part in a business deal in which one of its clients purchased property in a
proposed zone for a MARTA station in Doraville. The firm argued that the transaction
took place without knowledge of the MARTA plans and produced certified deeds in
support. Nonetheless, equal employment practices remained high on the agenda of the
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black delegation as they worked to ensure that black Atlanta “got its piece of the
action.”315
Black elected officials and community leaders presented a unified front in the
struggle for equal black participation at all levels of rapid transit development. The
issues of equal opportunity and affirmative action dominated the rapid transit
discussion, as black Atlanta demanded a fair share. Alderman Marvin Arrington noted
concerns that not enough money had been earmarked for minority firms. According to
Arrington, MARTA reports indicated inequity in the funds spent with black and white
firms. He further stated, “We are asking MARTA to set aside some funds for minority
contractors.” Rev. Joseph E. Lowery, pastor of Central United Methodist Church,
suggested MARTA change its current policy of awarding contracts simply on promises
to comply. He supported earlier sentiments that contracts should not be awarded to any
firms not in compliance with equal employment opportunity laws. Lowery went further to
admonish the MARTA board to make available information on the goods and services
needed for upcoming years so that minority firms could prepare to make bids and enter
competition. Leveling the playing fields in competition served as an equalizing factor
necessary to ensure opportunities for minorities. Finally, Vice Mayor Maynard Jackson
in summing up the delegation’s positions stated, “The elimination of racial bias from the
operations and policies of MARTA is an affirmative duty and the general manager of
MARTA has that affirmative duty.” He added that in regards to that affirmative duty, “the
MARTA General Manager’s nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance shall be cause
for his or her discharge, and that the board of directors should so declare.” He solidified
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the delegation’s decree to MARTA officials in stating, “We are for MARTA, but we are
for MARTA being right.”316
Parallel to black Atlanta’s demands, the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration (UTMA) called for “an effective affirmative action program” to ensure
equal representation of minority groups at all levels of MARTA’s operation. UTMA
studies evaluated MARTA’s civil rights compliance activities and identified two basic
needs of MARTA: increasing the number of blacks and women in upper level Transit
Division jobs; and developing a plan to include goals and timetables to implement equal
employment policies. Though UTMA did not formally charge discrimination, its report
revealed undesirable conditions, most prevalent being the lack of blacks in the job
categories of dispatchers, supervisors, and office and clerical workers. It also revealed
the overlooking of two minority women for office positions for which they appeared to be
more qualified than the white women hired. They applied for the position prior to the
application of the white woman who got the job. In matters concerning job titles,
discrimination presented a concern. The report claimed the Accounting Department
discriminated against women in job titles, compensation, promotions and benefits.
Women in the department received the title “bookkeepers,” while male counterparts
maintained the title “accountants.” The study indicated a lesser pay for women in
comparison to their male counterparts and showed no women supervisors out of a total
of sixty.317
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With regard to the undesirable conditions pinpointed by the UTMA, Morris Dillard,
a black MARTA executive, explained, “MARTA is expanding and that gives us a
wonderful opportunity to correct the weaknesses.” He also indicated that the UTMA
report provided positive input into MARTA planning and the recommendations provided
insight to be complied with. At this point, the rapid transit discussion in metropolitan
Atlanta had endured the challenges associated with social change since its conception.
Rapid transit came about at the height of the civil rights struggle and did not escape the
grasp of change. The ongoing struggle to eliminate inequality based on a “minority
group status” ranked among planning issues of the period. Well into a second decade of
planning, social change continued to both dominate and stall progress on the full
implementation of Atlanta’s rapid transit system.318

Changing the Color of Leadership
As rapid transit debates continued, so did changes in city leadership, economic
development, and outlook on the future. In 1960, Atlanta’s black population accounted
for 38 percent of the total population. By 1973, the year of Maynard Jackson’s election
to the city’s top post, blacks constituted a majority at 54 percent of the total population.
Jackson believed Atlanta to be the best city in America for black people to live, and its
reputation as an epicenter of opportunity attracted masses of young, ambitious blacks
from across the nation. State representative Julian Bond believed Atlanta to be the best
city for middle class blacks with college degrees; however, for poor blacks, the city
remained reminiscent of Birmingham, Jackson, and other southern cities. Nevertheless,
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Jackson realized the voting potential of his city, where blacks accounted for 48 percent
of the electorate, and were steadily increasing.319
Most of the black leadership conceded the idea of Sam Massell serving a second
term as mayor, then step aside for a black mayor in 1977. However, Jackson’s plan did
not reflect such belief. His plan placed him at the forefront in the 1973 election. As the
grandson of one of Atlanta’s foremost black leaders and civil rights giants John Wesley
Dobbs, he had been reared in the shadows of a leader at the forefront of struggles for
equality. Raised to think in broad terms, of principles and morals, and equality for all
during a period of great social change, he knew the experiences and challenges of his
leadership would be different from those of his grandfather and predecessors. Jackson
realized that in order to be mayor of Atlanta, his style needed to be all-inclusive,
representing whites and blacks, calming white fears and exceeding black expectations.
Achieving victory in this task depended on the successful merger of two different worlds,
a feat Jackson believed himself to be thoroughly prepared.320
At the beginning of his campaign, Maynard Jackson solicited the support of
Atlanta’s black leadership for the first time in all his campaigns. As a mature Atlanta
politician, Jackson realized that the support of the established black leadership
accompanied resources and influence necessary for victory. In particular, he courted
the support of Jesse Hill, Jr., who had been a central figure in Andrew Young’s
victorious 1972 campaign to become the first black U.S. congressman from the Deep
South since Reconstruction. Hill’s stamp of approval lent credibility, money, and votes,
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as he served as chief executive of Atlanta Life, a large black business. Hill, like other
members of the black leadership elite such as officers of the Atlanta Urban League,
thought the 1977 election to be perfect for a black mayor and expressed early
reluctance to Jackson’s 1973 bid. Jackson and his advisors conducted polling and
survey research of diverse groups of Atlanta citizens, which indicated favorable results.
With the results, they convinced Hill and the other black leaders that Jackson’s vision of
becoming Atlanta’s first black mayor might be worthwhile.321
On the other hand, Senator Leroy Johnson, who originally supported Jackson’s
mayoral bid, had a change of heart and decided to run for mayor himself. Johnson,
revered as the most powerful black politician in the South, provided an early threat and
could potentially split the black electorate. Jackson - the first black ever elected vice
mayor of Atlanta, and Johnson – the first black elected to the Georgia legislature in the
20th century, both running on “law and order” platforms and vowing to “bring honesty
back to government,” squared off for the support and endorsements of the black
electorate through debates, interviews, surveys, and polls. In the end, Jackson came
out on top. Ultimately, Jesse Hill and the black leaders reported to members of their
interracial coalitions, including banker Mills Lane, that clearly, Maynard Jackson
possessed the necessary requirements to be Atlanta’s first black mayor.322
Gary Pomerantz explains, “To many blacks in Atlanta in 1973, Maynard Jackson
became more than a mere candidate. He was a cause, a symbol, a spiritual
manifestation of black hopes and dreams a century old. Whites could not comprehend
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it.” Jackson’s popularity continuously grew throughout 1973. In the weeks preceding the
October 1973 election, The Daily World interviewed a cross-section of voters about their
opinions on the upcoming election, and the interests centered most about the
candidacies of current mayor and vice mayor, Massell and Jackson. Interviewers noted,
“Only a few of those contacted mentioned Senator Leroy Johnson or attorney Charles
Weltner.” Charles Weltner had been the candidate endorsed by the corridors of power
in white Atlanta. Moreover, still positive and upbeat, Sam Massell persevered in his
campaign for a second term. Elected mayor in 1969 with majority black voter support,
he responded to their needs. He called for blacks to comprise 50 percent of all city
government employees, and in four years, he raised the total by nearly 20 percent, or to
42 percent. He appointed blacks to head city departments and serve as local judges.
He created an Office of Affirmative Action and successfully lobbied for the passage of
the 1971 MARTA referendum. Massell and supporters believed his record as mayor
sufficed to gain the necessary support for a second term as mayor.323
In the primary election, Maynard Jackson won nearly 47 percent of the vote,
including more than 80 percent of the black electorate. He entered a run-off with Sam
Massell, who defeated Weltner by fewer than 1,000 votes to finish second, 19.8 percent
to 19.1 percent. Leroy Johnson finished last with a miniscule 4 percent of the total vote.
Jackson’s seat at the top came only 3,500 votes short of a majority. Fear immediately
hit the Massell campaign. In response, the team attempted to reenergize the campaign
and overcome the 27-point gap in the election results. The infamous “Atlanta’s Too
Young to Die” slogan grew from an attempt to regroup, but drew unwanted negative
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attention. Sam Massell believed that every decision made by Jackson as vice mayor
occurred along racial lines, and potentially as mayor, he would accelerate white flight.
He believed that with the rapid departure of whites, the inner city would decay at a
faster rate via the decimation of the tax base. This lack of that tax base would render
financial death upon the city. Attempts by the Massell campaign to racialize the mayoral
race failed in materializing the reaction necessary for victory in the run-off election.
Jackson garnered 73,603 votes, enough to triumph over Massell, who received 49,300
– becoming the first black mayor in a major southern city. He received solid black
support – 95 percent of the black vote, and considerable white votes at 21 percent. With
this election, Atlanta joined six other major U.S. cities with black mayors: Los Angeles,
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, Gary, and Newark.324

Maynard Jackson and Transportation Planning
“Atlanta is the most successful city in the nation,” proclaimed Jackson upon his
election to the city’s top post. “We have a city which fundamentally is attractive to
people. What we have to do is turn the statistics on a few things.” Jackson identified
keys to improving the city image and functionality as: attacking crime, improving
housing for middle and upper income groups, protecting inner-city neighborhoods, and
importantly, improving transportation systems. He further elaborated, “Atlanta was born
as a rail center and it has prospered as a hub of air and highway traffic. Atlanta needs
an efficient transportation system to grow and to prosper.” He concluded, “A successful
and comprehensive transportation system is of paramount importance to Atlanta’s
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future.” Jackson believed it possible to have a better and more efficient transportation
system to carry more Atlantans cheaper and faster without destroying stable
neighborhoods, uprooting people, and destroying the ecology of Atlanta. His platform on
transportation explained his belief that a transportation plan could be developed to
preserve existing neighborhoods, yet strengthen the downtown business areas. In a
press conference at city hall during his campaign for mayor, Jackson explained:
I do not see a successful movement of traffic as being inconsistent with
the public’s interest in protecting the livability of Atlanta’s neighborhoods.
Yet in recent years, some transportation planners in Atlanta have all too
often thought more about pavement that about what a transportation
system must be all about – people. The Atlanta Area Transportation Study
and the Central Area Study include among their plans construction of 91
miles of new expressway, 715 miles of new and widened streets, and over
1,000 acres near or in downtown to park 160,000 new cars, and the
purchase of right-of-way, often through existing residential communities,
for 40 more miles of future expressways – all at a cost to exceed $2
billion. These studies and plans reflected outmoded assumptions that
persons are or can be isolated from the interests of the affected
neighborhoods. Many of the proposed expressways date back to the 1946
Lochner Plan and the 1959 Expressway Policy Study. Each subsequent
study has relied too greatly upon the conclusions of those studies, with
little critical evaluation of changing conditions.
Effectively, Jackson’s goal of updating the city’s transportation plans became apparent
in many of his subsequent actions. He proposed the city immediately implement a
comprehensive transportation system to reflect modern and ongoing changes.325
“We in Atlanta have learned the hard lesson that over-dependence on
expressways and avoidable street widening is counterproductive,” explained Jackson.
His comprehensive transportation plans rejected intra-city expressways, including the
proposed I-485, an intra-city north-south expressway with a main artery through
northeast Atlanta. The neighborhoods most affected, unlike those affected by the
325
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original north-south expressway (downtown connector), contained mostly white and
middle to upper income residents. Opposition to the expressways came through the
efforts of neighborhood mobilization in areas accustomed to having weight in
community affairs while possessing resources useful in the prolonged controversy.
Furthermore, after the approval of MARTA in 1971, highway opponents pointed to it as
an alternative to expressways. They also used the newly enacted federal requirement
for environmental impact statements as grounds for a court challenge, prompting a
lawsuit which temporarily delayed construction of I-485. As the case progressed, it
rallied popular opposition and the freeway revolt ensued. The actions eventually drew
the support of Congressman Andrew Young and federal officials ultimately halted
construction.326
Jackson believed intra-city expressways destroyed established communities with
little compensating benefits in improved mobility. As a fourth-generation Atlanta resident
and a third-generation Auburn Avenue native, Jackson had witnessed firsthand the
devastation and results of intra-city expressway construction and development. After all,
his grandfather John Wesley Dobbs led black delegations in securing black rights and
opposition to issues such as expressway construction in the main commercial district
and residential areas of black Atlanta in the 1950s. Jackson advocated no new
expressways or major street widening to be planned through residential areas with
maximum community involvement at every level of planning and approved
environmental studies at the earliest stages. He also advocated improving MARTA,
making it more responsive to the needs of the people. Overall, Jackson’s outlook on
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transportation planning centered on maximum community involvement and citizen
participation at every level.327
Central to Jackson’s transportation plans were improvements to MARTA.
Jackson’s support increased because Atlanta’s rapid transit system could benefit
tremendously from the opening of the Federal Highway Trust Fund for rapid transit
funding on the same basis as highway funding. Improving MARTA’s responsiveness
and creating a quality, efficient system to enhance mobility in all aspects of city life
ranked high in his transportation plans. In 1974, he outlined his city’s ambitious mass
transit plans before a congressional committee in a report that contained large doses of
what his aides later referred to as “community soul.” This meant that the designers of
Atlanta’s transit system kept the needs of the citizens as a top priority. At the hearing on
urban transit problems held by the Joint Economic Committee, Jackson explained:
Mass rapid transit is the fastest, most efficient way of moving large
numbers of people in densely packed urban areas, but it can also play a
key role in revitalizing decaying areas of a city and boosting people’s
morale. Approached properly, mass transit can spur better housing,
contribute to a strong downtown area and help stem the flight of the white
and black middle class to the suburbs. Cities must be made livable again,
and to do that mass transit must not be used just to cart people out of the
concrete canyons at 5p.m.328
His plans for MARTA efficiency also included: maintaining the 15 cent fare, increasing
frequency of service, providing better route coverage with the city, offering special
services to the elderly and handicapped, and ensuring that no citizen lived more than
three blocks from public transportation. He also proposed MARTA make the most
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effective use possible of its right-of-way along existing railroad corridors to reduce to an
absolute minimum relocation of persons and businesses in the path of construction.329
Maynard Jackson saw rapid transit as a means of elevating the quality of life in
Atlanta for all people. Adamant about the positive effects of mass transit on citizens, he
said that mass transit could no longer be designed without major attention to community
values and concerns. Jackson boasted that concessions had already been made in the
rapid transit designs of Atlanta that skirted residential areas, which might have been
ruined. He also proclaimed that rapid transit could help increase a city’s tax base if the
city tightly controlled zoning in transit paths and spurred both commercial and
residential development along its routes. In Atlanta, planners engaged in using rapid
transit to achieve economic goals of opening up isolated areas to new businesses,
making job opportunities in the suburbs more accessible to inner city residents. Jackson
boasted of the job opportunities created by MARTA construction to train low-skilled and
low-income residents. In his closing statements before the hearing, Jackson solidified
his support for Atlanta’s rapid transit program in stating:
The federal government should make increased transportation planning
money directly available to the cities to ensure that the cities have prime
input in regional transportation planning. I’m not anti-highways, but I am
anti-destroying neighborhoods. We have a white . . . and to some extent, a
black flight problem in Atlanta and the irony of my position as the first
black mayor is that I have to fight to make sure they don’t leave the city.
But we can’t on one hand, say don’t leave Atlanta to a person then on the
next day, run a freeway through his bathroom.330
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In the case of Atlanta, Jackson believed that rapid transit could assist in making the city
“livable again.” Once efficient and rooted in the concerns of the people, Atlanta’s
transportation systems could enhance the economic outlook while improving the quality
of life in the city. Simply put, Jackson’s plan used transportation planning and improved
transportation systems not only for movement about the city, but also as a catalyst of
social, economic, and upward mobility.331

Ready, Set, Go!
After years of political maneuvering, constant changes, and joint efforts in
planning, the full scope of Atlanta’s rapid transit program moved closer to a reality. With
community support, along with funding and design in place, MARTA geared for the
largest public works construction project in the southeastern United States. In February
1974, MARTA began demolition and clearing the path for the rapid rail system. MARTA
General Manager Alan Kiepper called the demolition “a very significant step toward
actual construction of the rapid rail system.” MARTA acquired properties along the
planned train lines, relocating families and businesses as necessary. Over the course of
construction, MARTA estimated the dislocation of some 2,200 families, business, or
individuals with suitable compensation. Next, MARTA solidified contracts necessary for
construction, including: legal, design, labor, and insurance. In reference to questions
about diversity in the offering of contracts, MARTA officials explained that contractual
services had been and would continue to be offered to minority contractors, with the
bulk of such contracts to continue over the course of construction. MARTA’s Assistant
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General Manager Gladstone Chandler further explained, “we are not only concerned
with equal employment provided for people we do business with, but also within our
own organization.”332
By November 1974, MARTA reported that contractual agreements had been
extended to 28 minority firms. Services as either contractors or subcontractors on
construction and non-construction projects exceeded over $1 million. Services ranged
from moving services and sale of office supplies to design work on the Moreland
Avenue and Ashby Street Stations. Since the inception of MARTA’s Affirmative Action
Plan, a program designed to ensure that minorities – chiefly blacks and women –
receive a fair share of MARTA jobs and business opportunities, MARTA showed
concerted efforts to be inclusive in decision-making. With blacks being key supporters of
the rapid transit program and critical to ratification, along with being the group to be
most adversely affected by construction, their demands for inclusiveness carried weight.
Atlanta’s mass transit improved considerably in the 1970s in regard to service and
minority involvement. It served more neighborhoods and involved blacks in policymaking positions. With inclusiveness came a better quality of decision-making to reflect
the complexities of Atlanta and its entire people in areas other than rapid transit. The
role of race in mass transit development and operation proved significant as race
served as a major factor in most planning decisions.333
With construction drawing near, MARTA official continued to solidify designs and
final contracts. The selection of the architectural design for the aerial structure to be
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used along some 16 miles of the rapid rail system proved important. Each of the four
lines of the planned rail system included aerial structures. The selected designed
featured a “clear line” look to give the entire structure a minimum profile. In areas where
needed, concrete panels were to be attached to reduce train noise. With the selection of
the aerial design came the selection of firms for the trackwork. In particular, MARTA
selected the familiar DeLeuw, Cather and Company, a Chicago-based engineering and
architectural firm with a branch operation in Atlanta, for trackwork design on the East
Line. As the nineteenth firm selected by MARTA, DeLeuw, Cather and Company would
be responsible for the approximately seven-mile section between the Georgia State
University Station and the Avondale Station. This portion of the East Line would be the
first section of the system to be opened. The firms selected by MARTA consisted of
architectural and engineering professionals joining forces to execute specific functions
on the MARTA system. By January 1975, 69 firms actively engaged in designing 22
portions of the system. 45 of the firms represented Georgia: 43 from Atlanta, and one
each from Albany and Macon. Of the 69 firms, 10 were minority owned. Other areas of
responsibility for selected firms included: (1) North Line: Civic Center Station and
subway between Alexander Street and Baltimore Place, (2) North Line: Cain Street
Station and subway between Marietta Street and Alexander Street, and (3) South Line:
bridge over I-20 and aerial rail between the intersection of Whitehall Street and
Memorial Drive, and Eugenia Street. MARTA continued finalizing plans as the
construction groundbreaking drew near.334
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In the final weeks preceding the construction of the rapid rail lines, MARTA
continued in preparation for the momentous task ahead. In January 1975, in the largest
single real estate transaction in its history, MARTA acquired key land for the Five Points
Station plus temporary air rights easements needed for construction from Forsyth Street
west to Spring Street. The Five Points Station, designed to be the central hub of the
MARTA rapid rail system, would handle 205,000 passengers daily by 1995. MARTA
directors considered this successful transaction essential to the planned schedule and
overall functionality of the rapid transit program. “We can now proceed in an orderly
fashion to our published goal of providing rapid rail transportation to the citizens of
Metropolitan Atlanta and Fulton and DeKalb Counties by 1978,” explained MARTA
General Manager Alan Kiepper. In another significant event, MARTA named William
Earl Callier as its first trainee in the two-year program designed to prepare minorities for
managerial positions in transit operations. The program involved trainees in all phases
of MARTA’s transit operations through assignments in each of the four divisions within
the Department of Transit Operations. As MARTA neared construction, it attempted to
hold true to the promises made to citizens whose support made rapid transit possible.335
In preliminary plans available on the eve of construction, MARTA provided
summary fact sheets to make clear the long-range goals and improvements to be
implemented with the completion of the rapid transit program at full scale. MARTA
explained:
The total rapid rail and rapid busway system will consist of 60.9 miles of
rapid rail and busway lines in Fulton and DeKalb Counties. The system
will utilize 39 rapid rail stations and 2 rapid busway stations and parking
will be provided for over 30,000 vehicles. The rapid rail and busway
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system will be coordinated with the surface bus operations that will be
operating on over 1,350 miles of arterial and expressway systems in the
two-county area. The rapid rail system will be completed and placed into
full revenue operation by 1980. The construction of the rapid rail system
will include 10.1 miles of subway with 13 stations, 16.3 miles of aerial with
stations, and 26.5 miles of at-grade construction with 19 stations.336
MARTA’s short-range goals included: expanded and improved bus routes, improved
communication and informational services, providing earlier and later service hours, and
placement of over 100 passenger waiting shelters. In gearing for construction, MARTA
also provided construction maps and graphic timelines in a project master schedule to
outline every step of the process.337

Conclusion
On Wednesday, February 19, 1975, MARTA broke ground on the East Line of
the rapid rail system before some 1,000 people in an hour-long ceremony. At the
intersection of DeKalb and Arizona Avenues, the ceremony included guests: Mayor
Maynard Jackson, Governor George Busbee; Frank C. Herringer, administrator of the
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, MARTA Board Chairman John E. Wright,
and MARTA’s General Manager Alan Kiepper. The historic occasion came some three
years and four months after residents of metropolitan Atlanta narrowly approved a one
percent sales tax to finance the purchase and improvement of the existing private bus
system and the construction of a rapid rail system. MARTA Chairman John E. Wright
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said the groundbreaking represented the introduction of a new and exciting construction
effort designed to improve transportation in the entire metropolitan region.338
With construction on the way and the first rapid rail service slated for late 1978
via the East Line, the tangible realization of the journey that began a decade prior
moved a step closer to being achieved. A decade of intense back and forth
negotiations between MARTA officials and the citizens of the region produced a more
responsive plan that ultimately gained the support necessary to be adopted. MARTA’s
development over the decade links directly with the changing political environment that
altered the face and dynamics of city leadership. No longer could decisions be made
that disregarded certain groups, especially the black majority. In that regards, black
participation in the development of MARTA illustrates what black leaders had argued
throughout the postwar period, that equal participation in planning would create a more
efficient transportation system that would be responsive to the needs of all citizens and
necessary for the city’s future.
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Figure 29: Rapid Transit System under Construction and Design Layout,
Atlanta History Center
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Figure 30: Rapid Transit System, 1975. Atlanta History Center
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AFTERWORD
Atlanta’s experience demonstrates physical and social change in the postwar
American city. Many factors and historical forces contributed to change, which triggered
patterns that institutionalized customs and traditions. In particular, segregation in Atlanta
and throughout the South, dictated virtually every aspect of life in the postwar period. It
created an environment that shut African Americans out of most processes, including
those pertaining to planning. Yet, with limited resources and participation, they were
able to help shape change. The desire for equality and full participation continuously
gained strength over the early 20th century and collided with segregation, creating
tension and hostility in the postwar period. History records an era marked by turmoil,
strife, and progress. In the aftermath of the postwar changes and planning, decisionmaking reflected a more concerted effort to include and meet the needs of all citizens,
regardless of race.
By the start of the postwar period, Atlanta already functioned as a regional hub of
commerce and a transportation center for the southeastern United States. The city
boasted the title “Gate City of the South,” the region’s leading metropolis. The city also
maintained a class of business elites and commercial leaders determined to transform
the city’s economic enterprises into large scale ventures with greater reach. These
boosters envisioned not just a regional gateway, but national and international
prominence as well. One of the keys to creating the modern city of Atlanta rested in
effective planning; particularly in the area in which the city owed its existence –
transportation. Since its founding over a century earlier, transportation continued to play
a central role in the growth and development of the city and the region. With the
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economic advances of WWII and increases in urban population, Atlanta, along with
cities across America scrambled to find solutions to cope with the increased demands of
city living through planning. However, planning, like other functions of civic policy, fell
victim to segregation. With African Americans forced into a category of second-class
citizenship, void of rights and representation, early postwar planning produced
blueprints of modern Atlanta without the participation of African Americans.
**********************
In response to the economic upsurges of World War II, leaders in Atlanta
embarked on a planning mission to accommodate the increased demands of city living.
From the onset of postwar planning with the Lochner Report in 1944, to the
groundbreaking for the construction of the MARTA rapid rail lines in 1975, this project
explores the contours of race and mobility through the lenses of transportation planning.
It examines the city’s planning entities and dissects the plans produced by these
authorities, underscoring the lack of African American participation in the planning
process. As planning authorities operated in segregation, this research connects the
lack of African American participation in transportation planning with limited participation
in planning for other areas including housing and urban renewal. This project’s
framework is constructed with a two-fold function of mobility: first, in the physical sense
of movement about the expanding metropolitan landscape; secondly, and more
essential, in the social sense, showcasing a process of uplift for the African American
community in Atlanta.
This research illustrates an upward trajectory for African Americans over the
three-decade timeline. From being denied equal access and full political rights in a
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segregated society, to the election of Georgia’s first black state senator of the 20th
century and Atlanta’s first black mayor, this research vocalizes the struggles of Atlanta’s
African American citizens in the fight for civil rights and full participation from the aspect
of transportation planning. Using the city’s historic black newspapers filled with primary
accounts of the period, this project tracks the discourse of the diverse African American
community from the leadership and business elite to the working-class citizens
participating in public hearings. From little to no participation in highway planning and
construction through historic African American sections in the early phases, to positions
of demand in the creation of the rapid transit system in the latter phases, this research
shows the evolution of African American participation and influence in shaping planning
processes in postwar Atlanta.
Though this project ends at the groundbreaking for the MARTA rapid rail lines in
1975, it can very well be extended to the present day. Since 1975, race, mobility, and
transportation planning have been constant themes of Atlanta history. They remain
ever-present topics in the dialogue of a diverse metropolis rapidly approaching the six
million-population mark. As the gateway to the South, Atlanta is a center of regional,
national, and international importance.
Much of Atlanta’s success can be attributed to effective planning and the
expansive transportation networks. Subsequent growth and development since 1975
has exceeded projections of the postwar period, compelling metropolitan planning to
continuously evolve to accommodate. Yet, gridlock traffic congestion, limited mass
transit, public rejection of transit measures, major inter-governmental disputes, and a list
of other transportation and planning issues still exist. In planning and policy-making
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around modern issues as gentrification, in-migration, sprawl, tourism, traffic congestion,
water management, municipal services, crisis management, healthcare, education,
historic preservation, mobility and access, citizen participation and consideration of all
individuals involved can make the process more viable and complete. I assert that the
lifeblood of a city is rooted in how it provides equal and fair accommodations that meet
the needs and desires of its entire people, without limits or restraints.
As cities across the nation and the world embrace urban and metropolitan
growth, all can take lessons from the pages of Atlanta history. Segregation created
more problems than it solved. It created a society of hostility and unequal distribution of
rights and privileges, stifling the mobility of African Americans. The consequences of
segregation resonated in every aspect of city living during the postwar period and
continue to play a role in race relations and social development in the modern age.
Successful planning requires unabridged citizen participation. It must be
comprehensive and cognizant of all individuals within its boundaries. Importantly, it must
be historically accurate, as well as accurate in projections and fair in implementation. In
the case of Atlanta, transportation birthed the city, nurtured the city, and continues to
provide sustenance. From rail to highway to mass transit to air, innovation in
transportation systems and transportation planning propels a city, fostering growth and
development. All in all, through the victories and failures of a tremendous investment in
transportation, Atlanta continues rising, invigorated by its past, present, and future.
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